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The Emergence of Modern First
Amendment Doctrine
INTRODUCTION

The emergence of modern first amendment doctrine in the
years immediately following World War I is one of the most familiar developments in American constitutional history. Several
postwar first amendment decisions by the United States Supreme
Court are among the best known of all American cases. 1 Indeed,
the opinions by Justices Holmes and Brandeis in these cases contributed heavily to their reputations as giants of their profession.
The articles and book on free speech written between 1918 and
1920 by Zechariah Chafee, Jr., are similarly regarded as classics in
the history of American legal scholarship.2 The focus on these
landmark decisions and scholarly classics, however, has diverted
attention from other significant information which requires a reevaluation of the crucial period from the American entry into
World War I through the Supreme Court's decision in Whitney v.
California.3
My suspicion that important gaps remained in understanding
the development of postwar first amendment doctrine arose as an
unexpected by-product of research into judicial and scholarly interpretations of the first amendment in the generation before
World War I, a subject previously neglected by most scholars.
This research revealed that prewar decisions, including several by
Justice Holmes, generally rejected free speech claims, often by refusing even to recognize or address them, and occasionally by relying on the possible "bad tendency" of the speech involved. The

'

See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250

U.S. 616 (1919); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
2 Z. CHAIEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920); Chafee, A Contemporary State Trial-The
United States Versus Jacob Abrams et al., 33 HARV. L. REv. 747 (1920) [hereinafter cited as
Chafee, Contemporary State Trial]; Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARv. L.
REv. 932 (1919) [hereinafter cited as Chafee, Harvard];Chafee, Freedom of Speech, 17 NEw
REPUBLIC 66 (1918) [hereinafter
s 274 U.S. 357 (1927).

cited as Chafee, New Republic].

4 Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514 (1981), reports the results of this research. The concluding section describes "the role of the prewar
tradition in the early development of modem first amendment doctrine," id. at 579-94, and
anticipates some of the conclusions of this article, which is the "separate article" promised
then, id. at 581 n.366. Because this article is essentially a sequel, I hope the reader will
excuse the repeated references to my earlier work.
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postwar opinions by Holmes in Schenck v. United States,5
Frohwerk v. United States,6 and Debs v. United States,7 and by a
majority of the Supreme Court from Abrams v. United States8
through Whitney v. California, extended this pervasive tradition
of judicial hostility to free speech. On the other hand, prewar
scholarly writing was remarkably protective and foreshadowed the
views of well-known postwar civil libertarians. 10
This forgotten and complex prewar history makes clear that
modern first amendment doctrine, contrary to prevailing assumptions,1" did not begin abruptly after Congress passed the Espionage
Act 1 2 in 1917. Developments during the immediate postwar years,
rather than spontaneously creating first amendment doctrine, rapidly transformed it. Significant new perspectives on this transformation emerge from an examination of materials that have been
largely overlooked, including the early writings of Holmes, the legislative history of the Espionage Act, the construction of this statute in the lower federal courts, Supreme Court briefs and undeservedly obscure opinions, and a variety of documents and
correspondence, much of which remains unpublished.
Chafee's writings, reinforced by the decisions of Holmes and
Brandeis and generally accepted for decades, maintain that
Holmes established a libertarian standard of first amendment adjudication when he used the phrase "clear and present danger" in
Schenck. According to this view, the Supreme Court majority in
Abrams replaced Holmes's libertarian approach with the restrictive "bad tendency" theory, thereby provoking Holmes and Brandeis to dissent in order to defend the "clear and present danger"
test against this majoritarian heresy. 5
Recent scholarship has produced a revisionist interpretation of
this crucial period of first amendment history. Most strikingly, the
revisionists have demonstrated that Justice Holmes moved from a

6 249

U.S. 47 (1919).
6 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
7 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
6 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
9 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
10 See Rabban, supra note 4, at 559-79.
11 Id. at 516-24.
12 Espionage Act, ch. 30, tit. I, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2388
(1976)).
's Z. CHAFEE, supra note 2, at 154-55, gives the classic statement of this position. Cf. id.
at 94-106. Throughout this article, I use the word "libertarian" to describe expansive or
protective interpretations of the free speech clause of the first amendment, This usage
should not be confused with the popular ideological meaning of the word.
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restrictive construction of the first amendment in his opinions for
a unanimous Court in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, decided in
March 1919, to a libertarian position in his dissent in Abrams the
following November. While successfully attacking the mythology
created by Chafee, Holmes, and Brandeis, the revisionists uncovered some of the doctrinal roots of the "clear and present danger"
test. They have also brought needed attention to the relatively libertarian construction of the first amendment during and after
World War I by Chafee, Ernst Freund, and Learned Hand, and
have speculated about the probable influence of these men on
Holmes's changing views between Schenck and Abrams.14

" Ragan, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., and the Clear
and Present Danger Test for Free Speech: The First Year, 1919, 58 J. AM. HIST. 24 (1971),
is a recent and comprehensive presentation of the revisionist interpretation. Ragan concentrates on Holmes's transition from a restrictive to a libertarian construction of the "clear
and present danger" test between Schenck and Abrams. He traces the origins of "clear and
present danger" in Holmes's earlier approach to criminal attempts, analyzes Schenck,
Frohwerk, and Debs, describes Chafee's more libertarian interpretation of the first amendment and of "clear and present danger," examines the criticisms of Holmes by Hand and
Freund, and concludes with a review of the majority and dissenting opinions in Abrams.
Although Ragan's article is a convincing account of the transformation of "clear and
present danger," and focused attention on this crucial topic, earlier scholars had anticipated
many of his conclusions. See, e.g., S. KoNEPSKY, THE LEGACY OF HOLMS AND BRANDEIS 181234 (1956) (observing restrictive original meaning of "clear and present danger," libertarian
innovations of the Abrams dissent, and further advances by Brandeis); A. MEIKLEJOHN,
FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT

50-89 (1948) (contrasting Holmes's

restrictive approach to free speech, including "clear and present danger," with later sensitivity by Brandeis to first amendment values); Corwin, Bowing Out "Clear and Present Danger," 27 NOTRE DAME LAW. 325 (1952) (pointing out continuity between Holmes's restrictive
prewar decisions and Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs; "clear and present danger," originally a
casual dictum in Schenck, became a constitutional standard only in later dissents by
Holmes and Brandeis); Wechsler, Symposium on Civil Liberties, 9 AM. L. SCH. REv. 881,
882-84 (1941), reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONsTrruTIoNAL LAW, 1938-1962, at 628-29
(Barrett, E., ed. 1963) (asserting that "clear and present danger," a formula with "little
positive content," was "seized upon" after Schenck by postwar civil libertarians to attack
limitations on freedom of speech).
Three important articles written shortly after Ragan, supra, discuss the development of
first amendment theory following World War I. In 1973, The University of Chicago Law
Review published a symposium entitled Ernst Freund and the First Amendment Tradition,
40 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1973). In addition to reprinting Freund's critique of Debs from a
1919 issue of The New Republic, Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, 19 NEw
REPUBLIC 13 (1919), reprinted in 40 U. CH. L. REV. 239 (1973), the symposium contains two
articles: Kalven, Professor Ernst Freund and Debs v. United States, 40 U. CH. L. REV. 235
(1973); Ginsburg, Afterword, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 243 (1973). Kalven, stressing the restrictiveness of the "rarely cited" and "shocking" Debs decision, observes that this decision "raises
serious question as to what the first amendment, and more especially, what the clear and
present danger formula can possibly have meant at the time." Kalven, supra, at 235, 236,
237. Kalven contrasts Debs with Freund's libertarian criticisms and with Hand's "sensitivity
to accommodating a tradition of political dissent" in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244
F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). Kalven, supra, at 238. Kalven questions
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Yet the revisionists' insights, because they overlook the prewar
tradition and subsequent developments, leave much unexplained.
Neglected sources allow a comprehensive reinterpretation of the
emergence of modern first amendment doctrine. They also provide
a broader perspective on more recent developments and on contemporary analysis of this fundamental constitutional guarantee.
The legislative history of the Espionage Act, contrary to the assertions of the postwar civil libertarians, supported the restrictive decisions of the lower federal courts. 15 The decisions by Justice
Holmes in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs derived from his most
fundamental philosophical and legal views, expressed earliest and
most thoroughly in his seminal book, The Common Law,16 and reflect Holmes's antilibertarian Social Darwinism, which he often
translated into external tests of legal liability such as "clear and
present danger." Holmes's first Espionage Act opinions were more
restrictive than many of the lower court decisions brought to his
attention by the defendants' briefs. His correspondence about

Chafee's account of the development of "clear and present danger," but agrees that Holmes,
dissenting in Abrams, "was moved to a burst of eloquence about free speech that was to
enrich and permanently to alter the constitutional tradition of the first amendment." Id.
Ginsburg briefly reviews the correspondence between Hand and Holmes as well as Holmes's
reaction to Freund's article. "It is both plausible and intriguing," Ginsburg concludes,
to think that the criticism of Debs in the Freund article and in Hand's correspondence
with Justice Holmes throughout the period between Debs and Abrams compelled
Holmes to recognize the dangers of Debs's casual approach and influenced his thinking
about the value of political speech, even in time of war.
Ginsburg, supra, at 247.
Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine:Some
Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 719 (1975), establishes and examines in great detail
the differences between Hand's objective incitement test for free speech, which focused on
the content of the speaker's language, and Holmes's more restrictive approach, which determined the legality of speech by its probable effects or "bad tendency." By analyzing judicial
decisions and private correspondence, Gunther makes clear that this doctrinal dispute between Hand and Holmes persisted beyond Holmes's dissent in Abrams, which itself represented a significant libertarian advance over Schenck. Gunther also points out that Chafee,
who so effectively promoted the "clear and present danger" test, had a "secret preference"
for Hand's analysis in Masses. Id. at 746. In an epilogue, Gunther traces "the belated vindication of Hand's Masses approach," particularly in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969). Gunther, supra, at 750-55.
Bogen, The Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes, 11 HOFSTRA L. Ray. 97
(1982), disagrees with all of these scholars. While conceding that there is "some truth" to
their "speculations about Holmes' development of free speech theory over the summer of
1919," he argues "that the different tone of the Abrams dissent is not evidence of a marked
change in Holmes' view of free speech, but is rather the product of Holmes' frustration at
what he considered the misreading by critics and the public of his position in Schenck." Id.
at 99; cf. id. at 163, 173-74. I do not find Bogen's article persuasive.
" See infra section IHI.
16 O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1938 ed.).

1983]

Emergence of First Amendment Doctrine

1211

these opinions confirms the continuing vitality of his early
17
positions.
Chafee was the key figure in the heroic but often disingenuous
effort by a few brilliant men to create a libertarian tradition out of
this restrictive past. He misrepresented hostile judicial precedents,
including the Espionage Act decisions written, by Holmes and
Brandeis. Chafee also derived an unfounded libertarian meaning
from the phrase "clear and present danger." 18 Although Holmes
had referred to the tendency of speech in affirming convictions in
Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, and had used the phrase "clear and
present danger" only in Schenck, Chafee maintained that Holmes
intended these words to make "the punishment of words for their
bad tendency impossible." 19 Through his misconstruction of "clear
and present danger," Chafee was able to reach the entirely erroneous conclusion that Justice Holmes in Schenck agreed with
Chafee's own libertarian views.
A variety of historical, intellectual, and personal factors soon
led Holmes and Brandeis to join in Chafee's fictions. Holmes's expression of libertarian values in Abrams reveals the extent to
which he had become more sensitive to first amendment concerns
in the eight months following his opinions for a unanimous Court
in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs. In writing this dissent, Holmes
faced a major problem. Shackled by the heavy weight of restrictive
precedents, including his own opinions in the first Espionage Act
cases, Holmes had to find legal doctrines to support the values he
expressed in Abrams for the first time.
Chafee's Freedom of Speech in War Time,20 published between the decisions in Schenck and Abrams, provided a brilliant
and convenient solution. The myth Chafee created about the original appearance of "clear and present danger" in Schenck allowed
Holmes in Abrams to reject the "bad tendency" theory without repudiating his own prior decisions that had relied so heavily on it.
"Clear and present danger," a concept that Holmes developed
from a theory of judicial deference to majority will, became,
through Chafee's mediation, a libertarian standard of constitutional adjudication in Abrams.

17

See infra section V.E.

IS See infra section VI.E.

Chafee, Harvard, supra note 2, at 967.
Chafee, Harvard,supra note 2. This issue of the HarvardLaw Review arrived at the
Library of Congress on August 19, 1919.
'o
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Holmes never became entirely converted to libertarian views. 1
It was Brandeis who made the major doctrinal advances in the
1920's. Despite having joined in the unanimous decisions in the
first wartime cases, including several neglected decisions involving
the selective draft law,22 and despite having written the opinion in
Sugarman v. United States, 23 the companion case to Schenck,
Brandeis later transformed the progressive ideology he had developed before the war into postwar justifications for free speech.24
It is a major irony of the first amendment tradition that both
Chafee, the most effective advocate of the "clear and present danger" test, and Brandeis, the Justice who did most to add substance
to this phrase, seem to have recognized its deficiencies. Instead of a
test dependent upon predicting the potential consequences of
speech, both seem to have preferred an approach analyzing the
meaning of the offending words themselves, the method suggested
by some of the prewar commentary on the first amendment and
employed by Learned Hand in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten.25
Yet Brandeis, Chafee, and other civil libertarians were not willing
to abandon what looked, especially after Abrams, like one of the
few hints of tolerance in the history of Supreme Court adjudication
of first amendment issues. They tried to make the most of a bleak
situation, in part by ignoring prior hostile decisions and in part by
"read[ing] . . . the dissenting Abrams eloquence .. . back into
'26
Schenck as though it had been there all the time.

The context in which the words "clear and present danger"
first appeared proved to be a continuing constraint on emerging
first amendment theory. Only in the late 1950's did the Supreme
Court begin to propose alternative approaches to evaluating freedom of expression, and not until its 1969 decision in Brandenburg
v. Ohio17 had the law "worked itself pure."2 8 Perhaps civil libertari-

ans after World War I made an understandable strategic error in
promoting "clear and present danger" as the verbal device with
which to incorporate their recently discovered libertarian values
into the Constitution. It might have been wiser for them to have
22 See infra section VILD.

22Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918); Kramer v. United States, 245 U.S.
478 (1918); Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918).
.3 249 U.S. 182 (1919).
2, See infra section VIII.

244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917); see'supra note 14.
supra note 14, at 238.
2- 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
28 Kalven, supra note 14, at 236 n.6.
25

26 Kalven,
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followed their best instincts and, like Learned Hand, to have attempted a clean break with a hostile judicial tradition, even if that
risked challenging the country's leading jurist and entailed passing
up an opportunity to reform the existing tradition from within.
I.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The modern civil liberties movement emerged between the
congressional debates on the Espionage bill in early 1917 and the
Abrams decision in November 1919. Some activity, however, predates this period. In particular, the Free Speech League, a small
and informal organization based in New York City, made significant contributions between its founding in 1902 and the beginning
of World War I to supporting and publicizing free-speech litigation
and values. Members of the League were virtually alone in identifying and defending the principle of freedom of expression in a
wide variety of settings-from censorship of information about sex
to the "free speech fights" of the Industrial Workers of the World
(I.W.W.). Its efforts, which foreshadowed in many respects the
later and more effective work of the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), have never been adequately understood or
appreciated.29
In the years before World War I, the people later associated
with the origins of the modern first amendment tradition were essentially oblivious, and occasionally even hostile, to free speech activities and values. Roger Baldwin and other founders of the
ACLU, Learned Hand, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., and Louis D. Brandeis, all lived in a world far removed from the concerns and interests of the iconoclasts in the
Free Speech League, and even more distant from the workers and
radicals who most often suffered repression. 0 These postwar civil
libertarians, most of whom enjoyed positions of privilege and
power, generally had little personal sympathy for, or professional
interest in, the radical activity that provoked so many of the free
speech cases before the war. Most were in the mainstream of the
progressive movement, whose vision of a harmonious society based
on scientific principles left little room for dissent. Freedom of expression, to the extent that it was an issue for the progressives at
all, was a peripheral one. They saw social problems as symptoms of
"See Rabban, supra note 4, at 520-21 n.19. The article on the Free Speech League
promised in that footnote is still "forthcoming."
3' See D. JOHNSON, THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN FREEDOMs 194-98 (1963).
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a sick society and believed that their scientific program of reform
would eliminate the underlying causes. And even within the range
of problems they recognized, abuses of economic power loomed
much larger to most of them than threats to civil liberties. The
progressives concentrated on eradicating the barriers to the utopia
they confidently sought. They felt no reason to anticipate dissent
in paradise. In an efficient society, as in an efficient machine, friction would no longer be a difficulty. 1
World War I and its aftermath shattered the illusions of the
progressives and millions of other Americans. Many progressives
became "tired radicals,"32 but some responded by devoting increased attention to the defense of civil liberties. The transformation of consciousness that created the postwar civil liberties movement did not occur at the same time or in the same manner for all
its future leaders. Some of them opposed the war, and threats to
the free speech of pacifists and conscientious objectors alerted
them to first amendment problems relatively early. Significantly,
the ACLU developed from a Civil Liberties Bureau within the
31 R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920, at 154-56, 161, 170 (1967), contains a
particularly good discussion of the progressives' analogy between a harmonious society and

an efficient machine. Thomas, Nationalizing the Republic, 1890-1920, in B. BAILYN, D. DAvis, D. DONALD, J. THOMAS, R. WIEBE & G. WOOD, THE GREAT REPUBLIC 898-99 (1977), effec-

tively reiterates this theme.
P. MURPHY, THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH 18 (1972), points out that for most
progressives "freedom of expression did not rank high in the hierarchy of values." According
to Murphy, their own free speech was not threatened. Moreover, they believed that individual freedom would be insured by remedying "serious defects in society" through their program of "social control." Id. D. KENNEDY, OVER HERE 47 (1980), stressing the progressives'
concern "for commonality of mind as the indispensable prerequisite for a stable community," identifies their "hopeful premise that men and women in the mass were rational beings, uniformly responsive to reasoned argument and incapable of serious disagreement in
the face of scientifically demonstrated facts." Id.
Wiebe and Thomas convincingly maintain that the repression of civil liberties during
and after World War I was a natural outgrowth of the progressive movement. Wiebe considers the "fevers of war" part of the more general effort "to discipline American society," R.
WIEBE, supra, at 287, and create "a tight national cohesion," id. at 288. Thomas is more
explicit: "The war hysteria fed a progressive appetite for national unity that had gone unchecked by a tradition of civil liberties. The absence of a libertarian concern with protecting
basic freedoms, the central weakness in the progressive program, made a domestic war on
liberalism all but inevitable." Thomas, supra, at 1024.
31 W. WEm, TIRED RADICALS AND OTHER PAPERS (1921), captured the reaction of a generation of progressives to the war. The title as well as the concluding pages of an excellent
cultural history of the years from 1912 to 1917 underscore the emotional impact of World
War I.H. MAY, THE END OF AMERICAN INNOCENCE 393-98 (1964 ed.). See generally C.
FORCEY, THE CROSSROADS OF LIBERALISM 291-99 (1961); D. KENNEDY, supra note 31, at 8992; W. LEUCHTENBURG, THE PERILS OF PROSPERITY, 1914-32, at 120-57 (1958); Mowry, The
First World War and American Democracy, in WAR AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION 170, 172-73 (J.
Clarkson & T. Cochran eds. 1941).
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American Union Against Militarism, an organization founded in
1916 by prominent social workers to campaign against President
Wilson's drive for military preparedness and to advocate a mediated settlement of the war. Most of the founders of the ACLU,
including Roger Baldwin, were pacifists and conscientious objectors before they became civil libertarians. s
During the war, the public tended to vilify indiscriminately all
dissenters, from socialists and members of the I.W.W. to Christian
pacifists."' As a result, these previously separate groups, as well as
supporters of the war who became shocked at the extent of private
and official oppression, began to recognize their common interest
in civil liberties. 5 The repression during this period was probably
no worse in degree than that suffered by many radicals before the
war-for example, by the I.W.W. during the 1912 San Diego Free
Speech Fight 30-but it was more widespread. Instead of a temporary and localized outbreak against supposedly dangerous radicals,
there was sustained, nationwide repression of even the mildest and
most respectable dissenters. The repression became harder for
many to ignore, particularly because it struck closer to home.
Roger Baldwin, a wealthy Harvard graduate and an eminent reformer who in 1915 had been designated one of the ten most influential citizens of St. Louis, was jailed as a conscientious objector in
1918. His conviction disturbed many influential people in a way
the prior imprisonments of anarchists and workers had not. 7
For the most part, however, the modern civil liberties movement emerged after the war. Except for people like Chafee, whose
teaching responsibilities prompted him to think about free speech
issues, and Hand, who had to decide the Masses case the month
after Congress passed the Espionage Act, most supporters of the
war who became civil libertarians did not do so until after the Ar-

" See, e.g., D. JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 1-25,
36; C.

197; D. KENNEDY supra note 31, at 33-

MARCHAND, THE AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENT AND SOCIAL REFORM,

1898-1918, at 240-

61 (1972); Baldwin, Recollections of a Life in Civil Liberties-I, 2 Crv. Lm. REv., Spring
1975, at 39, 51-55 (autobiographical account). See generally P. MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND
THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 153-73 (1979).
3 See, e.g., H. MAY, supra note 32, at 387; P. MURPHY, supra note 31, at 22; R. MURRAY, RED SCARE 166-67 (1964 ed.); Thomas, supra note 31, at 1027. See generally D. KENNEDY, supra note 31, at 66-83; R. WIESE, supra note 31, at 287-90.
35 See D. JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 196-97; P. MURPHY, supra note 33, at 36.
3' See, e.g., M. DUBOFSKY, WE SHALL BE ALL 189-96 (1969); 4 P. FONER, HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 194-205 (1965).
s7 See P. MURPHY, supra note 33, at 161. Baldwin, supra note 33, at 62-65, relates this

incident. The entire article provides a vivid description of Baldwin's background and his
early years as a civil libertarian.
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mistice. They were often too involved in the war effort to focus on
the domestic abuse of power. The failure of the Versailles Peace
Conference "to make the world safe for democracy," along with the
extensive violations of the right to free speech and other civil liberties during the "Red Scare" of 1919, led many to reevaluate the
views they had held during the war. A large number discovered
that they now shared positions for which opponents of the war had
been persecuted and prosecuted."
Others, who did not change their opinions about the war itself,
were nevertheless outraged by the repression that followed. For
some, the defense of free speech became an active, and often a primary, concern. Several worked hard to protect the rights of the
same radicals whose suppression before the war they had largely
ignored.3 9 In January 1920, Roger Baldwin was finally able to overcome the taint of the pacifist origins of the Civil Liberties Bureau
and convince a significant number of previously reluctant prowar
liberals to join him in establishing the ACLU. 40 The emergence of
modern first amendment doctrine reflected these historical developments in the language of the law.

38 The circle of people associated with The New Republic, which included many of the
intellectual leaders of the progressive movement, dramatically illustrates this transformation. See C. FORCEY, supra note 32, at 221-315; C. LASCH, THE NEW RADICALISM IN AMERICA
181-224 (1965); Noble, The New Republic and the Idea of Progress,38 Miss. VALLEY HIsT.
REV. 387 (1951).

The shift in John Dewey's views is typical. In opposing "the conscription of thought" in
September 1917, Dewey focused on its inefficiency in promoting "social solidarity." He was
"not ... specially concerned" that "liberty of thought and speech" would "seriously suffer
...

in any lasting way." Dewey, Conscription of Thought, 12 NEW REPUBLIC 129 (Sept. 1,

1917), reprintedin 2 J. DEWEY,

CHARACTERS AND EVENTS

566-70 (1929). Dewey seemed more

concerned with the social cost of the victims' resentment than with their rights. Just two
months later, however, Dewey recanted. Observing the increase in "bigotry" during the war,
Dewey admitted that his earlier article now seemed "strangely remote and pallid." Dewey,
In Explanationof Our Lapse, 13 NEW REPUBLIC 17 (Nov. 3, 1917), reprintedin 2 J. DEWEY,
supra, at 571. Dewey's articles in The New Republic are discussed in C. LASCH, supra, at
204-05 and in M. WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA 167-68 (1976 ed.).
39 Several autobiographies by and biographies about postwar civil libertarians indicate
the impact of the war on the development of their libertarian views. See, e.g., W. NELLES, A
LIBERAL IN WARTIME: THE EDUCATION OF ALBERT DESILER 14, 19, 36, 60, 93, 96 (1940); 0.
VILLARD, FIGHTING YEARS 461 (1939); M. WRESZIN, OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD 75 (1965);
Baldwin, supra note 33, at 40, 42-43, 52-53, 59, 67; Chafee, Thirty-Five Years with Freedom
of Speech, 1 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 1-3 (1952); Lash, A Brahmin of the Law: A Biographical
Essay, in FROM THE DIARIES OF FELiX FRANKFURTER 3, 15, 31 (J. Lash ed. 1975); see also C.
FORCEY, supra note 32, at 125, 178, 183, 210, 314; C. MARCHAND, supra note 33, at 385; L.
WHIPPLE, THE STORY OF CiviL LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES V (1927).
40 See D. JOHNSON, supra note 30, at 147.
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THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT

As the likelihood of American participation in World War I
increased, lawyers in the Department of Justice became concerned
that existing federal laws would be insufficient "to regulate the
conduct of the individual during war time."41 These lawyers
wanted to repress "political agitation .

.

. of a character directly

affecting the safety of the state," particularly "disloyal propaganda" threatening the formation and maintenance of the armed
forces. 2 They assumed that the provisions of the existing Federal
Penal Code would be of only limited use. 43 The eminent legal
scholar Charles Warren, who was an assistant attorney general
during this period, maintained that speech "[a]dvising, inciting
and persuading others to give aid and comfort to the enemy"
might itself constitute treason.44 Yet the Department concluded
that the strict constitutional provision defining treason and its
proof, as well as the absence of any convictions under a federal
treason statute over one hundred years old, made the law of treason a fragile instrument "for suppressing or punishing disloyal and
41

O'Brian, Civil Liberty in War Time, 42 REP. N.Y. ST. BAR ASS'N 275, 299 (1919); see

also id. at 277; Gregory, Suggestions of Attorney-General Gregory to Executive Committee

in Relation to the Department of Justice, 4 A.B.A. J. 305, 305-06 (1918); O'Brian, supra, at
277.
41O'Brian,
supra note 41, at 277, 300.
11 1918 ATT'y GEN. ANN. REP. 16-17, 45 (citing §§ 6, 37, and 332); letter from Charles
Warren to F.A. O'Connor (May 15, 1916) (National Archives File RG 60, 9-4-25) (citing §§
4, 6, and 211). Section 4 prohibited inciting rebellion or insurrection against the United
States or its laws. Section 6 prohibited "seditious conspiracy." Section 37 prohibited conspiracies "to commit any offense against the United States." Section 211 declared "obscene"
and other "indecent" material "nonmailable," and was amended in 1911 to state that "indecent" material included "matter of a character tending to incite arson, murder, or assassination." Section 332 defined a principal as anyone who counsels or induces the violation of
federal law. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1088, 1089, 1096, 1129, 1152 (current
version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2383, 2384, 371, 1461, 2(a) (1976)) (codifying, revising, and amending
the penal laws of the United States); Act of March 4, 1911, ch. 241, § 2, 36 Stat. 1327, 1339
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976)) (amending § 211 of Act of March 4, 1909, ch.
321).
41 Warren, What Is Giving Aid and Comfort to the Enemy?, 27 YALE L.J. 331, 340-43
(1918); memorandum for the Attorney General by Mr. Warren (Jan. 16, 1918) (National
Archives File RG 60, 9-12-86) (calling attention to newspaper report of judicial decision
sustaining Warren's view "that printed publications, under certain conditions, might constitute treason"). Unfortunately, I have not been able to locate Warren's original memorandum. I assume its reasoning is reflected in his subsequent article.
While Congress was considering the Espionage bill, Warren wrote a congressman that
no current statute "provides penalties for treasonable utterances or writings," but that the
proposed legislation would cover them. Letter from Charles Warren to Hon. Harold Knutson (April 25, 1917) (National Archives File RG 60, 9-4-110). Warren probably did not want
his speculative theory of treason to jeopardize the Espionage bill, which promised firmer
grounds for punishing speech.
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Convinced that new federal legisla-

tion was needed, the Department drafted the Espionage bill and
47
submitted it to Congress. 6 Charles Warren was its chief author.
Congress debated the Espionage bill at length during April
and May of 1917; hundreds of pages of the Congressional Record
are devoted to its consideration. Much of the debate focused on
the history and meaning of the first amendment.48 Ironically, the
section of the bill that ultimately provided the basis for most of
the prosecutions hardly received any attention. 49 Discussion of
other proposed provisions, however, gives some indication of congressional views on free speech issues that would soon reach the
courts. These debates reveal, contrary to the confident but uninformed assertions of Learned Hand in Masses Publishing Co. v.
Patten,5 0 and Zechariah Chafee, Jr., in Freedom of Speech in War
Time, 51 that Congress intended the Espionage Act to encourage
the restrictive decisions that resulted.
A.

The Censorship Provision
A provision of the bill that would have allowed the President

to censor the press5

2

dominated congressional discussion and was

eventually eliminated by the conference committee.5 3 Several congressmen protested that the first amendment precludes prior restraints,54 and objected to delegating vast and unconfined "legislative" power over publications to the President and his
45

1918 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 41.

46

Id.

The Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary stated that Warren "drew
practically all" the statutes that became the Espionage Act. 2 Hearings on H.R. 291 Before
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1917) (statement of Rep.
Webb) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 291]. Attorney General Gregory also referred
to Warren's "active part in the framing of the Espionage Act." Letter from T.W.G. to Mr.
Warren (Dec. 12, 1917) (National Archives File RG 60, 189676).
48 See infra notes 54, 77-79 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917); see infra text accompanying
notes 164-71.
81 Chafee, Harvard, supra note 2; see infra text accompanying notes 507-17.
82 H.R. 291, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(c) (1917). A similar provision was included in S. 2,
65th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1917).
3 For discussions of the legislative history of this provision, see Carroll, Freedom of
Speech and of the Press in War Time: The Espionage Act, 17 MICH. L. REv. 621, 622-29,
636 (1919); Edgar & Schmidt, The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 929, 946-66 (1973). Both articles focus on the defeated "censorship" provision.
" See, e.g., 55 CONG. REc. 779, 2118-19 (1917) (statements of Sen. Borah), 2004-05
(statement of Sen. Ashurst).
4'

50
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subordinates." More particularly, they pointed out that the government officials most likely to enforce this provision would naturally be inclined to censor legitimate public criticism as unfair, seditious, and of benefit to an enemy. 56 Several congressmen also
suggested that the existing law of treason would be sufficient to
punish newspapers which published information aiding an enemy,
the danger that the "censorship" provision was designed to prevent. 57 A proviso precluding restrictions on "any discussion, comment, or criticism of the acts or policies of the Government and its
representatives, or the publication of the same" 58 did not allay
concern about the potential abuse of official discretion. 9 Nor did
an early conference report, which modified the original language of
the bill by specifically defining the categories of nonpublishable information and by allowing the President to permit publication of
otherwise illegal material deemed "not useful to the enemy."6 0 The
House instructed the conferees to strike the entire censorship provision,6 and Congress passed the Espionage Act without it.
B.

The Nonmailability Provision

Congressmen raised similar concerns while debating a provision that proposed to expand the authority of postmasters to declare objectionable publications "nonmailable." A law already on
the books, popularly known as the Comstock Act, allowed postmasters to exclude "obscene" and "indecent" publications; 2 the
initial version of the Espionage bill proposed to add to the nonmailable list publications of "treasonable or anarchistic character '6 3 or in violation of the bill's other provisions. 4 Congressmen
63See, e.g., id. at 1751 (statement of Rep. Chandler); see also id. at 784 (statement of
Sen. Brandegee), 1712 (statement of Rep. Dillon).
See, e.g., id. at 2119 (statement of Sen. Borah), 781-82 (statement of Sen. Lodge).
'7 See id. at 1766 (statement of Rep. Thomas); see also id. at 781 (statement of Sen.
Lodge), 2008 (statement of Sen. Walsh).
58 Both the Senate and House bills contained this proviso. Id. at 2109 (Senate bill),
1813 (House bill). The House Committee on the Judiciary acknowledged the "broad powers" given to the President, but stressed its confidence that he "will not abuse this authority." The Committee added that the proviso, although "hardly necessary," was included to
calm "the public and the newspaper fraternity." H.R. REP. No. 30, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 10
(1917).
" See, e.g., 55 CONG. REC. 1813 (1917) (statement of Rep. Chandler).
'o H.R. REP. No. 65, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1917) [hereinafter cited as REPORT No. 65];
see id. at 19 ("statement of the managers" on modification of § 4).
*zH.R. REP. No. 69, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1917).
"Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 258, § 2, 17 Stat. 598, 599 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
1461 (1976)).
13 H.R. REP. No. 30, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1917).

1220

The University of Chicago Law Review

[50:1205

protested that these provisions would confer unprecedented and
65
unreviewable "autocratic power" upon the Postmaster General
and could be used to ban "perfectly inoffensive and harmless"
publications"' on virtually any subject of "political, social, and industrial life."'67 Many stressed that the prohibition against "an-

archistic" publications, which was inserted after the Post Office
Department sent the members of the House Committee on the Judiciary some "horrible" samples, 8 would be especially subject to
administrative abuse because it could be interpreted so broadly.6
But the term "treasonable" also caused concern. "A whole lot of
people here and elsewhere," warned one representative, "seem to
think that if a man does not agree
with you he is a traitor and is
7' 0
guilty of treasonable utterances.

Remarkably, even vociferous opponents of the nonmailability
provision conceded throughout the lengthy congressional debates
that a variety of publications should not be circulated. They
agreed, for example, that it would be desirable to exclude from the
mails socialist publications advocating opposition to the war and
mass resistance to the draft. But they believed that no statute
could be so limited. Any nonmailability provision, they feared,
would allow postmasters to exclude "legitimate" publications as
well, thereby producing "a
far greater evil than the evil which is
1
sought to be prevented."'

H.R. 291, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1101, 55 CONG. REc. 1820 (1917).

55 CONG. REC. 1836 (1917) (statement of Rep. Stafford).
Id. at 3138 (statement of Rep. Crosser).
11 Id. at 1871 (statement of Sen. Cummins).
Id. at 1595, 1821 (statement of Rep. Webb).
"See, e.g., id. at 1820-24.
70 Id. at 1822 (statement of Rep. Mann). Senator Hardwick tried to meet some of the
objections to this provision by suggesting the deletion of any reference to the "character" of
words. "Something that would not be accounted treason," he reasoned, could plausibly be
considered "of a treasonable character." He therefore proposed an amendment replacing the
original language with a prohibition against mailing publications "advocating or urging treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to any law of the United States." Id. at 2056. The
conferees accepted this amendment after the Senate passed it, REPORT No. 65, supra note
60, at 21, and Hardwick's language became part of the Espionage Act. Espionage Act, ch. 30,
tit. XII, § 2, 40 Stat. 217, 230 (1917) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1717(a) (1976)). As a
response to congressional concerns about unreasonable searches, the final act also restricted
access1 to unopened mail. Id; see, e.g., 55 CONG. RaC. 2067-71 (1917).
7 E.g., 55 CONG. REc. 2062 (1917) (statement of Sen. Thomas). Senator Borah made
this point concretely. He shared Senator Overman's hostility to a publication that called
every national flag a symbol of bondage and oppression, and characterized a recruitment
inscription as a device to obtain "food for the cannon." But he countered this example with
"another from the opposite extreme," pointing out that a New York official had censored
the fourth verse of "The Star-Spangled Banner" because it might offend England, an ally
during the war. Id. at 1869. Borah complained that the proposed statute would not force
"
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It is conceivable that some congressmen withheld reservations
about suppressing various antiwar publications in order to oppose
the nonmailability provision on grounds that would be more appealing to the majority of their colleagues. But many critics of this
provision made clear their view that such publications should not
be protected by law. These critics simply suggested that expanding
the traditional list of nonmailable publications was a dangerous,
unnecessary, and disingenuous method. They claimed that the bill
was too limited as well as too broad: it threatened legitimate publications without reaching truly objectionable speech that did not
circulate through the mails. As in the debates over the censorship
provision, 7 several critics suggested that socialist and I.W.W. antiwar propaganda, whether written or spoken, should be punished as
treason.7 3 And if the law of treason proved inadequate, one con-

gressman reasoned, it would be better to let "these scurrilous Industrial Workers of the World . . . go scot free and continue to

libel, slander, and strike at this Government" than to "harrass [sic]
well-meaning and upright newspapers."74
Opposition to the nonmailability provision, therefore, did not
constitute resistance to the suppression of radical speech. Yet even
these limited objections failed to convince a majority of Congress.
The Senate easily defeated two motions to strike this section, 5 and
neither house limited the discretion of the Post Office
Department. 6
C. The Contrasting Votes on the Censorship and Nonmailability
Provisions
Why did Congress, despite several similar objections to both
provisions, grant broad censorship authority to the Post Office Department while denying it to the President of the United States?
To a certain extent this anomaly can be attributed to legal and
historical factors. Although the exclusion of publications from the
mail could effectively prevent circulation, it did not constitute an
actual prior restraint. The censorship. provision, by contrast, expressly prohibited publication. This distinction may have more forpostmasters to distinguish between these very different publications. Id.; see id. at 2062
(statement of Sen. Borah).
71 See supra text accompanying note 57.
73 See, e.g., 55 CONG. REc. 1603-04 (1917) (statement of Rep. Johnson).
74 Id.

at 1758 (statement of Rep. Johnson).

Id. at 2072 (motion defeated 39-28), 2269-70 (motion defeated 52-29).
76 Espionage Act, ch. 30, tit. XII, 40 Stat. 217, 230 (1917) (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1717 (1976)).
75
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mal than practical significance, but the debates reveal that many
congressmen considered the Blackstonian prohibition against prior
restraints the cornerstone of first amendment protection.7 7 Moreover, as defenders of the nonmailability provision pointed out to
its critics, Congress had already given the Post Office Department
power to exclude obscene and other "indecent" matter from the
mail. 8 Several Supreme Court decisions had upheld this statute
against first amendment challenges.7 9 Extending the list of nonmailable publications could have seemed a much less threatening
departure than a law permitting censorship.
Yet these explanations, however convincing, do not fully
account for the contrasting votes. As the debates on the nonmailability provision indicate, a more pragmatic consideration motivated Congress. Although many were concerned about protecting
the free speech of most citizens and newspapers, almost all appeared willing, and often eager, to restrict and punish the more
extreme antiwar statements by radicals.80 The censorship provision
would have allowed the President to forbid the publication of information on matters relating to the military and to national defense."" The prohibition would have attached to the information,
not to the style or tone of its presentation. The President's discretion to determine what information would be "useful to the enemy" might have allowed some selectivity in enforcement,8 2 but
the focus on specified subjects endangered all publications. This
provision could have prevented a major daily newspaper from publishing a thorough factual report on the armed forces, but could
not have restrained a general socialist attack on the war as an imperialist adventure that workers should resist. The nonmailability
provision, by contrast, referred to the language of the publication
rather than to the information published. Despite the faults identi-

7" See supra note 54. The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Holmes, had
accepted Blackstone's views as the constitutional rule. Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney General, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907); see 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *150-51.
78 See, e.g., 55 CONG. REC. 1836 (1917) (statement of Rep. Mann), 2057 (statement of
Sen. Sterling).
79 See, e.g., In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 133-35 (1892); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727,
736-37 (1877). Rabban, supra note 4, at 526-29, discusses the briefs and decisions in these
and related cases. It is revealing that counsel in Rapier warned that the reasoning of decisions prohibiting lottery advertisements from the mail could be used by a governing party
"to silence the journals of its adversaries" by enacting a law that all utterances hostile to
"'public interest and morals' . . . should be excluded from the mails." Id. at 527.
80 See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
81 See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
82 See 55 CONG. REC. 2094-95 (1917) (statement of Sen. Husting).
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fled by its opponents, it was a more suitable tool to reach those
antiwar statements that had few defenders in Congress. Under this
provision, a heated socialist or I.W.W. publication could be interpreted as advocating treason or resistance to law even if it contained no sensitive facts about the military.
Representative London, a socialist from New York, observed
during the congressional debates that the censorship provision
posed "a menace to freedom of press, of the big paper," but that
the nonmailability provision "isa menace to all."8 He considered
the expansion of postal power "an attack on the liberties of the
little fellow, of the helpless man, of the defenseless man, and not
on the powerful newspapers. '84 According to London, the Post Office would not interfere with the big newspapers, which "owned the
country," had "plenty of champions here," and generally supported the President.8 Instead, he feared that postmasters, like
many speakers in Congress, would "attack certain utterances as
'88
treasonable which were nothing more than a protest against war.
London urged his colleagues who had spoken out so strongly
against the censorship provision as a violation of free speech to
oppose the nonmailability provision as well. 87 The daily newspapers may not have "owned" the country, and advocates of antiwar
views may have been in greater danger than simply any "little fellow," but London's observations were essentially correct. Indeed, it
is hard to avoid the conclusion that Congress rejected his advice
precisely because it agreed with his analysis. The evidence of the
debates suggests that the majority wanted to restrict antiwar
speech it considered dangerous, while protecting the major newspapers and other nonthreatening expression. It is unlikely that
Congress trusted the postmasters more than the President; the majority simply viewed the nonmailability provision as a better way
to enforce its judgment about the appropriate wartime boundary
between protected and unprotected speech.
D.

Title I, Section 3

Federal officials invoked the nonmailability provision in several prosecutions, most notably in Masses Publishing Co. v. Pat-

83

Id. at 1779.
at 1780.

84 Id.
!d.

"Id.
87

Id.
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ten,8s an early and particularly important case. The overwhelming
majority of Espionage Act cases, however, arose under title I, section 3. 89 Between 1917 and 1919, hundreds of jury instructions and
federal court decisions interpreted its language: 90
Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully
make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to
interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval
forces of the United States or to promote the success of its
enemies and whoever, when the United States is at war, shall
willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty,
mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of
the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or
enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the
service or of the United States, shall be punished by a fine of
not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than
twenty years, or both. 1
Almost every word defining these offenses turned out to have crucial significance in subsequent litigation, but just a few congressmen referred to this provision during the entire debate about the
Espionage bill.2
Senator Cummins made sustained criticisms of an earlier version of title I, section 3. He objected to the section in the Senate
bill that punished "[w]hoever, in time of war, shall, by any manner, spread or make reports or statements, or convey any information, with intent to cause disaffection in or to interfere with the
operations, or success of, the military or naval forces of the United
States .... ." He emphasized that he had no qualms about the
next clause of the provision, which punished false reports9 4 "calculated to cause such disaffection or interference." Nor did he oppose
criminal sanctions for true statements intended to interfere with
the success of the military forces.9 5 Cummins therefore proposed to
amend the bill only by striking out the words "cause disaffection in
- 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
See 1919 AT'rY GEN. ANN. REP. 22; 1918 ATT'y GEN. ANN. REP. 21, 47.
Many of these jury instructions and decisions are included in the Interpretation of

89

War Statutes Bulletins, published by the Department of Justice between 1917 and 1919.
See infra note 108.
91 Tit. I, § 3.
92 See H. PETERSON & G. Fris, OPPONENTS OF WAR 17 (1957); Carroll, supra note 53, at
641.
6" 54 CONo. RE C. 3606 (1917); the text of the earlier version is at 3494.
Cummins had already attempted to clarify this clause. Id. at 3494-95.
95 Id. at 3606.
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or to" and "operations, or.""8 He explained that the term "disaffection" could be invoked to punish exposure of military mismanagement and criticism of official policies and acts. And he stressed
that when no American "can make a truthful statement if he has
intent to interfere with what is going on in the military world, I
think that you are sapping the very lifeblood of a free people."9 8 In
response to a colleague's attempted reassurances about the meaning of intent,9 9 Cummins observed that the law of intent assumes
"that one means the thing which naturally flows from his act or
10 0
word.
The Senate defeated Cummins's amendent, 10 1 but the House

96 Id.
97 Id.
at 3606-07. Cummins observed that if this provision had been the law in England,
articles in The Times exposing English military blunders and a speech by Winston
Churchill advocating the withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe would have been criminal. Id. Cummins added that he himself could have been convicted under the "disaffection"
standard because he had recently criticized injustices inflicted on American troops sent to
the Mexican border. Id. at 3608.
11 Id. at 3607. Cummins made clear that he considered the second part of his amendment, eliminating the words "operation, or" even more important because "every attempt to
change a military situation must be construed as an interference with the military operations." Id. at 3608.
'9 Id. at 3606-07 (statement of Sen. Walsh).
100 Id. at 3608.
101 Id. at 3613. The only other congressional discussion of title I, § 3, grew out of the
report of the House Committee on the Judiciary. 1 Hearings on S. 8148 Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S.
8148]; Hearings on H.R. 291, supra note 47. This Committee had held public hearings on
the entire bill. The majority of speakers at these hearings were lawyers, professors, and
ministers appearing for themselves or on behalf of organizations such as the American Federation of Labor, the American Union Against Militarism, the Emergency Peace Foundation, the Free Speech League, and the Women's Peace Party of America. Jane Addams,
John Reed, and Norman Thomas were the most prominent participants. The sole reference
to these public hearings in the congressional debates was an inaccurate comment by one
Committee member that, with the exception of possibly three or four speakers, the only
people who criticized this section were representatives of hoboes and "of people who, to my
mind, are worse than anarchists, because they profess to be American citizens and seem to
boast of the fact that they do not care to be loyal to their Government." 55 CONG. REc. 1604
(1917) (statement of Rep. Walsh). In striking contrast to the comments during the congressional debates, these speakers focused their objections to the Espionage bill on title I, § 3.
Many echoed the concerns expressed by Senator Cummins. The American Union Against
Militarism, while stressing its lack of opposition to criminal sanctions for "the witting dissemination of false information," urged that the clause punishing intent to cause disaffection or interference with military operations be limited in application to enlisted men. The
Union feared "the indefinite extension of the law to the whole body of citizenry." 1 Hearings on S. 8148, supra, at 6 (statement of Mr. Norman Thomas). One of its representatives
even suggested the elimination of this clause, leaving punishment of "sedition among the
troops in the field" to military authorities, who had traditionally exercised this power. Hearings on H.R. 291, supra note 47, at 44 (statement of Mr. Charles T. Hallinan). And Gilbert
Roe, appearing on behalf of the Free Speech League, maintained that by restricting the
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Committee on the Judiciary, perhaps in reponse to the vigorous
criticisms of the term "intent" at the Committee's public hearings, 102 subsequently deleted the word "disaffection" from a later
version of the Espionage bill. The Committee substituted the
phrase "insubordination, disloyalty, or refusal of duty" for "disaffection" in the clause punishing whoever "shall willfully cause or
attempt to cause disaffection in the military or naval forces."
Chairman Webb explained that "disaffection" was overly "broad,"
"elastic," and "indefinite," and "might ofttimes subject a perfectly
innocent person to punishment."1 0 The new wording was intended
offenses of this section to false reports and interference with the success of the armed forces,
the legitimate purposes of the Espionage Act could be met without jeopardizing free speech.
Id. at 63; see also id. at 10-11 (statement of Mrs. Horace A. Eaton), 39 (statement of Mr.
Gilbert E. Roe), 54 (statement of Mr. Arthur E. Holder), 71 (statement of Miss E.G. Balch);
1 Hearings on S. 8148, supra,at 17 (statement of Dr. Robert L. Hale). Indeed, Roe provided
the most trenchant and prescient of all criticisms of the Espionage bill by stressing the
dangers of the intent requirement in title I, § 3. Cummins had identified this problem in
passing, but Roe, drawing on his experience as a lawyer for the Free Speech League, brought
out its full implications. Roe observed, as had Cummins, that "you are presumed to intend
what are the necessary consequences of your act." The determination of intent, he added, is
a matter for the jury, and during a war "you are going to get a conviction any time any
United States district attorney asks for it." Hearings on H.R. 291, supra note 47, at 63.
A question from Chairman Webb allowed Roe to illustrate concretely the potential operation of presumptive intent. Webb asked whether a person could be convicted under this
clause for a speech made without any member of the military present, but printed in newspapers which ultimately reached the armed forces and caused disaffection. Hearings on H.R.
291, supra note 47, at 63. Roe replied affirmatively. He supported his response by referring
to Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915), a case in which Roe, as a voluntary service to the
Free Speech League, represented an editor convicted under a statute that penalized publications tending to "encourage or advocate disrespect for law." Roe reported that he "was
never more surprised" than when the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by
Justice Holmes, upheld that statute. The Fox precedent, Roe indicated, substantiated his
concerns about the Espionage bill. Hearings on H.R. 291, supra note 47, at 63; see Rabban
supra note 4, at 534-36 (discussing Roe's brief and Holmes's decision in Fox).
The members of the Committee did not make extensive comments during the hearings,
but several of them distinguished attempts to change the law from advice to resist existing
law. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 291, supra note 47, at 34-35 (statement of Rep. Caraway)
(distinguishing permissible "political agitation" from unlawful advice "to refuse to obey the
law"; provision would not prohibit "petitions for changes in laws, or expressing political
views with reference to what is wise or unwise"). They maintained that title I, § 3, would
and should punish opposition to enlistment. See, e.g., id. at 23 (statement of Rep. Summers)
(statement made opposite enlistment meeting, claiming that "a man who went to war now
was violating his duty," illegal under proposed provision). Questioning revealed that representatives had very different views on the line between permissible agitation and illegal opposition, prompting one of them to observe "that there is a distinct vagueness among the
members of the Committee as to how far this abridgement of speech is going" and to urge
more specific wording. Id. at 25 (statement of Rep. Eaton). Others suggested that opponents
of conscription should "be very careful as to how far you go" and should get advice from the
Attorney General or a district attorney. Id. at 23 (statements of Reps. Carlin and Dyer).
:0254 CONG. REc. 3609 (1917).
103 55 CONG. REC. 1594 (1917).
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to "get the dishonest fellow who deliberately undertakes to spread
disloyalty" while protecting the innocent mother who might create
disaffection in her soldier son by describing "sad conditions back
home." 10 In response to questioning, Chairman Webb maintained
that the new clause permitted factual reporting on conditions in
army camps as well as criticism of government policies and officials. He also assured a colleague that it would apply only to willfully false statements, and reiterated that the Committee had
"guarded" all true speech. 0 5 Yet, as Cummins had warned, striking one word did not remove the dangers to free expression envisioned by opponents of the bill.

III.

ESPIONAGE ACT LITIGATION IN THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS

Government attorneys soon began to prosecute antiwar
speech. At first, they used various provisions of the Federal Penal
Code to reach agitation that seemed to advocate disobedience to
the Selective Draft Law, passed by Congress a month before the
Espionage Act. 0 6 Most of these prosecutions resulted in convictions. 0 7 As one federal judge bluntly pointed out, the Selective
Draft Law created a different situation; speech that previously
would have been considered "merely. . . general discussion" could
now be viewed as "inducing persons to violate the law."' 0 8 The
government also instituted several prosecutions of antiwar speech
under the treason statute, despite reservations about its utility. 0 9
An early decision substantiated these doubts by holding that

:04

Id. at 1594-95.

0o5Id. at 1595. Congress also reduced the original fines and prison terms, id. at 793, and
added the final clause of § 3. Id. at 871 (suggestion of Sen. Lodge); REPORT No. 65, supra
note 60, at 19; see also 55 CONG. REc. 3137 (1917) (short interchange contrasting § 3 with
the censorship provision).
108 Selective

Draft Act of 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76; see 1918 Arr'Y

GEN. ANN.

REP. 45-46;

supra note 43 and accompanying text.
107 1918 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 46-47; 1917 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 74; see, e.g., Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918); Kramer v. United States, 245 U.S. 478 (1918);

Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918); Fraina v. United States, 255 F. 28 (2d Cir.
1918); Firth v. United States, 253 F. 36 (4th Cir. 1918); United States v. Stilson, 254 F. 120

(E.D. Pa. 1918), aff'd, 250 U.S. 583 (1919); United States v. Pierce, 245 F. 878 (N.D.N.Y.
1917). But see United States v. Baker, 247 F. 124 (D. Md. 1917) (directed verdict of not
guilty).
108 United States v. Phillips 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 14). The
Justice Department's Interpretationof War Statutes Bulletins are pamphlets containing
opinions, rulings, and jury instructions by federal judges in response to prosecutions, during

World War I, under the various war statutes. All the bulletins cited here contain jury instructions, and are on file at the Library of Congress.
100 1918 ATT'y GEN. ANN. REP. 41-42.
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"mere words, no matter how vilely disloyal . . . , if accompanied
by no other overt act than their utterance or publication, cannot
be made the basis of a charge of treason." 11 0 This loss limited the
future use of the law of treason,"1 but it did not deter continued
repression of antiwar speech. The Espionage Act replaced the Penal Code and the treason statute as a more effective method of
suppressing unwanted "propaganda""' 2 and of dealing with "disturbing malcontents. 1" 3 The government even managed to prosecute successfully under the Espionage Act the same newspaper editor who had prevailed under the treason statute." 4 Of the
10

United States v. Werner, 247 F. 708, 710 (E.D. Pa. 1918). "Such seditious utter-

ances," the court promptly added, "are misdemeanors at common law, and, of course, properly made statutory offenses; but the point made is they are not treason." Id. The treason
clause provides in relevant part: "No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in Open Court." U.S.
CONST. art. 3, § 3, cl. 1.
In Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919), one of the first Espionage Act decisions by the Supreme Court, Justice Holmes rejected the defendants' suggestion "on the one
hand that some of the matters dealt with in the Act of 1917 were treasonable and punishable as treason or not at all, and on the other that the acts complained of not being treason
could not be punished. These suggestions seem to us to need no more than to be stated." Id.
at 210. As Hurst points out, Holmes disposed of the treason claim "with a curtness which
does not do justice to its merits." J. HuRsT, THE LAW OF TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES 161
(1971).
In Wimmer v. United States, 264 F. 11 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 494 (1920), the
Sixth Circuit explained in more detail why it reached the same conclusion as Holmes. According to the court,
it has never been doubted that Congress may punish, under the ordinary rules of prosecution and without trenching upon the constitutional limitation as to treason, acts
which are of a seditious nature and tend toward treason, but which are not of the direct
character and superdangerous degree which would meet the constitutional test and
make them treason; and even more must this be true of words.
Id. at 13.
Yet Hurst suggests, in a frustratingly inconclusive discussion, that the history and the
restrictive definition of the treason clause in the Constitution limit the punishment of
speech and cast doubt on the constitutionality of the Espionage Act. J. HURST, supra, at
126-66; see also Z. CHAFEE, supra note 2, at 201-03 (suggesting without concluding that the
treason clause precludes federal sedition law).
...See 1918 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 41. Attorney General Gregory interpreted Werner as
holding that "the treason statute could not be used against propaganda, however disloyal or
dangerous, except in the rare cases where there is available proof that the propagandist is an
agent of the enemy." Id. at 42.
112 Id. at 45. Chafee believed that the conspiracy statutes in the Federal Penal Code
would have been sufficient to punish utterances posing "any serious danger to the prosecution of the war." Z. CHAFEE, supra note 2, at 41.
113 1917 Ar'y GEN. ANN: REP. 75.
14 Compare Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920) (affirming conviction of
Louis Werner and others under Espionage Act) with United States v. Werner, 247 F. 708
(E.D. Pa. 1918) (overturning treason indictment of Louis Werner). The Department of Justice had urged the United States Attorney who tried and lost Werner to "keep watch on this
paper from day to day, carefully examining each issue and keeping a file of same, and bring
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approximately two thousand Espionage Act prosecutions,1 1 5 the
overwhelming majority were brought and won under title I, section
3.116

These Espionage Act cases in the lower federal courts extended the prewar tradition of hostility to free speech, often by the
familiar technique of relying on the alleged "bad tendency" of language. They also foreshadowed the construction of the Espionage
Act by the Supreme Court, including the unanimous opinions by
Justice Holmes in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs. The few protective opinions emphasized the restrictiveness of the typical decision.
Despite the mythology subsequently created by Chafee, these
lower court decisions make clear that Holmes's first Espionage Act
opinions, like his prewar decisions, were in the repressive mainstream, not the libertarian vanguard, of judicial interpretation of
free speech claims.
A.

Decisions Punishing Speech

Federal district judges generally let juries decide as a question
of fact whether a defendant's language violated the law. Whatever
the offending language, surrounding circumstances, or jury instructions, almost all prosecutions led to guilty verdicts. Some defendants appealed these verdicts, usually without success. Most circuit courts affirmed simply by relying on the general principle that
judges in criminal appeals should not overrule jury findings of fact.
Many jury instructions virtually precluded acquittals. One
prosecution under the Espionage Act when you believe that the accumulation distinctly
shows a pro-German or antiwar propaganda." Letter from John Lord O'Brian to Francis
Fisher Kane (April 9, 1918) (National Archives File No. 9-12-86-65).
Dissenting in Schaefer, Justice Brandeis observed that this prosecution reminded him
"of the days when men were hanged for constructive treason." 251 U.S. at 493. He quoted at
length from the jury charge, which distinguished the treason clause from the Espionage Act
in language strikingly similar to the Sixth Circuit's holding in Wimmer. Id. at 493-94 n.1;
see supra note 110 (discussing Wimmer). Brandeis surmised in horror that "the jury may
well have believed from the charge that the Espionage Act had in effect restored the crime
of constructive treason." Id. at 493.
115

1919 ATT'Y

GEN. ANN.

REP.22.

, See 1918 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 47. Several works discuss some of these cases. See,
e.g., Z. CHAFER, supra note 2, at 56-66; P. MURPHY, supra note 33, at 198-211 (discussing the
few protective decisions); H. PETERSON & G. Frr, supra note 92, at 140-47, 152-56, 161-66,
170-78, 181-93; Carroll, supra note 53, at 640-60. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 2, at 388-94, contains an extremely useful appendix listing prosecutions and results in Espionage Act cases.
My reports of convictions in the text that follows are taken from this appendix. See also H.
PETERSON & G. FrrE, supra note 92, at 353-57 (table of wartime cases, mostly brought under
the Espionage Act); NATIONAL CwL LmEITEs BUREAU, WAR-TIME PROSECUTIONS AND MOB
VIOLENCE (1919) (pamphlet containing list of cases compiled from Bureau's correspondence
and press clippings).
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judge told the jury that the Espionage Act punished utterances
"which are unfriendly and disloyal to the government" or "are of
such a character as to bring the Government's efforts into disrepute or to retard them." Statements calculated to have a "disturbing influence" on men eligible for military service, he added,
would also violate the law.117 Another judge read the Espionage
Act as "prohibiting every man from in any manner attempting to
weaken. . . the forces which the Government has to rely upon in
this war" or from otherwise affecting the spirit of the people. The
defendant had been charged with interfering with the fundraising
efforts of the Red Cross and the YMCA, and the judge instructed
the jury that these organizations were among the "forces" that
depended upon a "proper spirit." 1 8 In an analogous case of a defendant who claimed that the capitalists' war would make Liberty
Bonds worthless, the judge informed the jury that the first amendment "can not be successfully invoked as a protection where the
honor and safety of the Nation is involved."11 9 Another defendant,
who had advised against enlisting until drafted because the United
States had entered the war on faulty premises, heard his jury instructed that they had a right to take into account the "feeling on
the part of the great majority of the American people that this war
must be won; that no other result would be tolerated. 1 20 In a similar prosecution against a man accused of falsely stating that the
war was designed to produce slavery to financial barons, the judge
required the jury to accept the congressional war resolution as reciting well-known historical facts and "as correctly stating the
causes" of American participation. 1 ' And some judges expressly
stated that convictions could be based on a defendant's opinion. 22
Most jury instructions, however, were much more objective.
The majority of federal district judges carefully reviewed the law
of intent. Based on the traditional principle that intent must be
inferred from external manifestations, they repeatedly announced
United States v. Taubert 4-5 (D.N.H. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 108).
118 United States v. Wallace 5 (S.D. Iowa 1917) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 4); see id.
at 9 (objection of counsel for defendant).
"9 United States v. Tanner 3 (D. Colo. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 56).
120United States v. Wolf 4 (D.S.C. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 81).
United States v. Harper 3 (W.D. La. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 76).
122 See, e.g., United States v. Binder 5 (E.D.N.Y. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin
126) (if opinions "were calculated to cause the effect prohibited . . . then defendant is
guilty"); United States v. Weinsberg 6-7 (E.D. Mo. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 123)
(statements expressing opinions and designed to cause "disloyalty and refusal of duty" prohibited); United States v. Frerichs 9 (D. Neb. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 85)
("mere prophesy, or predictions, may amount to an obstruction").
"'
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the basic rule that one is presumed to intend the natural and usual
consequences of his acts and that all relevant surrounding circumstances should be taken into account. 2 3 Like their counterparts
before the war, judges often made this point by telling juries 1to
24
weigh the "tendency" of language in determining its legality.
Many judges pointed out that the Espionage Act punished advocacy of insubordination and obstruction of recruitment, while they
stressed that all Americans remained free to express opinions on
the war. 25 Several specifically contrasted legal agitation for repeal
of law with illegal advocacy of resistance to law. 12 Beyond such
generalities, however, judges rarely refined these standards in ways'
that could help a jury determine if a particular defendant's speech
violated the Espionage Act.
Some convictions by juries so instructed are not surprising.
For example, a jury found a man guilty of attempting to cause insubordination because he told people subject to the draft that he
hoped Germany would win the war and that "the best thing they
22 See, e.g., United States v. Nearing 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin

192); United States v. Weist 4-5 (E.D. Mo. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 169); United
States v. Bunyard 9 (E.D. Mo. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 168); United States v.
Prieth 12 (D.N.J. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 156); United States v. Rhuberg 5 (D.
Or. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 94); United States v. Zittel 4 (W.D. Wash. 1918)
(Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 90); United States v. Henricksen 2 (D. Neb. 1918) (Interp. of
War Stat. Bulletin 86); United States v. Mackley 3 (D. Vt. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 83); United States v. Foster 3, 5-6 (W.D. Wash. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 78);
United States v. Ramp 6 (D. Or. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 66); United States v.
Huhn 5 (D. Wyo. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 58); United States v. Baltzer 8-9
(D.S.D. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 3); United States v. Doll 3 (D.S.D. 1917) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 5).
124 See, e.g., Unites States v. Bold 8-9 (D. Or. 1919) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 183);
United States v. Equi 23 (D. Or. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 172); United States v.
Wishek 5 (D.N.D. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 153); United States v. Fontana 6-7
(D.N.D. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 148); United States v. Pierce 35, 37 (N.D.N.Y.
1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 52); United States v. Doll 4 (D.S.D. 1917) (Interp. of
War Stat. Bulletin 5).
126 See, e.g., United States v. Nearing 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin
192); United States v. Albers 17 (D. Or. 1919) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 191) (interpreting language of 1918 amendment); United States v. Berger 8-9 (N.D. Ill. 1919) (Interp. of
War Stat. Bulletin 186); United States v. Bold 7-8 (D.Or. 1919) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 183) (interpreting language of 1918 amendment); United States v. Elmer 3 (E.D. Mo.
1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 171); United States v. Debs 12 (N.D. Ohio 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 155) (interpreting language of 1918 amendment).
126 See, e.g., United States v. Kornmann 12-13 (D.S.D. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 89); United States v. Pierce 19-20, 23-24 (N.D.N.Y. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin
52); United States v. Olivereau 6-7 (W.D. Wash. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 40); see
also United States v. Wells 7-8 (W.D. Wash. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 70) (prosecution under Penal Code); United States v. Isenhouer 15 (W.D. Okla. 1917) (Interp. of War
Stat. Bulletin 23) (prosecution under Penal Code).
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• . .could do when in battle would be to put up their hands and

let the Germans take them prisoners. '127 Another jury convicted
an I.W.W. speaker, indicted on similar charges, for advising conscripted men that they "better have a pick and shovel laboring for
the working men instead of carrying a gun for the capitalists."128
Yet similar instructions led to convictions for much more innocuous speech. As Gilbert Roe had warned the House Committee
on the Judiciary,1 29 juries instructed on the law of intent and tendency typically convicted defendants. Juries often construed as
"false statements" claims by defendants that the financial interests
of capitalists were responsible for American participation in the
war. 30 A jury found a minister guilty of an attempt to cause insubordination because he distributed a pamphlet teaching that Christians should not kill in wars.131 Another jury convicted twentyseven "German" farmers in South Dakota, who belonged to the Socialist Party, for conspiring"I to obstruct the recruitment service
because they petitioned the governor to change his decision exempting entire counties from the draft.13 3
Even instructions unusually sensitive to free speech generally
resulted in guilty verdicts. In United States v. Equi,34 jurors cautioned against being influenced by their personal feelings about the
I.W.W. nevertheless found an I.W.W. speaker guilty under the insubordination and obstruction clauses for stating in a public address that the I.W.W. was not fighting for the flag of any country,
but for "the red banner that stood for the blood of the industrial
workers."13 5 Juries also returned guilty verdicts after instructions
not to convict on the basis of idle gossip1 36 or speech
made "as a
'137
result of sudden anger and without deliberation.

Some judges, in jury instructions and circuit court affirmances
of guilty verdicts, gave closer attention than did most of their col1
28
12
"3

United States v. Rhuberg 2 (D. Or. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 94).
United States v. Ramp 2 (D. Or. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 66).
See supra note 101.
See, e.g., United States v. Kirchner 2 (N.D.W. Va. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulle-

tin 69); United States v. Pierce 2 (N.D.N.Y. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 52). See Z.
CHAFEE, supra note 2, at 388-394, for reports of convictions in these cases.
1 United States v. Waldron 304 (D. Vt. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 79).
122 Title I, § 4 of the Espionage Act punished conspiracies "to violate the provisions of
sections two or three of this title . . . ." Espionage Act, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (1917).
" United States v. Baltzer 1 (D.S.D. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 3).
234 United States v. Equi 4-5 (D. Or. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 172).
235 Id. at 4.
126 United States v. Zadeniack 7 (N.D. Ohio 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 143);
United States v.Miller 4 (D. Colo. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 104).
17 United States v. Krafft 4 (D.N.J. 1917) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 6).
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leagues to the specific language of title I, section 3. Several judges
concluded, consistently with the statutory language but contrary to
the assurances of Representative Webb during the congressional
debates," 8 that statements need not be false to violate the insubordination and obstruction clauses. 3 9 "A presentation of historic
facts," one judge emphasized, if "marshalled so as to extol and glorify Germany, and so as to hold up to criticism and reproach Great
Britain, with whom our soldiers were to fight and wage this war,
might accomplish the results forbidden by the law."' 4 0 Judges also
construed "obstruct" loosely.14 1 One acknowledged that the obstruction clause, unlike the insubordination clause, did not expressly punish attempts. Yet he concluded that the enlistment and
recruitment service could be obstructed without actually being
stopped. He therefore told the jury, using a phrase commonly
adopted in other instructions, "that obstruction in its broad sense
means to hinder, to impede, to embarrass, to retard, to check, to
slacken, to prevent, in whole or in part" and even "to render more
burdensome or difficult the enforcement and execution of the
law.' 42 In construing all three clauses of title I, section 3, moreover, judges repeatedly observed that the relationship between language and the statutory prohibitions need not be direct'43 and,
more specifically, that the offending speech need not be made in
the presence of soldiers. ' "Can a man who contaminates the
1-1 See supra text accompanying note 105.
139 See, e.g., Goldstein v. United States, 258 F. 908, 910 (9th Cir. 1919); United States v.
Equi 12 (D.Or. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 172); United States v. Wishek 5 (D.N.D.
1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 153); United States v. Binder 5 (E.D.N.Y. 1918) (Interp.
of War Stat. Bulletin 126).
04United States v. Wishek 5 (D.N.D. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 153). The
judge did concede that the truth of a statement is relevant to determining the intent of a
speaker. Id.
"I See, e.g., Deason v. United States, 254 F. 259, 261 (5th Cir. 1918); Doe v. United
States, 253 F. 903, 906 (8th Cir. 1918); O'Hare v. United States, 253 F. 538, 540 (8th Cir.
1918); United States v. Rhuberg 4 (D. Or. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 94); United
States v. Frerichs 4 (D. Neb. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 85); United States v. Wolf
5-6 (D.S.D. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 81); United States v. Hitt 6 (D. Colo. 1918)
(Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 53).
1" United States v. Hitt 6 (D. Colo. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 53). The decision by the Second Circuit in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 38 (1917), may
have been the original source for this phrase.
"4 See, e.g., United States v. Equi 11 (D. Or. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 172);
United States v. Stephens 7 (D. Del. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 116).
' See, e.g., Goldstein v. United States, 258 F. 908, 911 (9th Cir. 1919); Coldwell v.
United States, 256 F. 805, 809 (1st Cir. 1919); Kirchner v. United States, 255 F. 301, 302-04
(4th Cir. 1918) (citing for support many jury instructions from Interpretationsof War Statutes Bulletins); United States v. Weinsberg 7 (E.D. Mo. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin
123); United States v. Miller 4 (D. Colo. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 104).
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spring at its source," one judge asked, "avoid responsibility because the resulting damage occurs at the mouth of the stream?"1 4 5
And the Eighth Circuit held that an indictment under the Espionage Act need not allege the illegal effects of language. For a
purely statutory offense, it reasoned, "the
words of the statute con146
tain all the ingredients of the offense.'
Judges hearing Espionage Act cases, like their predecessors
faced with free speech claims before the war, rarely referred to the
first amendment. The few who cited it generally stressed that the
Constitution does not provide absolute protection for speech. They
listed the traditional exceptions for libel, slander, blasphemy, and
obscenity, and emphasized, as had the Supreme Court in a 1904
decision,1 7 that the government's right of "self-preservation" supersedes an individual's freedom of expression. 4 8 One judge, for
example, reasoned that the first amendment "carries with it no
right to subvert the purposes and destiny of the nation. ' 149 Judges
also observed that free speech is but one of many equally important rights protected by the Constitution.5 0 As a jury instruction
pointed out, the same Constitution that forbids Congress from
abridging free speech also grants it power to declare war and raise
armies. Neither provision, the judge asserted, could "destroy or
break down" the other. He concluded that the Espionage Act, by
punishing interference with the war effort without reaching "the
proper advocacy of principle within the limitations of the law," appropriately balanced these two constitutional provisions.' 5 ' Another judge bluntly stated that speech "which in ordinary times
might be clearly permissible, or even commendable, in this hour of
national emergency, effort, and peril, may be as clearly treasonable, and therefore properly subject to review and repression."' 52
He therefore upheld the seizure by the government of a film about

United States v. Nagler, 252 F. 217, 222 (W.D. Wis. 1918).
Doe v. United States, 253 F. 903, 904-05 (8th Cir. 1918).
" United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904), discussed in Rabban,
supra note 4, at 536.
j"

'"

148

Id. at 294.

148

United States v. Motion Picture Film "The Spirit of '76," 252 F. 946, 948 (S.D. Cal.

1917), aff'd sub nom. Gold stein v. United States, 258 F. 908 (9th Cir. 1919).
1"' United States v. Equi 20-21 (D. Or. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 172); United
States v. Stephens 3-4 (D. Del. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 116).
15'United States v. Stephens 21 (D. Del. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 172); see
also Doe v. United States, 253 F. 903, 906 (8th Cir. 1918) (stressing war power as constitutional justification for Espionage Act).
"1' United States v. Motion Picture Film "The Spirit of '76," 252 F. 946, 948 (S.D. Cal.
1917), aff'd sub nom. Goldstein v. United States, 258 F. 908 (9th Cir. 1919).
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the Revolutionary War because it portrayed "unspeakable atrocities committed by British soldiers,"1' 53 which might "tend . . . to
15 4
make us a little bit slack in our loyalty to Great Britain."
B.

Decisions Protecting Speech

A few decisions demonstrated that it was possible to construe
the Espionage Act in ways that protected antiwar speech. A handful of district judges withheld cases from juries, and an equally
small number of their colleagues on the circuit courts reversed convictions on appeal.
Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Masses Publishing Co. v.
1 5 5 decided the month after
Patten,
Congress passed the Espionage
Act, interpreted it in a way that would have precluded most subsequent convictions under its provisions. The New York Postmaster
precipitated the case by invoking the Espionage Act to declare The
Masses "nonmailable." According to the Postmaster, antiwar articles and cartoons in The Masses "tended to produce a violation" of
all three clauses of title I, section 3.151 Gilbert Roe represented the
editors who were threatened with the very dangers to free speech
that Roe himself had highlighted in his testimony before the
House Committee on the Judiciary.1 5
Hand granted the injunction Roe sought against the Postmaster. He treated the clauses of the Espionage Act in order, and began his opinion by reasoning that the "false statements" punished
by the first clause referred only to "the spreading of false rumors
which may embarrass the military." The government's application
of this clause to The Masses constituted an impermissible attempt
"to raise it into a means of suppressing intemperate and inflammatory public discussion, which was surely not its purpose." Hand
conceded as "unhappily true" that the contents of the magazine
might "enervate public feeling at home" and cause "mischievous
effects" on the war effort. But he insisted that these tendencies
153 Id. at

947.

I" Id. at 948.
255 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). Gunther, supra note 14, has
afforded Hand's decision the prominence it has long deserved. That article stresses, with
convincing support from Hand's correspondence with Holmes and Chafee, that Hand
viewed his objective incitement standard as a protective alternative to examining the "bad
tendency" or "probable consequences" of language, the approach used by most federal
judges, including Justice Holmes, to determine the legality of speech under the Espionage
Act.
1 244 F. at 536.
M See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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were beside the point in construing the falsity clause."' 8
Hand's discussion of the remainder of the Espionage Act made
clear that his objection to judging speech by its tendencies did not
depend on the limitation of the first clause to "false statements."
While conceding the Postmaster's position that "to arouse discontent and disaffection among the people with the prosecution of the
war and with the draft tends to promote a mutinous and insubordinate temper among the troops," Hand refused to find a violation of the insubordination clause. 15 9 He also granted that praise
of convicted opponents of the draft has "a tendency to arouse emulation in others."1 0 Yet such tendencies, he concluded, did not
constitute obstruction. Hand would declare language illegal under
these provisions only if it could "be thought directly to counsel or
advise insubordination"""' or, under the obstruction clause, to constitute "direct advocacy of resistance to the recruitment and enlist'' 2
ment service. 11
Hand acknowledged that "words are to be taken, not literally,
but according to their full import." He insisted, however, that "the
literal meaning is the starting point for interpretation. 16 3 Hand
reasoned that. words "which have no purport but to counsel the
violation of law" are themselves illegal. "Yet to assimilate agitation, legitimate as such, with direct incitement to violent resistance, is to disregard the tolerance of all methods of political agitation which in normal times is a safeguard of free government."
Hand feared that such an interpretation would render illegal all
political speech "apt to create a seditious temper," and he concluded that in passing the Espionage Act "Congress had no such
revolutionary purpose in view." ' Although Hand readily conceded
I8

244 F. at 539.

259Id.
10 Id. at 541.

Id. at 540-41.
"02 Id. at 541. At the conclusion of his opinion, Hand added a final objection to evaluat-

161

ing the legality of speech by its tendency. Such a test would make it difficult if not impossible for defendants to disprove the charges against them and would create an imprecision in
standards and a discretion in administration inconsistent with "the normal assumption that
law shall be embodied in general propositions capable of some measure of definition." "The
tradition of English-speaking freedom," Hand reasoned, "has depended in no small part
upon the merely procedural requirement that the state point with exactness to just that
conduct which violates the law." Id. at 543. Hand was sensitive to the problems of vagueness
emphasized before the war by Gilbert Roe and Theodore Schroeder of the Free Speech
League. See Rabban, supra note 4, at 534-35, 577-78 & n.346. Roe may have stressed this
point in oral argument before Hand.
163244 F. at 542.
16 Id.
at 540.
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that illegal counseling "may be accomplished as well by indirection
as expressly,"' 5 he did not indicate in his decision when it was
necessary to look beyond the "literal meaning" of words. In
Masses, at least, he saw no reason to do so. e6
Hand also made clear throughout his opinion that he was construing the Espionage Act rather than interpreting the Constitution. He granted the possibility "that Congress may forbid the
mails to any matter which tends to discourage the successful prosecution of the war." "It may be," he added, "that the fundamental
personal rights of the individual must stand in abeyance, even including the right of the freedom of the press ....

,,

He assumed

Congress could repress hostile criticism "in the throes of a struggle
for the very existence of the state."'6 " And he reiterated that he
was not questioning "the power of Congress to establish a personal
censorship of the press under the war power.' 69 Hand, however,
accompanied each of these caveats with the confident assertion
that Congress had not chosen to invoke such power in passing the
Espionage Act. Indeed, he concluded that "its exercise is so contrary to the use and wont of our people that only the clearest expression

. .

justifies the conclusion that it was intended."' 70 Yet

the legislative history of the Espionage Act, which Hand never
cited in his opinion, demonstrates the congressional intent to punish the very kind of antiwar material that prompted the Postmaster to declare The Masses "nonmailable.''
Hand's decision in Masses did not take hold. A circuit court
judge wrote an opinion disapproving Hand's test while staying the
165 Id.
"'
In a decision after the Second Circuit's reversal in Masses, Hand tried to elaborate
his original position on indirect counseling. He acknowledged that illegal "counsel or advice
need not be explicit, since the meaning of words comprises what their hearers understand
them to convey." United States v. Nearing, 252 F. 223, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1918). He cited Mark
Antony's funeral oration as an example of language that "can in fact counsel violence while
it even expressly discountenances it." Id. at 228.
In Nearing, Hand defined the test of speech under the insubordination and obstruction
clauses as the question: "What words make their utterer responsible for crimes which in the
course of nature, including the wills of others, may be expected to follow from them?" Id. at
227. I assume that his construction of these clauses, which was considerably looser than
analogous passages in Masses, incorporated Hand's interpretation of the Second Circuit's
reversal. See infra note 177 (quoting Hand's understanding of Second Circuit's Masses
holding).

167 244 F. at 538.
165 Id. at 540.
"0 Id. at 543.
170 Id. at 540. But see infra text accompanying notes 531-32 (Hand privately admitting
his "ignorance" about the history of free speech).
'71 See supra section II.

1238

The University of Chicago Law Review

[50:1205

injunction, 1 2 and a full panel of the Second Circuit soon reversed
Hand's order. 17 3 After quoting Hand's statement that anything less
than urging resistance to law is protected, the panel simply expressed its disagreement. The Second Circuit used the familiar approach of evaluating "the natural and reasonable effect of what is
said" and held that an incitement to crime may be indirect.1 7
This reversal and the general lack of support for his approach
apparently led Hand to reject free speech claims that judges who
reached protective decisions in other cases might have accepted. In
United States v. Nearing,1 7 5 after pointing out that he had "tried
unsuccessfully" in Masses to suggest that the legality of speech
must be "determined by the character of the words themselves,"
Hand announced that he would not attempt another definition. 7 8
Instead, he relied on the holding by the Second Circuit in Masses,
which he cited throughout his opinion as if to disclaim personal
responsibility for following its approach. 77 And in United States
7
v. Eastman,1
8 while again citing the Second Circuit's reversal in
Masses, Hand went out of his way to distinguish a protective decision by another federal district judge. 79 Having lost his theoretical
battle over the appropriate protection for speech under the Espionage Act, Hand was evidently reluctant to fight a rearguard action
by limiting the use of his opponents' weapons in ways that might
have achieved some practical benefits. 8 0
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 245 F. 102 (2d Cir. 1917).
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
174 Id. at 38. In a concurring opinion, Judge Ward emphasized that not every publication may be punished for its "indirect effect" to obstruct recruitment. "In addition to the
natural effect of the language on the reader," he maintained, "the intention to discourage is
essential." Id. at 39. Judge Ward did not indicate what would constitute evidence of such an
intention.
172
173

17
27

252 F. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
Id. at 227-28.

177

Id. at 228, 229, 230, 231. Hand paraphrased and explained his understanding of the

Second Circuit's holding:
That though in the form of public discussion words, which might not themselves

amount to advice or counsel to violate the law, would nevertheless make their author
criminally responsible if they were in fact the cause of the results forbidden, and if

they were uttered with the specific intent of producing those results. In short, the test
was made, not objective only, but in part subjective, as is indeed often the case in the
definition of crime.
Id. at 228.
178 252 F. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
179 Id. at 233 (distinguishing United States v. Schutte, 252 F. 212 (D.N.D. 1918), discussed infra text accompanying notes 194-200, 206).
180 In Nearingand Eastman, Hand did not require the government to make any show-

ing that the relationship between language and its probable effects was "proximate" or "direct." Nor did Hand require proof in indictments that the offensive speech actually reached
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Other judges, while following the traditional tests of intent
and "bad tendency," nevertheless were able to place some restraints on the government's use of title I, section 3 as a dragnet to
secure convictions for antiwar speech. Judge Bourquin's directed
verdict in United States v. Hall 181 was the earliest of these decisions. The defendant, in the presence of men registered for the
draft, used harsher language than most convicted speakers. In addition to typical comments about President Wilson being a "Wall
Street tool," he stated that "he would flee to avoid going to the
war." Yet Judge Bourquin pointed out that these statements were
made, in "badinage," at picnics, and during saloon arguments in a
small village in Montana, sixty miles from the nearest railroad, and
apparently hundreds of miles from the nearest army base. 182 He
cited the standard interpretation of intent, but maintained that
the natural consequences and surrounding circumstances in this
case made the inference of intent to interfere with the operation
and success of the military "absurd. ' 8 3 Bourquin added that many
of the substantive offenses defined by the Espionage Act "are of
the nature of attempts," which require "proximity to the object of
their operation. 1 8 4 By defining military forces to include only men
actually in service, rather than all registered men, Bourquin found
insufficient "proximity to constitute attempts." And the final
clause, by creating the crime of obstruction rather than "mere attempts to obstruct," could not be violated without a showing of
actual "injury to the service. '' 85 Like Hand in Masses, Bourquin

men subject to the draft or actually enlisted. Eastman,252 F. at 233; Nearing, 252 F. at 230.
But see infra text accompanying notes 185, 194, 202 (other federal judges imposed these
requirements). And Hand upheld use of the insubordination clause against subsequent issues of The Masses even though he acknowledged that the Second Circuit expressed doubt
about its applicability. Eastman, 252 F. at 233. Hand's public acceptance of defeat, however,
did not prevent his private adherence to his original position in subsequent correspondence
with Holmes and Chafee. See Gunther, supra note 14, at 731-50.
Judges in other contexts, faced with tensions between their beliefs and formal legal
principles, have reached unnecessarily harsh judgments by retreating to a mechanical formalism in areas where they retained discretion, a technique that helped them deny personal
responsibility for their decisions. See R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975) (analyzing decisions
by antislavery judges before the Civil War); see especially id. at 199, 233. Perhaps Hand's
recognition that he had to conform to the Second Circuit's reversal of his decision in Masses
similarly prompted him to reach excessively restrictive results in subsequent Espionage Act
cases.
248 F. 150 (D. Mont. 1918).
162 Id.
at 152.
161 Id.
at 152-53.
:84Id. at 152.
165 Id. at 153. Bourquin invoked the doctrine of impossibility to support his analysis.
He reasoned that just as a man who intended to kill could not be convicted of attempted
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also observed that the false statements punished by the Espionage
Act did not include "opinions, beliefs, intentions, and arguments." 186 He concluded by calling a "mistake" the "public impression" that the Espionage Act could punish "mere disloyal utterances" and slander or libel of public officials. While conceding
that such expressions could violate state law when tending to
breach the peace, he emphasized that since the Sedition Act of
1798 Congress, perhaps reflecting "the genius of democracy," had
18 7
not made them federal crimes.
Judge Bourquin's opinion in Hall so disturbed the Department of Justice that its lawyers sought an amendment of the Espionage Act.18 8 Similar decisions during this period might have deterred some later prosecutions and encouraged other judges to
withhold weak cases from juries. Eventually, a small minority of
district judges followed Judge Bourquin's example, perhaps because they had been disappointed by earlier jury verdicts of guilty.
Judge Amidon, who tried many Espionage Act cases before directing acquittals in two, wrote Chafee that many ordinarily competent jurors believed that they had to return a guilty verdict in
order to prove their loyalty.18 9
A few circuit court reversals of guilty verdicts also construed
the Espionage Act in ways that limited its restrictions on speech.
These protective decisions, often echoing Judge Bourquin's reasoning in Hall, addressed many of the same issues of statutory construction as their restrictive counterparts while reaching opposite
results. Several courts carefully distinguished unpopular but legal
opinions from the "false statements" prohibited by the Espionage

murder if he shot a pistol at someone several miles away, so the defendant, whatever his
intent, could not be convicted for comments made hundreds of miles from the nearest military forces. Id.
186Id. at 152.
187Id. at 153-54.
I" In an address to the Executive Committee of the American Bar Association while
Congress was considering such an amendment, Attorney General Gregory cited this "celebrated case" as an example of "the ineffectiveness of [the Espionage] law when applied by a
judge not in accord with its purposes." Gregory observed that most district judges "properly
left to the jury the duty of determining the intention of the accused from the language used
and the circumstances under which it was used," but he expressed confidence that "a much
more drastic" amendment being considered by Congress "will form the basis for convictions
in all federal districts." Suggestions of Attorney-General Gregory, 4 A.B.A. J. 305, 306-07
(1918). Gregory got what he wanted in the 1918 "Sedition Act." Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75,
40 Stat. 553; see 1918 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 18.
189 Letter from Judge Charles F. Amidon to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (August 29, 1919)
(Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Papers, Box 4, Folder 1, Harvard Law School Library) [hereinafter
cited as Chafee Papers].
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Act. For example, Judge Munger dismissed charges of falsity
against statements alleging that Jesus Christ was the only person
better than the Kaiser, 1 0 that "Germany can't be whipped,""19 and
that the Red Cross "are a lot of thieves and grafters. 1 92 He came
to the same conclusion about the claim that Wilson and the munitions makers were responsible for the war. According to Munger,
no consensus existed about the causes of the war; indeed, historians could probably cite a hundred. "[T]o charge a man with making a false statement because he undertakes to single out one thing
as the cause of the war," he reasoned, "is placing a construction
upon the law that was not contemplated."1 93
Other protective decisions stressed that there must be some
"proximity" between language and the crimes defined by the Espionage Act; intent could not be inferred from the "secondary," "remote," or "indirect" effects of language.194 However unfair, unjust,
unpatriotic, or disloyal, speech could not be punished without
some substantial evidence of its impact.19 " The protective decisions
conceded that the effect of speech can be inferred from its surrounding circumstances, but they emphasized that these circumstances must be examined carefully."' As a result, several judges
maintained that the failure to specify them in the pleadings or indictment precluded a conviction. 9 Where "circumstances are an
element of a crime," Judge Amidon observed, "[they] cannot be
left to speculation or inference, but must be clearly and directly
charged." Simply to identify the challenged language and assert illegal intent "would be a mere legal conclusion."19' 8 Indeed, one cir-

"o

United States v. Frerichs 2 (D. Neb. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 85).

11

Id.

"2 United

States v. Koenig 2 (E.D. Mo. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 166).
Id; see also Kammann v. United States, 259 F. 192, 193 (7th Cir. 1919); Sandberg v.
United States, 257 F. 643, 646, 648 (9th Cir. 1919).
'" See, e.g., United States v. Mills 2 (D.N.D. 1919) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 204);
United States v. Henning 15 (E.D. Wis. 1919) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 184); United
States v. Koenig 3-4 (E.D. Mo. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 166); United States v.
Schutte, 252 F. 212, 215 (D.N.D 1918).
1,5 See, e.g., United States v. Mills 4 (D.N.D. 1919) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 204);
United States v. Schutte, 252 F. 212, 213, 215 (D.N.D. 1918).
'"See infra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 198-99.
log United States v Schutte, 252 F. 212, 214 (D.N.D. 1918); see also Grubl v. United
States, 264 F. 44, 46 (8th Cir. 1920); Fontana v. United States, 262 F. 283, 286-87 (8th Cir.
1919); Shilter v. United States, 257 F. 724, 725-26 (9th Cir. 1919); United States v. Koenig 1,
3 (E.D. Mo. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 166); cf. Balbas v. United States, 257 F. 17,
23, 25 (1st Cir. 1919) (indictment sufficient but no circumstances permitting inference of
unlawful intent).
193
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cuit court held a pleading lacking such specificity a violation of the
sixth amendment because it failed to inform the defendants of the
charges against them. 199
Moreover, the kind of surrounding circumstances that
prompted most judges and juries to find violations of the Espionage Act did not satisfy some of the few judges who reached protective decisions. Focusing on the nature of the audience, judges
held that speech to a women's club,20 0 or in private conversations,201 could no
not be punished under the Espionage Act. Some
courts explicitly held that speech must reach men in the military
before provisions of the Espionage Act could apply.20 2 Another
judge added that the identification of a soldier in the audience was
not itself sufficient to constitute an attempt to cause insubordination. 20 3 In a different context, a circuit court criticized a trial judge
for failing to require the jury to decide if the defendant was "so
drunk that he was incapable of entertaining the specific criminal
intent required by the Espionage Act. ' 204 And, in the case of a
member of the Nonpartisan League charged with obstruction for
his statement that the sons of farmers, not of merchants and bankers, were fighting in France, Judge Amidon identified a variety of
extenuating circumstances. Amidon pointed out that the speaker
and his organization had been harassed with accusations of disloyalty, and that the speech was extemporaneous, constantly interrupted, and delivered at the end of a heated political campaign. 20 5
Several of the protective decisions emphasized that Congress
did not intend the Espionage Act to punish unpatriotic or disloyal
language. "Such a perversion of law," one judge concluded, "would

199 Foster v. United States, 253 F. 481, 482 (9th Cir. 1918); see supra note 162 (Hand's
emphasis in Masses on specificity).
200 United States v. Schutte, 252 F. 212, 214 (D.N.D. 1918).
o1 See, e.g., Fontana v. United States, 262 F. 283, 288 (8th Cir. 1919); Harshfield v.
United States, 260 F. 659, 660 (8th Cir. 1919); Wolf v. United States, 259 F. 388, 393 (8th
Cir. 1919); Sandberg v. United States, 257 F. 643, 648 (9th Cir. 1919).
202 See, e.g., Grubl v. United States, 264 F. 44, 46-48 (8th Cir. 1920); Kammann v.
United States, 259 F. 192, 194 (7th Cir. 1919); Shilter v. United States, 257 F. 724, 725-26
(9th Cir. 1919).
203 United States v. Henning 16 (E.D. Wis. 1919) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 184).
204 Stenzel v. United States, 261 F. 161, 163 (8th Cir. 1919).
205 United States v. Mills 3-4 (D.N.D. 1919) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 204). Judge
Veeder, in a prosecution under the penal code for conspiracy to obtain an illegal draft exception, gave an instruction that might have convinced some juries in Espionage Act cases
to acquit. According to Veeder, "circumstances which on their face may appear criminal are
often, when explained by their connection with surrounding circumstances, undeniably innocent." United States v. Jacobson 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 39).
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itself be a supreme act of disloyalty ...
."06 Another judge observed that if Congress had wanted to pass a sedition law, it could
have modeled one after the Sedition Act of 1798. He construed the
provisions of the Espionage Act as evidence that Congress "industriously sought to keep away" from this ancient precedent.0 7 A
number of decisions cited the express prohibition of "unpatriotic
or disloyal" language in the 1918 amendment to the Espionage
Act" 8 as proof that the original law had no such purpose. 0 9
A few remarkable circuit court reversals, decided after the Armistice and after most Espionage Act decisions, recognized the difficulty of reaching fair verdicts during war, the very problem identified by Gilbert Roe during the hearings on the Espionage bill and
expressed privately by Judge Amidon to Chafee21 0 The courts
pointed out that patriotic citizens had become "particularly impatient" 11 and "to a certain extent [had] lost their mental poise. "212
Only two months after a unanimous Supreme Court, in opinions
written by Justices Brandeis and Holmes, upheld convictions in its
first four Espionage Act cases, 1 3 one circuit court observed:
It is natural, in time of war, when patriotic sentiment is high,
that it is particularly difficult to secure a fair trial for men
accused of crimes connected with the war. At such times the
task of the court becomes especially difficult and requires
great care to prevent miscarriage of justice. These are practical considerations, which must be constantly borne in mind,
or the verdicts of juries in such cases will mistakenly become
expressions of their hatred for unpatriotic acts in general, instead of their careful judgment on the facts shown by the evidence in the particular case. Patriotism must not become,
United States v. Schutte, 252 F. 212, 213 (D.N.D. 1918).
Henning 17 (E.D. Wis. 1919) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 184).
this amendment except in passing references because most of the
federal prosecutions were brought before it was enacted. See Z. CHAFES, supra note 2, at 46.
Decisions under its provisions, moreover, generally followed the approach of the earlier Espionage Act cases. For background on the 1918 amendment, see id. at 44-46; H. PETERSON &
G. FrrE, supra note 92, at 208-21.
108

107 United States v.
208 I do not discuss

28" See, e.g., Wolf v. United States, 259 F. 388, 391 (8th Cir. 1919); Von Bank v. United
States, 253 F. 641, 643 (8th Cir. 1918); United States v. Henning 17 (E.D. Wis. 1919) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 184); United States v Schutte, 252 F. 212, 215 (D.N.D. 1918).
210 See supra note 101 and text accompanying note 189.
211 Stokes v. United States, 264 F. 18, 25 (8th Cir. 1920).
:'2 Hall v. United States, 256 F. 748, 752 (4th Cir. 1919).
13 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204
(1919); Sugarman v. United States, 249 U.S. 182 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.

47 (1919).
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even innocently, a cloak for injustice. The right of an accused
in the courts of this nation to a fair trial must not vary with
the character of the crime.2 14
This judicial perception came too late and too infrequently to
make any difference in most cases.
IV.

THE INITIAL WARTIME CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT

Supreme Court review of prosecutions against antiwar
speeches and publications began with its Selective Draft Law decisions in January 1918.215 The Court issued its first four Espionage

Act opinions in March

1919.216

In all of these cases, the Supreme

Court unanimously affirmed convictions while giving little or no attention to the first amendment. Subsequent scholars, preoccupied
17
with Justice Holmes and the "clear and present danger" test,
have generally not noticed the connections between the Selective
Draft Law and the Espionage Act cases, connections emphasized
by the government lawyers who briefed the first Espionage Act appeals and acknowledged by Holmes in Schenck v. United States.218
A.

The Selective Draft Law Cases

Ten appeals of convictions under the 1917 Selective Draft Law
reached the Supreme Court a year before the first group of Espionage Act cases. All concentrated on attacking the constitutionality
of the draft. The Supreme Court, prompted by the Solicitor General,21 9 consolidated six of them and, in the Selective Draft Law
Cases,22 0 upheld the draft as a legitimate exercise by Congress of
its constitutional power "to declare war" and "to raise and support
2,2
arm ies. 2

214

215

Wolf v. United States, 259 F. 388, 394 (8th Cir. 1919).
Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918); Kramer v. United States, 245 U.S.

478 (1918); Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918).
216

Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204

(1919); Sugarman v. United States, 249 U.S. 182 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919).
217 See Rabban, supra note 4, at 516-22, 579-81, 595, and the sources cited therein.
218 See infra note 278 and text accompanying note 323 (discussing briefs and Holmes's
opinion in Schenck). Two articles do refer to Goldman and to Holmes's citation of it in
Schenck: Filvaroff, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 189, 202-03
(1972); Ragan, supra note 14, at 34.
219 Motion by the United States to Advance, Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480

(1918).
220
221

245 U.S. 366 (1918).
Id. at 377 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
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The Court issued additional opinions in the four remaining
cases to deal with "other questions"2 2 left unresolved by its consolidated opinion. In three of these four cases-Ruthenberg v.
United States, Kramer v. United States, and Goldman v. United
States-the government claimed that an antiwar speaker had violated the criminal code by inducing or conspiring to induce an eligible person not to register. 2
Like many cases implicating freedom of speech in the generation before World War I, neither the briefs nor the decisions in
Ruthenberg, Kramer, and Goldman explicitly addressed the meaning of the first amendment or concentrated on free speech issues.
The attorneys for the convicted speakers, however, did challenge
the punishment for speech. Protesting that the indictment failed
to show how the defendants' "multifarious political activities"
aided a man not to register,22 4 the lawyers in Ruthenberg claimed
that the indictment was unconstitutionally vague.2 25 The government responded by asserting that the defendants "knew the
speeches that caused their arrests, '2 6 and the Supreme Court dismissed this claim by the defendants' attorneys as "so unsubstantial
'227
as not to require even statement.
Harry Weinberger, the lawyer for the defendants in Goldman
and Kramer,maintained in his brief for Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman 228 that nothing either defendant ever said or wrote
could be construed as an overt act in a conspiracy to urge men not
22 Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474, 476 (1918).
23 Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480, 481 (1918) (inducement); Kramer v.
United States, 245 U.S. 478, 479 (1918) (conspiracy); Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S.
474, 475 (1918) (conspiracy). The fourth case, Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390 (1918), affirmed
the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from a man arrested for failing to register
as required by the Selective Draft Law.
1Z4 Brief for Plaintiffs in Error at 23, Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918)
[hereinafter cited as Ruthenberg Brief]. The attorneys pointed out that their clients had
never met the man they allegedly aided. Was this man, the attorneys asked, "influenced by
printed leaflets, form, letter, speech, song, public exhortation, private appeal? And when?
Where?" According to the attorneys, all their clients "could know till the moment of trial
was, they were charged with 'aiding' a man unknown to them, somewhere in Cleveland,
sometime before the registration, not to register. It was a legal ambush into which they were
driven blindfold[ed]." Id.
:15 Id. at 25.
36 Brief for the United States at 104-05, Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480

(1918).
27

245 U.S. at 483.

228Goldman and Berkman were indicted as co-conspirators; the indictment is reprinted
in Brief on Behalf of the Plaintiffs-in-Error at 1-5, Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474
(1918) [hereinafter cited as Goldman Brief].
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to register. 229 The government, Weinberger pointed out, had produced "no evidence that they advised people to disobey the law."
Nor had it submitted any proof that anything Goldman or Berkman said or wrote had even reached men subject to the draft.
Weinberger acknowledged that Goldman and Berkman strongly
disapproved of the draft, but he stressed that "no one was ever
convicted before of the crime of disapproving of laws."23 In Weinberger's view, a jury under the influence of the prevailing "war
hysteria" 23 1 had convicted his clients simply for expressing their
views on a "public question. 2 3 2 Conceding that Goldman and
Berkman distinguished between opposition to conscription and advice not to register, the government's brief supported the jury verdict because "the result reasonably deduced from advice not to be
'233
conscripted is to refuse to take the first step.
The Supreme Court emphasized that its opinion sustaining
the draft in the Selective Draft Law Cases disposed of all the constitutional questions in Goldman.34 The Court rejected Weinberger's arguments about the sufficiency of the evidence by attributing them to the erroneous "assumption that the power to review
embraces the right to invade the province of the jury by determining questions of credibility and weight of evidence." Despite this
disclaimer, the Court did review the record and "without recapitulating the evidence"-indeed, without referring to any of
it-concluded in a summary sentence that "the proposition that
there was no evidence whatever of guilt to go to the jury is absolutely devoid of merit." 235 The Court reached the same determination in Kramer. As long as there was "evidence tending to show
guilt," the case could not be taken from the jury. Once again, the
Court, without identifying such evidence, claimed to have found
it.

236

Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 20. The logic of the government's position, Weinberger added, would have
imposed liability on the corporations that successfully brought legal challenges against the
first income tax laws and on the railroads who resisted the eight-hour day. Id.
229
230

221

Id. at 18.

Id. at 20. The brief pointed out that Goldman had "expressly stated that she cannot
and would not tell people not to register." Id. at 21.
233 Brief for the United States at 120, Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918).
In fact, Goldman and Berkman indicated that they would not have registered had the law
applied to them. Id. at 117-19 (quoting speeches by Berkman and Goldman).
234 245 U.S. at 476.
235 Id. at 477.
238 Kramer v. United States, 245 U.S. 478, 479 (1918).
222
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The First Espionage Act Cases

Schenck, Sugarman, Frohwerk, and Debs reached the Supreme Court the following term. In all four cases, the government
charged that antiwar articles and speeches caused or attempted to
cause insubordination in the armed forces or obstruction of recruitment or enlistment.2 3 7 In Schenck and Frohwerk, the government also alleged that antiwar articles provided evidence of a conspiracy, expressly forbidden by section 4 of the Act,138 to violate
other of its provisions. 23 9
Probably because Eugene V. Debs,24 0 the Socialist Party's perennial candidate for president, was the most prominent defendant
in an Espionage Act prosecution, his case was the most thoroughly
briefed. Seymour Stedman, who defended many socialists in Espionage Act cases and who represented Sugarman and Debs, devoted
his main effort to the Debs case, as did Alfred Bettman and John
Lord O'Brian, who wrote the government's briefs in all four of the
Espionage Act cases. 241 And Gilbert Roe selected Debs
as the Espi42
onage Act case in which to file an amicus brief.
237 The defendants in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs were charged under both the insubordination and obstruction provisions. Transcript of Record at 5, Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Transcript of Record at 4, Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S.
204 (1919); Transcript of Record at 29, 42, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
Sugarman was charged only under the insubordination rovision. Transcript of Record at 12, Sugarman v. United States, 249 U.S. 182 (1919). The first count of Debs's indictment
charged him under the provision forbidding publication of "false reports," Transcript of
Record at 2, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), but the United States Attorney
withdrew this count before trial, id. at 151.
1M Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. I, § 4, 40 Stat. 217, 219.
.:9 See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 48-49; Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 205.
40 See R. GINGER, THE BENDING CRoss: A BIOGRAPHY OF EUGENE VICTOR DEns 353-84
(1949) (discussing Espionage Act prosecution of Debs and Court's decision).
2'1 In his Sugarman brief, Stedman referred the Court to his brief in Debs for a discussion of the first amendment issues applicable to both cases. Brief of Plaintiff in Error at 21,
Sugarman v. United States, 249 U.S. 182 (1919) [hereinafter cited as Sugarman Brief]. In
their brief in Frohwerk, O'Brian and Bettman only summarized their response to first
amendment arguments because the "whole subject had been so thoroughly discussed" in
their brief in Debs. Brief for the United States at 18, Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S.
204 (1919) [hereinafter cited as Brief for the United States in Frohwerk]. Stedman's brief
for Debs was 87 pages, see Brief for Plaintiff in Error, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919) [hereinafter cited as Stedman Brief for Debs]; the government's reply was 91 pages.
See Brief for the United States, Dabs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for the United States in Debs].
242 In his preliminary statement in Debs, Roe explained that he represented Nagler, a
plaintiff-in-error in a case "involving the construction and constitutionality" of the same
provisions of the Espionage Act. Because the Nagler case would not be reached for argument until after the Supreme Court decided Debs, Roe decided, with the consent of the
Solicitor General and Stedman, to file a brief as amicus curiae. Brief of Gilbert E. Roe, as
Amicus Curiae, at 1-2, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) [hereinafter cited as Roe
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1. The Defendants' Briefs. In his briefs for Debs and
Sugarman, Stedman repeated the objections that the defendants in
Goldman, Kramer, and Ruthenberg had raised to their indictments.243 In his Debs brief, however, Stedman went on to make a
quantum leap beyond his predecessors by translating these objections into constitutional arguments. 2 " Stedman called the first
amendment "the vital issue of this case.

' 245

Because the indict-

ment itself presented "no theory of the pleader as to the pertinence of defendant's words to move others to action,

'246

any rela-

tionship between Debs's speech and the prohibition of the
Espionage Act was "left for conjecture of judge and jury., 247 Ac-

cording to Stedman, these deficiencies "led to a sedition conviction
under a thin disguise of a charge of actual military obstruction by
means of words.

'248

And the first amendment, Stedman concluded,

does not permit convictions simply because a jury concludes that a
defendant has a "seditious temper. "249
Stedman borrowed the phase "seditious temper" from Hand's
opinion in Masses, which he quoted at length, identifying it incorrectly, though understandably, as the only case "leading to anything in the nature of a rule as to when the Espionage Act, applied
to speech
and press, might pass the bounds of constitutional valid' 250
ity.

He asserted without citation that Hand's requirement of

Amicus Brief in Debs]. The government eventually confessed error in Nagler. Nagler v.
United States, 254 U.S. 661 (1920).
...See Sugarman Brief, supra note 241, at 8-16; Stedman Brief for Debs, supra note
241, at 38.
24 In the first paragraph of the section entitled "The indictment fails to charge a
crime," Stedman made clear the extent to which his brief in Debs relied on first amendment
claims: "The primary argument under this heading is carried over to the general discussion
of the right of free speech under a subsequent heading of the brief. At this point we desire
merely to call attention to the fictitious character of the pleading as pleading." Stedman
Brief for Debs, supra note 241, at 35. Stedman made no reference to the first amendment at
the analogous point in his brief for Sugarman. Sugarman Brief, supra note 241, at 8.
4I Stedman Brief for Debs, supra note 241, at 61. To emphasize the importance of the
first amendment in Debs, and perhaps as a warning to the Court that it should resist its
frequent inclination to avoid first amendment claims, Stedman introduced his constitutional
argument by observing: "The millions in many countries who respond to the idealism of
Eugene V. Debs ... will bluntly speak of the Debs case as a free speech fight." Id. at 61-62.
246 Id. at 64.
247

248
249

Id. at 77.
Id. at 64.
Id.

2'0 Id. at 63; see id. at 65-69 (quoting Hand's opinion in Masses). Other Espionage Act
decisions, Stedman maintained, could not be reconciled with the first amendment, which
the lower court judges had "easily swept... aside." Id. at 63. Roe's amicus brief and the
brief for Schenck also cited Hand's opinion in Masses approvingly, though without
Stedman's misleading hyperbole. Roe Amicus Brief in Debs, supra note 242, at 10; Brief of
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"purposeful incitement to specific unlawfulness" was simply a restatement of the liability of an accessory at common law, and
claimed that it provided the only constitutionally permissible
basis
25 1
for "Congress to make public utterances criminal.
Stedman criticized as inconsistent with the first amendment
any reliance on the "indirect effect" or "the reasonable and natural
consequences" of speech to find specific criminal intent under the
Espionage Act.25 2 Affirmance of Debs's conviction by the Supreme
Court would distort the literal meaning of the statute and suppress
the discussion and advocacy of socialist opposition to war. "Antiwar politics would be confined to times of peace, when the issue
has not the vitality of national immediacy. ' 25 3 As a result, discussion of war-the most crucial subject of public policy-would become the exclusive concern of high government officials, and restrictions on free speech would arise in direct proportion to the
importance of the issues at stake. Stedman urged the Court not to
allow such a "caricature" of the first amendment through a "preposterous perversion of the established precedents of our own
'2
history. "
Gilbert Roe's amicus brief in Debs reinforced Stedman's arguments by demonstrating in a particularly effective manner the first
amendment implications of the technical and evidentiary objections others had raised. Perhaps because of his broad experience as
a member of the Free Speech League and as a frequent litigator of
first amendment cases, Roe was able to illustrate vividly the broad
implications of the "bad tendency" test. "The most that any jury
or any judge can say about any language of a speech or article in
the absence of any evidence that it produced a particular effect,"
Roe argued, "is that it would have a tendency to produce the results complained of ..
*255 Reiterating the basic theme of his
testimony while Congress was considering the Espionage bill, Roe
added:
Once this court says that public discussion of the measures of government can be punished because of any intent
which a jury may find caused the discussion, or because of any

Plaintiffs in Error at 7, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) [hereinafter cited as
Brief for Schenck].
251 Stedman Brief for Debs, supra note 241, at 71.
:52 Id. at 84.
53

Id. at 80.

I" Id. at 84.
255 Roe Amicus Brief in Debs, supra note 242, at 16.
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result which a jury may think will follow such discussion, then
the free speech and free press of the Constitution is
destroyed.2 5
According to Roe, limiting public discussion because of its alleged
bad tendency, "whether accomplished directly by Congress
through an act which frankly declares its purpose, or indirectly by
permitting a jury, without evidence, to draw the conclusion that
general public discussion of measures of Government cause [sic]
injury to the United States by obstructing enlistments, is unconstitutional .. . ."I" Roe observed that most district court instructions in Espionage Act cases allowed punishment for the "bad tendency" of speech 258 and urged the Supreme Court not to adopt a
similar construction.
By raising first amendment challenges to the "bad tendency"
test, Stedman and Roe attacked the heart of the traditional judicial approach to free speech issues. The briefs for the defendants
in these cases, however, did not limit their discussions of the first
amendment to this central point. Several made the historical argument that the first amendment superseded the law of seditious libe 2 59 and expanded the protection for free speech beyond Blackstone's mere prohibition against prior restraints.26 0 The brief for

2" Id. at 48; see supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing Roe's testimony).
257 Roe Amicus Brief in Debs, supra note 242, at 16-17.
at 10. Roe maintained that the Espionage Act decisions by the lower federal
258 Id.
courts suppressed "substantially all hostile criticism of every measure even remotely connected with the war." Id.
259 Stedman Brief for Debs, supra note 241, at 74-76, 85; Roe Amicus Brief in Debs,
supra note 242, at 32-42; Statement, Brief and Argument for Plaintiff in Error by Frans E.
Lindquist at 28-31, Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) [hereinafter cited as
Lindquist Brief for Frohwerk].
260 Stedman Brief for Debs, supra note 241, at 86; Roe Amicus Brief in Debs, supra
note 242, at 23-26; Brief for Schenck, supra note 250, at 5-6. Roe devoted particular attention to a refutation of Blackstone. After stating that he had never read a brief or decision
interpreting the first amendment in its historical context, Roe Amicus Brief in Debs, supra
note 242, at 22, Roe pointed out that Blackstone's discussion of free speech was written a
generation before the adoption of the first amendment and simply reflected the effect on
English law of the repeal of the Licensing Act in 1694. Id. at 23. He added that Blackstone's
conservative views on speech were opposed by many of his English contemporaries. Id. at
25-26. According to Roe:
Mr. Justice Blackstone's belief in the fortunate condition of the English press after the
repeal of the licensing acts in 1694, like his belief in witchcraft, have a historical interest, but there is no more reason for accepting his beliefs about one than about the
other as a measure of liberty and freedom in this country today.
Id. at 24. Roe also observed that Professor St. George Tucker, in his 1803 American edition
of Blackstone's Commentaries, stated that freedom of the press encompasses subsequent
penalties as well as prior restraints. Id. at 44.
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Schenck stressed that free speech, including the "scrutiny and condemnation" of government officials, promotes the exercise of responsible citizenship and the "spread of truth in matters of general
concern" that "is essential to the stability of a republic. ' 261
Stedman claimed that the "degree of tolerance of minority sentiments" is the traditional test of political freedom. 26 2 And one brief
for Frohwerk suggested that the first amendment prohibits the
punishment of any criticisms of government policy that do not
2 63
meet the Constitution's definition of treason.
In their briefs for Debs, Stedman and Roe rejected the proposition that Congress can rely on the war power to restrict speech,
an issue Learned Hand explicitly left undecided in his statutory
construction of the Espionage Act in Masses.6 4 If the war power
could limit the scope of the first amendment, Stedman argued,
public officials would be too eager to discover grave dangers to the
state in any "agitation desired to be suppressed." 265 He vigorously
maintained that the first amendment's protection of public discussion could not be "swept aside . . . as an incident of the war
power."26 6 Roe claimed that the first amendment is an absolute
prohibition against all exercises of congressional power affecting
speech. Just as Congress cannot abridge free speech to borrow
money or collect taxes, it cannot abridge free speech to wage
war. 2617 The first amendment is the constitutional provision "most
calculated to preserve our free institutions to ourselves and to posterity. 1 68 Unless the "breach already made in the wall of constitutional liberty" by the lower courts' interpretation of the Espionage
Act is "speedily and permanently repaired," Roe argued, "it will
certainly be enlarged as one exigency after another seems to make
it necessary, until the whole structure will give way before the asBrief for Schenck, supra note 250, at 6.
Stedman Brief for Debs, supra note 241, at 62; see Brief for Schenck, supra note
250, at 8 (importance of allowing "honest criticism of the majority by the minority").
242 Lindquist Brief for Frohwerk, supra note 259, at 28-29. In addition, Stedman rejected the "possible" theory that the Espionage Act could punish "instigation to treason."
"Congress has no power," Stedman claimed, "to amend or enlarge the definition of treason
written into the Constitution." Stedman Brief for Debs, supra note 241, at 85. For a discussion of the relationship between the treason clause and the first amendment, see supra note
110.
244 See supra text accompanying notes 167-70 (discussing Hand's construction of war
power).
265 Stedman Brief for Debs, supra note 241, at 74.
264 Id. at 71.
267 Roe Amicus Brief in Debs, supra note 242, at 19-20, 48.
263Id. at 20.
261

242
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democratic

government.
2. The Government's Response. The government's reply
briefs, submitted by O'Brian and Bettman in the initial group of
Espionage Act cases, made explicit much of the reasoning that,
though not clearly articulated, seemed to provide the basis for the
Supreme Court decisions in Goldman, Kramer, and Ruthenberg.
These briefs vigorously disagreed with the defendants' objections
to the form of the indictments and to the sufficiency of the evidence. "When the tendency of the words used, rather than the particular words themselves, constitute [sic] the gist of the offense,"
the government argued in Sugarman, "it is sufficient for the indictment to charge this general tendency, without detailing the
particular words. ' 2 70 The precise words which constitute an attempt are "the evidentiary details of the method by which the unlawful purpose was carried out" and to identify them specifically
"would be pleading evidence."2 7 ' According to O'Brian and
Bettman, their adversaries were incorrectly trying to transform a
challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, a question trial judges
properly left to juries, into a first amendment case.27 2
O'Brian and Bettman chose their brief in Sugarman to make
their most detailed arguments against the relevance of first amendment issues to the Espionage Act litigation. This brief emphasized
that the first amendment arguments raised on behalf of Sugarman
had been decisively foreclosed by the Supreme Court in Goldman,
Kramer, and Ruthenberg.2 75 The only issues of constitutional law
in both the earlier cases and Sugarman involved the validity of the
Selective Draft Law itself, not the acts which provided the basis
for the defendants' convictions. 274 No other legitimate constitutional attack, they argued, could be raised, "for, obviously, if that
statute is valid, the constitutionality of prohibiting attempts 27
to5
cause violations thereof necessarily and inevitably follows,"
whether under the Penal Code, as in Goldman, Kramer, and Ruthenberg, or under the Espionage Act as in Sugarman.
Id. at 21.
270 Brief for the United States at 11, Sugarman v. United States, 249 U.S. 182 (1919)
269

[hereinafter cited as Brief for United States in Sugarman].
271 Id. at 10. See Brief for the United States in Debs, supra note 241, at 23 ("it is
difficult to conceive what more could be set forth . . . without pleading evidence").
2 Brief for United States in Debs, supra note 241, at 77-78.
273 Brief for the United States in Sugarman, supra note 270, at 36.
274Id. at 36-37.
2*75Id.

at 37.
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O'Brian and Bettman did not consider whether the first
amendment requires that counseling disobedience of the law be
distinguished from other categories of attempts. Since the language
of the speeches and publications punished in all of these cases consisted of virtually identical claims by socialists that the war was
a
27
capitalist conspiracy in which workers should not participate,

6

it

was easy for O'Brian and Bettman to deny that Sugarman, which
involved the same relation between speech and crime as Goldman,
Kramer, and Ruthenberg, presented any distinct constitutional issue. O'Brian and Bettman deemed the constitutional question in
Sugarman so "frivolous" that "it must have been inserted for the
sake of giving a colorable claim to the appeal to this court.

'27

Ac-

cording to them, Stedman made his untenable first amendment argument because it was the only possible way to distinguish
Sugarman from Goldman, Kramer, and Ruthenberg. The evident
weakness of this desperate position, they maintained, "demonstrate[s] that this case is not genuinely and seriously one" raising
constitutional questions. Their brief recommended that the Supreme Court dismiss Sugarman's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.27
In Debs, probably because Stedman and Roe raised first
amendment issues so explicitly, O'Brian and Bettman did not, as
they had in the government's other Espionage Act briefs, belittle
the constitutional dimensions of the case. Although they suggested
that no constitutional question was "necessarily involved

27 9

in

Debs, O'Brian and Bettman did respond to their adversaries' first
amendment claims. Even Stedman, they observed, accepted "intentional incitement to violations of law" as beyond the constitutional protection for free speech, and they insisted that this was
just the standard under which Debs had been charged and convicted. Debs's position, O'Brian and Bettman argued, would re27'

See, e.g., id. at 36.

Id. at 37.
Id. In their brief in Schenck, O'Brian and Bettman strongly reiterated this position
on the first amendment, even though Schenck's lawyers did not use Stedman's arguments to
criticize the indictment. Observing that Sugarmanand Schenck had been set for hearing on
the same day, O'Brian and Bettman referred to their brief in Sugarman and used almost
identical language. They argued that the Selective Draft Law decisions had "foreclosed" any
reliance on the first amendment in Schenck. "The cases correspond, the only distinction
being that they were brought under different statutes and relate to different stages of the
duties of men subject to the draft-distinctions which have no relevance to the question of
constitutionality." As in Sugarman, they concluded that the constitutional question "is too
well settled adversely to the defendants and too unsubstantial to form the basis of the jurisdiction of this court over this case." Brief for the United States at 20-21, Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) [hereinafter cited as Brief for the United States in Schenck].
279 Brief for the United States in Debs, supra note 241, at 69, 78.
'7

278
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quire a much more protective rule. He
seems to contend that as he did not express this unlawful advice in words so direct, plain, and unmistakable as to leave no
room whatever for the slightest thought or intellectual process
on the part of the jury, no need of any process of inference
whatever, the constitutional immunity applies to his speech. 8 0
This contention would put the government in the impossible position of being "powerless to punish any incitement to lawlessness,
however intentional and however effective, so long as it is concealed in veiled, indirect, or rhetorical language." 2 8'
O'Brian and Bettman pointed out that Hand's decision in
Masses, so heavily relied upon by Stedman, had been reversed by
the Second Circuit in language which supported the government's
position in Debs.2 82 The trial court's charge to the jury in Debs,
they added, was a model of fairness consistent with the proper
standard established by the Second Circuit in Masses. 283 Like
many of his district court colleagues,2 84 the judge had told the jury
that the Espionage Act did not forbid a citizen to "discuss, criticize, or disapprove" of any proposed or existing law or policy. If
Debs only gave his version of the truth in order to reshape national
policy through peaceful methods and did not also intend to commit any act prohibited by law, the jury must return a verdict of not
guilty. To convict Debs, the judge concluded, the jury would have
to find that he had a "specific, willful, criminal intent" and that he
used language having "a natural and reasonably probable tendency
to cause the results which have been forbidden by these provisions
of the espionage law. '28 5 In emphasizing this jury charge and the
Second Circuit decision in Masses, O'Brian and Bettman reiterated the government's position that a conviction for an unlawful
attempt under the Espionage Act could properly be based on a
jury determination of the "bad tendency" of language.
In their reply to Roe, O'Brian and Bettman stated in con280 Id. at 72.
281

Id.

at 73-74 (quoting Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 37-38 (2d Cir.
1917)). For a discussion of the Second Circuit's decision, see supra note 174 and accompanying text. Stedman tried without success to minimize the impact of the Second Circuit's reversal. See Stedman Brief for Debs, supra note 241, at 68-71. Roe simply conceded that
Hand's decision had been overruled. Roe Amicus Brief in Debs, supra note 242, at 10.
282 Brief for the United States in Debs, supra note 241, at 75.
284 See supra text accompanying notes 117-46 (discussing district court instructions
282

Id.

under the Espionage Act).
285 Brief for the United States in Debs, supra note 241, at 76-77.
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clusory language that Debs was not punished for his beliefs or
opinions, which they acknowledged would have been unconstitutional, but for a willful attempt, through the use of language, to
obstruct recruitment. 8 6 Yet O'Brian and Bettman did address
Roe's basic concerns. "Mr. Roe claims," they correctly
paraphrased,
that by reason of the temper of the public during a war, a law
directed at obstruction of the war will inevitably be applied so
as to suppress all critical discussion of the war, and that the
Espionage Act, as applied by the courts and juries, has produced that effect.2 87
O'Brian and Bettman did not dispute Roe's analysis but contended
that his position, in its "zeal for free speech," would subvert the
jury system and the separation of powers.2 88 They construed his
"plea" as an appeal to the Supreme Court "to ignore the constitutional limitations of its functions and correct what he conceives to
be a mistaken legislative policy or mistaken, though lawful,
verdicts."2 89
O'Brian and Bettman responded to most of the defendants'
additional first amendment arguments, especially in their main
brief in Debs. They characterized Stedman's brief as advocating,
contrary to history and precedent, a "field of immunity from Federal interference for all exercise of the vocal organs" and "all products of the printing press." 29 0 They agreed that the first amendment protects "legitimate political agitation"2 9' 1 and "hostile
criticism of the war,"29 2 but stressed that the speeches and articles
for which the defendants in the Espionage Act cases were prosecuted and convicted went well beyond these bounds. Though they
conceded, despite Holmes's decision in Patterson v. Colorado ex
rel. Attorney General,9a that the first amendment might be
broader than Blackstone's rule against prior restraint and might
restrict legislative power over speech to traditional common law
crimes,294 they insisted, contrary to the conclusions of the legal and
2'

Brief for the United States, in Reply to Brief of Gilbert E. Roe, as Anicus Curiae, at

2, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) [hereinafter cited as Reply to Roe].
287 Id.
at 3.
288 Id.
28 Id. at 3-4.
290 Brief for the United States in Debs, supra note 241, at 69.
2I Brief for the United States in Schenck, supra note 278, at 13.
22 Reply to Roe, supra note 286, at 2.
283 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
28 Brief for the United States in Debs, supra note 241, at 81.
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historical scholars cited in the defendants' briefs, that seditious
speech could be punished at common law.2 95 In response to Roe's
lengthy attack on the Sedition Act of 1798, they maintained that
the authorities cited by Roe were "partisan documents put forth in
the heat of a bitter political contest, 2 96 and they pointed out that

John Marshall had written a substantial defense of the Sedition
Act's constitutionality.9 7
Notwithstanding their assertion of Congress's right to punish
seditious libel, O'Brian and Bettman took pains to distinguish the
1917 Espionage Act from the "objectionable features" of the 1798
Sedition Act, which "sought to punish libelous attacks on the Government." The Espionage Act, they asserted, "carefully avoids that
pitfall" by limiting its prohibitions to "interference with the process of raising armies," a valid exercise of the war power vested in
Congress by the Constitution. 29 8 This vital power, upon which the

survival of the nation depends, "includes the power to punish willful obstruction of that process, whether that obstruction be by spoken or written word or by other means.

'299

O'Brian and Bettman

also invoked the war power to refute the argument that the constitutional clause on treason defines the limits of prohibited speech.
This argument, they maintained, would render the war power
meaningless because obstruction of war laws arises more from commercial than from treasonable motives.300 The Constitution defined
treason, but it "has left to Congress the definition of other offenses
which may interfere with the conduct of a war." 301
O'Brian and Bettman ended the government's main brief in
Debs by relying on recent Supreme Court decisions. If the war
Id.
Reply to Roe, supra note 286, at 9 (citing Marshall, The Address of the Minority in
the Virginia Legislature to the People of the State, which contains a vindication of the Constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Laws (Library of Congress, Class E 327, Book A22)).
297Id. at 11. O'Brian and Bettman quoted at length from Marshall's pamphlet. Id. at
12-16. The pamphlets on both sides, they asserted, "were early guns in that contest between
Federal and State rights and between strict and broad construction of the Constitution, in
which Marshall's views prevailed . . . ." Id. at 11.
299 Brief for the United States in Debs, supra note 241, at 83; accord Reply to Roe,
supra note 286, at 9.
299 Brief for the United States in Debs, supra note 241, at 80; accord Brief for the
United States in Frohwerk, supra note 241, at 22-23; Reply to Roe, supra note 286, at 8.
300 Brief for the United States in Frohwerk, supra note 241, at 21-22. The government
observed that laws enacted by Congress under the authority of the war power included the
raising of war revenue, food regulations, and the control of exports, as well as the Espionage
Act. Id. Once again, the government did not view restrictions on speech as presenting special problems.
32
Id. at 22.
295
298
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power allows Congress to deprive a man of liberty or even life in
order to raise an army, as the Supreme Court held in the Selective
Draft Cases,30 2 they reasoned that it must also allow Congress to
punish obstruction of recruitment. 0 3 They maintained that the
"right of self-preservation" identified by the Supreme Court in
United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams 30 4 further supported the
validity of the Espionage Act.30 5 And to support the proposition
that obstruction by speech or press is not entitled to special protection, they cited the Supreme Court's decision only months earlier in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States,3 06 which relied on
the "bad tendency" theory to sustain, as a willful obstruction of
the administration of justice, a newspaper's contempt conviction
for criticizing judicial conduct during a trial. O'Brian and Bettman
maintained that the war power of Congress can limit free speech as
readily as the contempt power of a court.3 0 7 "No authority," they
concluded, "can be adduced for the defendant's contention that
there is a constitutional right to obstruct by speech the exercise of
the power to raise armies so long as the speaker does not urge a
violation of law."' 08
3. The Supreme Court's Decisions. The Supreme Court decided Schenck and Sugarman on March 3, 1919, and Frohwerk
and Debs on March 10, 1919. All four decisions unanimously sustained convictions for speech in violation of the Espionage Act,
and focused more on questions of criminal law than on the first
amendment. In his opinion in Sugarman, Brandeis accepted the

302
33

3-

245 U.S. 366 (1918).

Brief for the United States in Debs, supra note 241, at 89.
194 U.S. 279, 294 (1904). For a discussion of lower court reliance on Turner in Espi-

onage Act cases, see supra note 147 and accompanying text.
Brief for the United States in Debs, supra note 241, at 89-90.
247 U.S. 402, 419 (1918) ("The test . . . is the character of the act done and its
direct tendency to prevent and obstruct. . . ."). Justice Holmes wrote a dissent in Toledo,
in which Justice Brandeis concurred. Holmes, silently retreating from his opinion in Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney General, 205 U.S. 454 (1907), pointed out that the statute
governing the courts' contempt power confined it to "misbehavior of any person in their
presence, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice." Toledo, 247 U.S. at
423 (Holmes, J., dissenting). "Without invoking the rule of strict construction," Holmes concluded that" 'so near as to obstruct' means so near as actually to obstruct-and not merely
near enough to threaten a possible obstruction." Id. Holmes reasoned that under this statute the summary proceeding of contempt, rather than the regular process of indictment, is
justified only if the possibility of obstruction is "imminent" and an emergency demands
"immediate action." Id. at 423-25. Holmes's focus here on imminence and immediacy pro305
"o

vides a striking contrast to his neglect of these requirements in Schenck, Frohwerk, and
Debs, discussed infra notes 317-63 and accompanying text.
307Brief for the United States in Debs, supra note 241, at 89-90.

308 Id. at 89.
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government's invitation to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction
because the defendant did not present any substantial constitutional question.30 9 Brandeis, however, arrived at this conclusion for
reasons different from those the government suggested, which further obscured the underlying first amendment issues. Brandeis did
not respond to the government's argument, derived from Goldman,
Kramer, and Ruthenberg, that the punishment of speech as an attempt to violate a valid statute cannot possibly implicate the first
amendment.3 1 0 Nor did he discuss any of the extensive constitu-

tional claims made in Stedman's brief for Debs, even though
Stedman concluded his brief for Sugarman by referring to those
arguments "in order to save repetition and the time of this
court."311 Rather, Brandeis relied on a factor ignored by the briefs
of the parties; he simply made the plausible but debatable observation that Stedman's only two constitutional exceptions involved
jury instructions which "clearly embodied" his original requests.3 12
In declining jurisdiction and in refusing to discuss first amendment
issues, Brandeis observed that "mere reference to a provision of
the Federal Constitution, or the mere assertion of a claim under it,
does not authorize this court to review a criminal proceeding
",313

Unlike Brandeis in Sugarman, Holmes refused to accept the
government's contention that the first amendment should not, or
need not, be addressed in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs. His treatment of free speech claims, however, essentially extended the prewar tradition of judicial hostility and neglect. Holmes discussed
the first amendment in one paragraph in Schenck,314 and then relied on Schenck in dismissing similar claims in Frohwerk3 5 and
31 He never mentioned the Masses litigation or other
Debs.
protective precedents and legal authorities cited in the defendants'
309

Sugarman v. United States, 249 U.S. 182, 185 (1919).

3'0 See supra notes 273-78 and accompanying text.
31 Sugarman Brief, supra note 241, at 21.
312 Sugarman, 249 U.S. 182, 185 (1919). Brandeis included in his opinion the texts of
Stedman's requested instructions and the trial judge's actual charge. Id. at 184-85.
There were some arguably significant differences between Stedman's requests and the
judge's charge. Stedman had objected to the judge's statement that freedom of speech protects honest criticism of a law. Stedman had not included the word "honest" in his requested instructions, and he maintained, in an argument ignored by Brandeis, that the
judge's charge abridged free speech by allowing the improper inference that criticism must
be honest in order to be lawful. Sugarman Brief, supra note 241, at 20.
s31 Sugarman, 249 U.S. at 184.
314 249 U.S. at 51-52 (1919).
310 249 U.S. at 206-07 (1919).
3s 249 U.S. at 215 (1919).
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briefs. Instead, Holmes concentrated on issues of criminal law317
and accepted most of the positions advocated by the government.
Holmes approved punishment based on the indirect tendency of
speech, upheld substantial judicial deference to jury evaluations of
evidence, and supported greater restrictions on speech during
times of war. In all three cases, his analysis bore a remarkable similarity to his prewar decisions, particularly his opinion in Fox v.
Washington. I
Although Debs was the most thoroughly briefed of the three
cases, Holmes chose Schenck as the vehicle for discussing first
amendment issues, perhaps because the defendants in Schenck,
unlike those in Frohwerk or Debs, had sent antiwar circulars to
men accepted for military service, a somewhat more sympathetic
factual context for affirmance. Holmes maintained that the defendants would not have mailed such a document "unless it had been
intended to have some effect, and we do not see what effect it
could be expected to have upon persons subject to the draft except
to influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out." '1 9 He also
rejected the claim that no conspiracy existed, an argument which,
in Holmes's view, "only impairs the seriousness of the real defence,' 3 20 the first amendment. Holmes then wrote a paragraph on
the first amendment emphasizing his continued adherence to the
3 21
"bad tendency" approach.
Although the briefs in Schenck, unlike those in Debs, did not
attack this approach as being inconsistent with the first amendment, Holmes assumed that Schenck claimed first amendment

317 Kalven pointed out that Holmes treated Debs as "a routine criminal appeal,"
Kalven, supra note 14, at 238, an observation Gunther applied to Schenck and Frohwerk as
well. Gunther, supra note 14, at 736 n.83. "Read freshly with the eyes of today," Kalven
accurately concluded, "the outcome in Debs is shocking." Kalven, supra note 14, at 236. But
read in the context of Supreme Court decisions in the generation preceding Debs, and of the
lower court decisions in Espionage Act cases, the reasoning and results in all of these cases
are depressingly predictable.
319 236 U.S. 273 (1915). In Fox, Holmes upheld the conviction of the editor of an article
advocating nude bathing. Holmes strained to reject Gilbert Roe's argument that the applicable statute, which punished publications for their "bad tendency," was "an unjustifiable
restriction of liberty and too vague for a criminal law." Id. at 277; see Corwin, supra note
14, at 326-29 (comparing Fox and Schenck and concluding they are "indistinguishable");
Rabban, supra note 4, at 534-36 (discussing Fox).
3,9 Schenck, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919).
310 Id. at 50. On the previous page, Holmes had made clear that he considered the first
amendment the defendants' "real defence." He stated that the defendants brought their
case on first amendment grounds and "have argued some other points also of which we must
dispose." Id. at 49.
3
Id. at 51-52.
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protection even if the circulars did tend to obstruct the draft.2 2
Holmes spent the remainder of the paragraph emphasizing his disagreement. He observed that Goldman could be considered to dispose of Schenck, but he "thought fit to add a few words" on the
first amendment because the defendants raised this constitutional
concern and Goldman did not specifically refer to it.3 23 Holmes re-

treated from his position equating the first amendment with
Blackstone's prohibition against prior restraints.324 He also admitted that "in many places and in ordinary times" the publications
punished in Schenck would be protected by the first amendment.
But he pointed out that "the character of
every act depends upon
3 25
the circumstances in which it is done.

Holmes then wrote the two sentences that Chafee soon made
famous as the "clear and present danger" standard:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has 3a26 right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree.

Though the words "clear and present danger," as Chafee immediately recognized,3

27

had protective overtones, in its context this

passage does not appear to announce a libertarian standard of first
amendment interpretation. In the sentence immediately following,
Holmes apparently concluded that the war power can override the
first amendment, addressing the issue left open by Hand in Masses
and debated in the briefs in Debs. "When a nation is at war,"
Holmes reasoned, "many things that might be said in time of
peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will
322 Id. at

51.
Id. at 52.
"It well may be," Holmes acknowledged, "that the prohibition of laws abridging the
freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them may have
been the main purpose, as intimated in Pattersonv. Colorado,205 U.S. 454, 462." 249 U.S.
at 51-52.
326 249 U.S. at 52. Holmes illustrated this point in language which has since become
famous: "The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic." Id. He also cited a prewar free speech case,
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911), which upheld a labor injunction by distinguishing normal speech from an unlawful conspiracy giving language "a
force not inhering in the words themselves." See Rabban, supra note 4, at 531-32 (discussing Gompers).
326 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
327 See supra notes 551-66 and accompanying text (discussing Chafee's interpretation
of "clear and present danger").
323
324
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not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right."328 The "circumstances" of war, Holmes seemed to be saying, are themselves
likely "to create a clear and present danger" that speech will hinder the nation's effort, thereby producing one of "the substantive
evils Congress has a right to prevent." In his very next sentence,
moreover, Holmes recurred to the "bad tendency" doctrine. Citing
Goldman, Holmes concluded: "If the act (speaking, or circulating a
paper), its tendency and the intent with which it is done are the
same, we perceive no ground for saying that success alone warrants
making the act a crime." '2 9 Like the lower federal courts in Espionage Act cases,330 Holmes in Schenck inferred intent from the
probable consequences and surrounding circumstances of speech.
This sequence, contrary to the subsequent assertions of Chafee and
others, strongly suggests that Holmes did not consider "clear and
present danger" a libertarian replacement for the "bad tendency"
doctrine he himself had often invoked in prior decisions. It seems
inconceivable that Holmes would use the word "tendency," stress
the unimportance of a successful act, and rely on cases that did not
demonstrate any sensitivity to free speech in order to elaborate a
libertarian test designed as a constitutional bar to convictions
based on predicting the tendency of speech. 31
Holmes's decisions in Frohwerk and Debs relied on Schenck
and provide further proof that he did not regard any of these opinions as a significant departure from his restrictive prewar analysis
of speech. Neither Frohwerk nor Debs contained the phrase "clear
and present danger" and both, on weaker facts than Schenck, sustained convictions under the Espionage Act by relying on the "bad
tendency" theory.
In discussing the first amendment in Frohwerk, Holmes considered it necessary to add only slightly to what he had already
said in Schenck. He cited one prewar case332 for the proposition
that the first amendment was "not[] intended to give immunity for
,"' Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
329

Id.

111See supra notes 123, 183-85, 194-205 and accompanying text (discussing lower court
analysis of intent).
" "Clear and present danger," Justice Frankfurter subsequently claimed, "itself is an
expression of tendency and not of accomplishment, and the literary difference between it
and 'reasonable tendency' is not of constitutional dimension." Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252, 296 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
"I Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897); see Rabban, supra note 4, at 539-40
(discussing this case).
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every possible use of language." No "competent person," Holmes
commented, would consider a law against counseling murder "an
unconstitutional interference with free speech." 3 ' After citing
Schenck to support his statement "that a person may be convicted
of a conspiracy to obstruct recruiting by words of persuasion,
he treated the Frohwerk case as a matter of criminal law.33 5 As
Holmes observed, Frohwerk's publications consisted of "the usual
repetition that we went to war to protect the loans of Wall
Street."3 6 Even though Frohwerk had deplored draft riots, Holmes
did not find "much to choose ' 337 between his article and Schenck's
"impassioned language ' 1' 38 against the draft, evidently because
Frohwerk used words "that might be taken to convey an innuendo
of a different sort. 33 9 Holmes's reliance on possible innuendo and
his metaphor that "a little breath would be enough to kindle a
flame"3 40 demonstrate his continued use of the "bad tendency"
theory to punish speech, as does his acknowledgment that
Frohwerk, unlike Schenck, had not made any special effort to contact men eligible for the draft.3 41
Consistent with Goldman, which he did not cite, Holmes also
gave great deference to the factual determinations by the jury.
Holmes suggested that the record in Frohwerk was inadequate and
that a more complete one might have provided grounds for reversing "the very severe penalty imposed." But Holmes felt obligated
to reach his decision "on the record as it is." Because he did "not
know how strong the Government's evidence may have been," he
found it impossible to say "that the articles could not furnish a
basis for a conviction. '342 Holmes, as the government had urged in
its briefs, also rejected attacks on the lack of specificity in the indictment3 43 even though, as Stedman effectively argued in his brief
3 44
for Debs, this very vagueness encourages unsatisfactory records.

333249 U.S. 204, 206.
334

Id.

315Weaknesses in the record, Holmes stated, "have caused us to consider the case with
more anxiety than if it presented only the constitutional question which was the theme of
the principal argument here." Id.
336

Id. at 207.

337Id.

11

Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51.

339Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 207.
340

Id. at 209.

34 Id. at 208.
341 Id. at 209.
343 Id. at 209-10.
344 See Stedman Brief for Debs, supra note 241, at 38.
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And Holmes dismissed the suggestion that the treason clause limits the punishment for speech by claiming that it "need no more
than to be stated" to be refuted.3

45

Holmes did acknowledge in

Frohwerk that even during war some speech cannot be penalized:
"We do not lose our right to condemn either measures or men," he
reasoned, "because the Country is at war." 4 ' But he negated the
potential value of his one libertarian concession by refusing to
limit jury determinations of the possible consequences of speech.
Even more clearly than Frohwerk, Debs demonstrated
Holmes's continued reliance on the tendency of speech as the test
for its legality and his willingness, bordering on eagerness, to sustain jury findings of fact. Despite the excellence and thoroughness
of the analysis in the briefs, which contained by far the most extensive discussions of the first amendment among all the briefs
filed in the Supreme Court during the preceding generation,4
Holmes, in a peremptory sentence, stated that any first amendment issues in Debs were "disposed of' in Schenck

4s

He also as-

serted, with no explanation beyond the citation of Frohwerk, that
the indictment was sufficient.

49

As O'Brian and Bettman had

urged in their brief for the government,35 Holmes treated Debs as
if it presented evidentiary rather than constitutional questions, but
at least Holmes, in contrast to Chief Justice White in Goldman,
Kramer, and Ruthenberg, 51 explained in Debs the basis for his
conclusion that the evidence supported the guilty verdict.
Holmes acknowledged that the "main theme of ...

[Debs's]

speech was socialism, its growth, and a prophecy of its ultimate
success," topics which could not be punished under the Espionage
Act.3 52 However, Holmes added, "if a part or the manifest intent of
the more general utterances was to encourage those present to obstruct the recruiting service and if in such passages such encouragement was directly given, the immunity of the general theme
may not be enough to protect the speech. 3' 53 Later in his opinion,
Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 210; see supra note
Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 208.
3"' See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying
348 Debs, 249 U.S. at 215.
349 Id.
350 See supra notes 270-72 and accompanying
351 See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying
345

110 (discussing this claim).

"

:52

text.

text.
text.

Debs, 249 U.S. at 212.

53 Id. at 212-13. Holmes later repeated that if the "natural and intended effect" of

Debs's speech "would be to obstruct recruiting," it "would not be protected by reason of its
being part of a general program and expressions of a general and conscientious belief." Id.
at 215.
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Holmes suggested that the encouragement contained in a part of
the speech need not be direct. Much of Debs's speech, he pointed
out, "had only the indirect though not necessarily ineffective bearing on the offences alleged."3 "4 The fact that Debs told his audience that prudence required him not to disclose the full force of
his opposition to the war was, for Holmes, an intimation that they
"might infer that he meant more" rather than an indication, to be
counted in Debs's favor, that he had tried to avoid the prohibitions
of the Espionage Act. 5 5 Based on these observations, Holmes concluded that the speech contained sufficient evidence "to warrant
the jury in finding that one purpose of the speech, whether incidental or not does not matter, was to oppose not only war in general but this war, and that the opposition was so expressed that its
natural and intended effect would be to obstruct recruiting. '356
Consistent with the approach of all judges except Learned
Hand in Masses, Holmes stated that evaluating the tendency of
language as evidence of the speaker's intent is a principle "too well
established and too manifestly good sense to need citation of the
books. 35 7 Holmes stressed his approval of punishing speech for its
"bad tendency" by following the government's lead in praising the
trial judge's charge to the jury. 5 8 Holmes apparently approved the
common practice whereby judges, after giving juries essentially
neutral instructions, allowed them to consider virtually any speech
that the government considered objectionable.3 59 He also rejected
Stedman's objection to the admissibility at trial of the "Anti-war
Proclamation and Program" of the Socialist Party, which, according to Holmes, "contained the usual suggestion that capitalism was

'

Id. at 214.

1"1Id.

at 213. The laughter and applause from the audience that followed these statements by Debs provides support for Holmes's conclusion. See R. GINGER, supra note 240, at
356. In his biographer's opinion, Debs intended his speech not simply "to arouse resentment
and opposition to the war," but also "to taunt the Federal authorities into placing him on
trial." Id. at 353. I am grateful to Benno Schmidt for highlighting these passages during a
faculty seminar he gave at the University of Texas School of Law on Jan. 20, 1983.
356 Debs, 249 U.S. at 214-15.
357 Id. at 216. Holmes had read Hand's opinion in Masses before writing his opinions in
Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs. Less than a month before the Supreme Court announced
these decisions, Holmes complimented Hand on the "admirable form" of Masses while adding that "I haven't the details in my mind and will assume for present purposes that I
should come to a different result." Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Learned
Hand (Feb. 25, 1919) (Learned Hand Papers, Box 103, Folder 24, Harvard Law School Library) [hereinafter cited as Hand Papers], reprintedin Gunther, supra note 14, at 758.
358 Debs, 249 U.S. at 214-15; see supra note 283 and accompanying text (praise of trial
judge in government brief).
31, See supra notes 123-37 and accompanying text (discussing jury instructions).
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the cause of the war." 60 Holmes reasoned that Debs's acceptance
of this program would be evidence of his intent to obstruct the
recruitment service. In Debs, as in Frohwerk, Holmes deferred to
jury findings on the indirect tendency of speech." 1
Holmes continued the prewar judicial tradition of hostility to
first amendment values by using the "bad tendency" theory to reject free speech claims in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs. Even
within this framework, he did not take as his model the few decisions by district and circuit judges, some of which had been
brought to his attention in the defendants' briefs, 83 2 that protected
some antiwar speech by requiring specificity in indictments and a
direct relationship between speech and potential effects.36 3 Instead,
Holmes adopted the looser construction of the Espionage Act that
had prevailed in the lower federal courts.
V.

THE DOCTRINAL ORIGINS OF "CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER

' 3 64

In 1922, Chafee wrote Holmes to ask for "[a]ny light that you
can give me on the background of your opinion in the Schenck
case." In particular, Chafee wondered if "your test of clear and
present danger. . . was at all suggested to you by any writers on
' 5
36
the subject or was the result entirely of your reflections.
Holmes's brief response confirms the analysis suggested by the
texts of Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, and provides fascinating insights into the phrase that had already assumed crucial importance
in first amendment interpretation. Apologizing for having to
"make a hurried answer" based on "ancient memory," Holmes
replied:
The expression that you refer to was not helped by any book
that I know of. I think it came without doubt after the later
cases (and probably you-I do not remember exactly) had
taught me that in the earlier Paterson [sic] case, if that was
the name of it, I had taken Blackstone and Parker of Mass. as
unrefuted, wrongly. I simply was ignorant. But I did think
360

249 U.S. at 215-16.

, Id.
" See Roe Amicus Brief in Debs, supra note 242, at 8-10; Stedman Brief for Debs,
supra note 241, at 37; Brief for Schenck, supra note 250, at 7-14.
:'3 See supra notes 194-205 and accompanying text.
" Valuable discussions with William Powers helped clarify the contents and organization of this section.
'5 Letter from Zechariah Chafee, Jr., to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (June 9, 1922)
(Chafee Papers, supra note 189, Box 14, Folder 12). Chafee hoped that this test would
"drive out the old notion of bad tendency," a comment to which Holmes did not reply.
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hard on this matter of attempts in my Common Law and a
Mass. case-later in the Swift case (U.S.)-and I thought it
out unhelped 6 s
"Parker of Mass." is Isaac Parker, the former Chief Justice of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, whose 1825 decision in
Commonwealth v. Blanding 67 approved Blackstone's rule against
prior restraints. Holmes's reference to the "later cases" is unclear;
the Supreme Court did not modify its approval of Blackstone in
Patterson v. Colorado368 until Holmes's own opinion in Schenck.
Perhaps Holmes was thinking of Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United
States,3 69 in which he, joined by Justice Brandeis just months

before Schenck, dissented in a case similar to Patterson. In any
event, Holmes's letter to Chafee, in language understandably more
explicit than that of a judicial decision, underlined the retreat
from Patterson which he signaled in the text of his Schenck
opinion.
Holmes's acknowledgment of his reliance on his earlier thinking about the law of criminal attempts, particularly on his Common Law,3 70 is even more revealing because it provides convincing

"I

Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (June 12, 1922)
(Chafee Papers, supra note 189, Box 14, Folder 12). This letter was handwritten and is
difficult to decipher. Ragan, supra note 14, at 26 & n.12, reads "Patriotic" where I read
"Paterson," and claims that Holmes was referring to Schenck. Because Schenck is the case
in which Holmes first used the words "clear and present danger," it is unlikely that he
would refer to Schenck as an "earlier" case when discussing the origins of this phrase. See
Bogen, supra note 14, at 100 & n. 20 (independently coming to the same conclusion about
Holmes's handwriting). Ragan's claim that the "later cases" refer to Frohwerk and Debs, id.
at 26 n.12, is also improbable. Holmes retreated from Blackstone's view, which he had accepted in Patterson, in the text of Schenck itself, and Schenck preceded Frohwerk and
Debs. See supra note 324 and text accompanying note 293. These corrections do not alter
my view that Ragan's article contains an excellent analysis of the important relationship

between Holmes and Chafee.
387 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 313 (1825).
368 Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney General, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (quoting
Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) at 313).
369 247 U.S. 402, 422 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see supra note 306 and accompanying text (discussing Toledo).
370 O.W. HOLMES, supra note 16. M. HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE
PROVING YEARS, 1870-1882 (1963), the second volume of Howe's biography of Holmes, places
The Common Law "at the center of the stage." Id. at 253. See id. at 160-200 for Howe's
discussion of some of the themes that I will emphasize in the text that follows. Rogat, The
Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 213 (1964), is an exceptionally profound article that
examines the complex relationships between Holmes's life and work, and places them in
historical context. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 48-56 (1977), contains a trenchant summary of The Common Law. Gilmore's analysis exhibits the same fearless cynicism
as Holmes's thought.
Edmund Wilson's book on Civil War literature includes a revealing chapter on Holmes.
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additional support for the conclusion, suggested by the language of
his first Espionage Act opinions, that he did not use the words
"clear and present danger" as a libertarian alternative to the "bad
tendency" test. Holmes's discussion of attempts, in this book and
in his subsequent opinions, is part of a cohesive framework of analysis that informed his approach to all legal questions. A review of
the key doctrines of The Common Law helps relate his Espionage
Act decisions to the totality of his work.
A.

The Common Law

Holmes completed The Common Law, "the most important
book on law ever written by an American, 3 7 1 in 1881, the week
before his fortieth birthday. This milestone was particularly important to Holmes, who believed that "if a man was to do anything
he must do it before 40. ' 's 72 Holmes tried to reduce the common
law to fundamental principles of broad applicability. For the
remaining fifty years of his long life, he relied on these principles,
and often on the precise language of The Common Law, even in
constitutional adjudication.3 73 "Both as an aphorist and as a
judge," Yosal Rogat has pointed out, "Holmes rarely changed his
mind."3MU As Brandeis had observed of Holmes: "He has said many
things in their ultimate terms, and as new instances arise they just
3' 7 5
fit in.
1. Fundamental Themes. Two fundamental themes pervade
The Common Law. Holmes maintained that legal development
necessarily replaces internal and moral standards with external
and objective ones and that the law must enforce the community's
will against individual claims. Near the beginning of his book,
E. WILsoN, PATRiOTic GoRE 743-96 (1962). Wilson observes that Holmes, perhaps uniquely
among judges, never dissociated his professional work from broader issues. Id. at 781.
371 Rogat, supra note 370, at 214.
372 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Mrs. Charles S. Hamlin (Oct. 12, 1930),
quoted in M. HowE, supra note 370, at 135. The Common Law, according to Howe, was the
"achievement by which he wanted to be judged at the age of forty." M. HowE, supra note
370, at 135. Holmes wrote The Common Law while in private practice and spent virtually all
his non-practicing time over a six-year period on this project. Id. at 253. Edmund Wilson
also emphasizes Holmes's concentrated ambition. E. WsON, supra note 370, at 754-56.
3' Rogat, supra note 370, at 214, 247. According to Howe, Holmes, even in teaching
constitutional law, was most interested in the "philosophical structure and historic roots of
the common law." M. HowE, supra note 370, at 31. Soon after he completed The Common
Law, Holmes was appointed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and never
wrote another scholarly book. Thus The Common Law was his only comprehensive theoreti-

cal work. G. GiLMORE, supra note 370, at 51.
3

Rogat, supra note 370, at 214.

3' Quoted in id. at 247.
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Holmes promised that he would demonstrate that the law, though
rooted in primitive desires for revenge against blameworthy conduct and often retaining the language of morals, "is continually
transmuting those moral standards into external or objective ones,
from which the actual guilt of the party concerned is wholly eliminated.

37

6

A few pages later, he announced his other major theme:

"The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should
correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong."'s3 Holmes assumed that communities, like individuals, are ultimately motivated by "justifiable selfpreference." "If a man is on a plank in the deep sea which will only
float one," he elaborated, "and a stranger lays hold of it, he will
thrust him off if he can. When the
state finds itself in a similar
3 78
position, it does the same thing.

With obvious disdain, Holmes quickly dismissed the Kantian
argument that the harshness of the second theme denies men their
inherent natural rights to equality and reduces them to things.3 7 9

"If man lives in society," Holmes observed sardonically, "he is liable to find himself so treated."380 Kant's moralistic "dogma of
equality" might be a laudable ideal, but, Holmes maintained, rules
of law should be based on tougher, more realistic views about
human nature.381 Holmes's views were distinctly those of a Social
Darwinist.382 The law appropriately expresses the community's
376 O.W. HOLMES, supra note 16, at 38. Holmes was much more interested in demonstrating the contemporary pervasiveness of external standards throughout the law than in
tracing their historical roots. See M. HowE, supra note 370, at 168-69. Gilmore persuasively
argues that the lectures constituting The Common Law only
pretend to be a historical survey of the development of a few fundamental common law
principles which, according to Holmes, had recurrently manifested themselves in the
several fields he chose to deal with-principally criminal law, torts, and contracts. In
fact, the historical underpinning was patently absurd, even when it had not been deliberately distorted. I do not mean to suggest that Holmes was a poor historian or that he
did not know what he was doing. He was an excellent historian and knew more about
what he was doing than most of us do. He was making a highly original, essentially
philosophical statement about the nature of law. For reasons which he never explained,
he chose to dress his statement in the misleading disguise of pseudo-history. Perhaps
the disguise was a way of sugarcoating the pill-of making the new and unfamiliar
appear to be old and familiar. Perhaps it was an elaborate joke which it amused
Holmes, who was of a sardonic turn of mind, to play on his audience.
G. GmMORE, supra note 370, at 52.
37
O.W. HOLMES, supra note 16, at 41.
378 Id. at 44.
379 Id. at 42-44.

380 Id. at 44.

Id. at 43-44.
Legislation, Holmes asserted in an unsigned law review comment, "like every other
device of man or beast, must tend in the long run to aid the survival of the fittest." 7 AM. L.
381

32
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self-preference, he reiterated, by treating "the individual as a
means to an end, and uses him as a tool to increase the general
' S3 s
welfare at his own expense.
2. The Relationship Between Community Will and Objective
Standards. In his typically cryptic manner,3 8 4 Holmes did not explain the full meaning of his often brilliant prose. He gave the
clear impression that his two fundamental themes were related,
but never stated precisely how. He did, however, leave enough
hints to allow a plausible reconstruction.
Holmes apparently believed that the general welfare is
achieved when the community deters actions it deems dangerous
or harmful. Thus the law is primarily designed "only to induce external conformity to rule,"38s 5 and prevention of deviance becomes
"the chief and only universal purpose of punishment. 38 6 In this
scheme, a theory of retribution that posits a "mystic bond between
wrong and punishment"3 8 7 has no function and may even interfere
with the realization of social goals. Holmes attributed the retributive theory of justice to the idealism he discredited as
unrealistic.3 88
Holmes also seemed to deny that punishing or rewarding individual motives has any bearing on the desired social results. He
therefore entirely divorced individual blameworthiness from liability. He acknowledged that the modern legal system includes the
concept of culpability, which he considered a psychological necessity whose "denial would shock the moral sense of any civilized

Rav. 583, 583-84 (1873), quoted in M. HowE, supra note 370, at 45. He rejected the "tacit
assumption of the solidarity of the interests of society," and claimed instead that the "struggle for life" that "is constantly putting the interests of men at variance with those of the
lower animals ...is equally the law of human existence." Id., quoted in part in M. HowE,
supra note 370, at 43-44. "Holmes's demand, in effect, was that we recognize that the Darwinian view of nature compels an adjustment in traditional theories of law and of sovereignty." M. HOWE, supra note 370, at 44. Rogat calls Holmes a "crude" Social Darwinist.
Rogat, supra note 370, at 231.
O.W. HOLMES, supra note 16, at 46-47.
Felix Frankfurter observed this quality in Holmes's judicial opinions. Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 523 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See generally, G. GiLMoRE, supra note 370, at 52, 56; Rogat, supra note 370, at 238-39. It is reassuring that even Edmund Wilson found The Common Law "opaque." E. WiLSON, supra note
370, at 780.
:83 O.W. HOLMES, supra note 16, at 49.
se Id. at 46.
3s7 Id.

at 42.
See id. at 42-47. See generally Rogat, supra note 370, at 225 (criticizing Holmes's
failure to acknowledge the importance of "general commitments to fairness, generality and
neutrality" as constituting a "fundamentally impoverished account of legal phenomena").
3"

1270

The University of Chicago Law Review

[50:1205

community."389 But culpability is retained only by imposing liability for conduct that the community considers blameworthy in an
idealized average man. Holmes reasoned that "a law which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average
member of the community would be too severe for that community
to bear. 3 90 However, the conduct of this average man "of ordinary
intelligence and reasonable prudence," often represented by the
jury, "is an external or objective standard when applied to any
given individual." Someone "morally without stain" may nevertheless be punished if he lacks the qualities of the average man.31
The origins of Holmes's attachment to externality may have
been more psychological than logical. 92 Certainly, the connection
he posited between community will and "external conformity to
rule 3 9' does not entail his conclusion that attention to individual
motives is unrelated to achieving this conformity. An individual's
3 94
internal state may affect his likelihood of obeying a given rule,
as Holmes himself recognized in extreme cases such as infancy and
39 5
madness.
Whatever the source of Holmes's views, he spent much of The
Common Law "reducing" various forms of modern legal liability to
external standards. He observed that "acts, taken apart from their

O.W. HOLMES, supra note 16, at 50; see id. at 49-51.
:goId. at 50.
38

391

Id. at 51.

Howe considers Holmes's "desire for certainty in law" the principal explanation for
his emphasis on externality. M. HOWE, supra note 370, at 197. Rogat argues convincingly
that Howe's view is incomplete. According to Rogat, Holmes, rather than appreciating certainty more than his contemporaries, "minded less ... [its] unjust consequences." Rogat,
supra note 370, at 221-22. Much of the brilliance of Rogat's article lies in its demonstration
that Holmes's obsession with external standards of liability, as well as many of his other
professional and personal characteristics, originated in his fundamental detachment from
life, a trait he shared with other New England Brahmins estranged from, and made marginal by, the Gilded Age. Id. at 228-43.
311 O.W. HOLMES, supra note 16, at 49.
"'
"Even if the general justification of punishment is the utilitarian aim of preventing
harm," H.L.A. Hart observed in a review of Howe's 1963 edition of The Common Law,
it is still perfectly intelligible that we should defer to principles of justice or fairness to
individuals and not punish those who lack the capacity or fair opportunity to obey. It is
simply not true that such a concern with the individual only makes sense within a
392

system of retribution ....

Hart, Book Review, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Oct. 17, 1963, at 15-16; see infra note 401 (actor's
personality key element of modern theories of criminal attempt).
O5.W. HOLMES, supra note 16, at 50. Aside from such exceptions, Holmes reiterated,
external standards "take no account of incapacities." Id. "If they fall on any one class
harder than on another," he observed with the acquiescence of the Social Darwinist, "it is
on the weakest." Id. at 51.

1983]

Emergence of First Amendment Doctrine

1271

surrounding circumstances, are indifferent to the law,"39 6 and concluded that most "acts are rendered criminal because they are
done under circumstances in which they will probably cause some
harm which the law seeks to prevent. 3 97 Holmes reiterated that
the foresight of probable harm on which liability depends must be
determined by reference to the "prudent man, that is, by general
experience," 8 and not by investigating the consciousness of a particular defendant.
B.

The Application of Fundamental Themes to Substantive Law

Holmes devoted much of The Common Law to applying his
fundamental themes to different substantive areas of the law. His
belief in the priority of community will is apparent throughout the
book, but he emphasized the centrality of external and objective
standards. His analyses of criminal attempts and torts most directly foreshadow his opinions almost forty years later in Schenck,
Frohwerk, and Debs.
1. Criminal Attempts. Holmes's discussion of the law of criminal attempts, the specific portion of The Common Law he mentioned in his letter to Chafee,5 9 is particularly interesting and important because the speeches at issue in Schenck, Frohwerk, and
Debs were punished as attempts to violate the Espionage Act.
Holmes defined an attempt as an overt act that "has failed to
bring about the result which would have given it the character of
the principal crime. ' 40 0 The act is punished as an attempt "if, supposing it to have produced its natural and probable effect, it would
have have amounted to a substantive crime." The failure of an act
to produce its natural consequences, while properly mitigating the
severity of punishment, should not remove liability entirely if the
preventive purpose of law is maintained. Thus, in the law of attempts, as in the criminal law generally, "[a]cts should be judged
by their tendency under the known circumstances, not by the actual intent which accompanies them.140 1 The common "statement

'"
It

3s

Id. at 54.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 56; see id. at 53-57. A legislature, Holmes added, can create liability for acts

that it considers dangerous but are not generally recognized as such. Id. at 58-59.

See supra note 366 and accompanying text.
00 O.W. HOLMES, supra note 16, at 65.

:99

411 Id. at 66. As Francis Allen has pointed out, "modern students of the criminal law
have, in general, rejected Holmes' broad espousal of the so-called objective theory of culpability." Allen, Mr. Justice Holmes: Some Modern Views-Criminal Law, 31 U. CHI.L. REV.
257, 257 (1964). The Model Penal Code, for example, includes "culpability" in its definition
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that a man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his
acts," a frequent assertion of federal judges in Espionage Act decisions, was, for Holmes, "a mere fiction disguising the true theory,' ' 40 2 another vestige of moral terminology in a mature legal sys-

tem actually based on external and objective standards.
Holmes recognized that actual intent is an element of many
crimes. Yet he cleverly assimilated even these crimes into his general theory. For Holmes, the main purpose for punishing an act is
"to prevent some harm which is foreseen as likely to follow that
act under the circumstances in which it is done." Typically, prediction is based on "the common working of natural causes as shown
by experience.

' 40 3

But sometimes an otherwise innocent act is ren-

dered dangerous because the accompanying actual intent "raises a
probability that it will be followed by such other acts and events as
will all together result in harm." Salvaging his preference for objective over moral standards, Holmes emphasized that actual intent is
important "not to show that the act was wicked, but to show that
it was likely to be followed by hurtful consequences" that the law
properly seeks to prevent.04
Holmes pointed out that bad intent does not necessarily entail
liability for a criminal attempt and alluded to judges' prior difficulty in deciding when actual intent is relevant. His proposed solution reiterated his emphasis on the primacy of community demands. "Public policy, that is to say, legislative considerations, are
at the bottom of the matter .... ",405 The specific considerations
identified by Holmes in The Common Law--"the nearness of the
danger, the greatness of the harm," the "degree of apprehenof attempt and refers to the actors' purposes and beliefs. MODEL PENAL CODE § 501(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); see Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes

in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 571, 573 (1961). Drafters of the Model Penal Code explicitly
rejected Holmes's approach to criminal attempts. "The primary purpose of punishing attempts," Wechsler, Jones, and Korn maintained, "is to neutralize dangerous individuals and
not to deter dangerous acts." They did concede, however, that dangerous conduct "is not
entirely irrelevant" because it has "some relation to the dangerousness of the actor's personality." Id. at 587.
402 O.W. HOLMES, supra note 16, at 66 n.2; see id. at 134, 136. Thurman Arnold, who
regarded the general concept of a criminal attempt as a useless abstraction, believed that all
definitions of intent, whether based on presumed intent or probable consequences, "run into
one another" and are all meaningless fictions. Arnold, Criminal Attempts-The Rise and
Fall of an Abstraction, 40 YALE L.J. 53, 68, 79-80 (1930).
O.W. HOLMES, supra note 16, at 67.
"' Id. at 68; see id. at 76. But see Allen, supra note 401, at 258.
O.W. HOLMES, supra note 16, at 68.
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sion, ' 40 6 and "the degree of probability that the crime will be accomplished" 4 0 7-foreshadow his formulation of "clear and present
danger" in Schenck.
2. Torts. Throughout The Common Law Holmes emphasized
his position that the same general principles apply to both criminal
and civil liability.4 08 Holmes faced his greatest challenge in proving
that torts based on fraud, malice, and intent-words that denote
"actual wickedness"-also depend on objective and external,
,rather than moral and internal, standards. 40 9 This discussion has a
double significance: it emphasizes Holmes's adherence to his general theory of liability, and, because several of these torts involve
the use of language, it anticipates his later analysis of speech in the
Espionage Act cases.
Holmes claimed that the tort of deceit, which consists of uttering false statements with the intent that they persuade another
person to act to his detriment, can be "reduced" to external standards in the same manner as other torts and crimes. Here again,
intent is based on foresight of consequences judged by "common
experience," not by the internal state of mind of a particular defendant. 410 Knowledge of falsity is measured not by the actual

406Id.
"I Id. at 69. In a striking example of his deference to the community will, Holmes
illustrated his approach by citing an Alabama decision where "a slave who ran after a white
woman, but desisted before he caught her, ha[d] been convicted of an attempt to commit
rape." Id. at 68 (citing Lewis v. State, 35 Ala. 380 (1860)). "No doubt the fears peculiar to a
slave-owning community," Holmes observed without further comment about a community
he fought against during the Civil War, "had their share in the conviction. . . ." Id. at 69.
Holmes's counterexample underlines this deference. He observed that a man cannot be
punished for attempted murder, if, after starting out for the location of the intended murder, an obstacle in the course of travel forces him to return home. Id. at 68. Holmes posited
no logical distinction between this hypothetical case and the Alabama rape decision. Indeed,
the nearness of the danger and the probability of completion seem identical, and murder is
a greater harm than rape. Only the "degree of apprehension" of slaves by their owners
could, under Holmes's analysis, account for the different results.
Given these views, it is not surprising that Holmes, almost 40 years later, deferred to
judgments by Congress and juries that antiwar speech constituted an attempt to interfere
with the American military effort during World War I.
408 See, e.g., id. at 2, 44, 77, 130-31, 161-63. In discussing the torts of trespass and negligence, Holmes reminded his reader that "law takes no account of the infinite varieties of
temperament, intellect, and education which make the internal character of a given act so
different in different men." The general welfare, he insisted, requires "a certain average of
conduct, a sacrifice of individual peculiarities going beyond a certain point." Id. at 108. In
tort law, as in criminal law, liability arises "from failure to comply with fixed and uniform
standards of external conduct, which every man is presumed and required to know." Id. at
111.
401Id. at 130-31.
4 0 Id.
at 133; see id. at 132-34.
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knowledge or guilt of the defendant, but by an objective standard
determined by reference to the average member of a community.4 1 1
Similarly, Holmes argued that the law of slander does not require actual malice or actual intent. Rather, liability rests on the
"manifest tendency" of words to harm, whether or not the defendant actually intended this effect. 412 As in his discussion of criminal attempts that involve actual intent, Holmes maintained that
tort liability varies with the likelihood and the seriousness of the
danger. "The possibility of a great danger has the same effect as
the probability of a less one, and the law throws the risk of the
venture on the person who introduces the peril into the community. ' 413 Liability, he added, does not depend on foresight of specific harm, but on circumstances from which a prudent man would
perceive danger.4 14
C. Prewar Decisions by Holmes in Attempt Cases
Holmes's prewar decisions in cases involving attempts connect
The Common Law with his first Espionage Act decisions and
demonstrate the essential consistency of his analysis through almost four decades. In Swift & Co. v. United States, 41 5 the Supreme Court case he identified in his letter to Chafee, 41" Holmes
4 117
twice cited his decision in Commonwealth v. Peasee,
probably
the "Mass. case" to which he also referred. And in Peaslee,Holmes
relied on the opinion he wrote in Commonwealth v. Kennedy.4 8 In
all three cases, Holmes drew heavily on his discussion of attempts
in The Common Law.
In Kennedy, Holmes repeated his underlying emphasis on externality and foreseeability. "As the aim of the law is not to punish
sins, but is to prevent certain external results, the act done must
411

Id. at 137.

412 Id. at 138.
413 Id. at 154-55. For example, Holmes observed that the "peril of conduct" begins earlier for slander than for deceit because "the tendency of slander is more universally harmful." Id. at 140.
414 Id. at 147. To a perceptive modern critic, "Holmes' major preoccupations with underlying theory and with the shift from moral to external standards yield sophisticated and
arresting results when applied to negligence." But these preoccupations, when applied to
fraud, malice, and intent, seem "doctrinaire, unilluminating and even a little foolish."
Kalven, Mr. Justice Holmes: Some Modern Views-Torts, 31 U. CHL L. Rv. 263, 266
(194).
415 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
416 See supra note 366 and accompanying text.
417 177 Mass. 267, 59 N.E. 55 (1901), cited in Swift, 196 U.S. at 396, 406.
418 170 Mass. 18, 48 N.E. 770 (1897), cited in Peaslee, 177 Mass. at 272, 59 N.E. at 56.
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come pretty near to accomplishing that result before the law will
notice it."' 1 9 He pointed out that determinations of proximity depend on surrounding circumstances and alluded to additional bases of liability, including "the gravity of the crime, the uncertainty
of the result, and the seriousness of the apprehension." Affirming a
conviction for attempted murder by poison, Holmes stated that an
"unlawful application of poison is [such] an evil [that] . . . even if
not enough to kill, [it] would warrant holding the liability for an
attempt to begin at a point more remote from the possibility of
accomplishing what is expected than might be the case with lighter
420
crimes."
Peaslee was an appeal of a conviction for an unsuccessful attempt to burn a building by soliciting a servant to light combustibles arranged by the defendant. Holmes, relying on Kennedy,
again observed that the "degree of proximity" necessary to constitute an attempt "may vary with circumstances." Normally, he
added, an overt act does not constitute an attempt as long as "further acts are contemplated as needful" to bring about the crime.
But evidence of bad intent may so increase the probability of an
actual crime that an otherwise innocent act may be considered an
attempt.421 Holmes made the same point in Swift, a case brought
under the Sherman Act alleging an attempted monopoly. 22 "Not
every act that may be done.., to produce an unlawful result," he
added, "is unlawful, or constitutes an attempt. It is a question of
proximity and degree.' 2 8 The Sherman Act, Holmes emphasized,
simply adopted these principles from the common law.424
D.

The Continuity of Holmes's First Espionage Act Decisions

Holmes's Espionage Act decisions in March 1919, particularly
the paragraph in Schenck that contains the words "clear and present danger," vividly reflect the influence of these antecedents,
sometimes in almost identical language. In these opinions, as in
most of his decisions, Holmes did not rehearse the basic underpinnings of the approach he announced in The Common Law. Holmes
appropriately recognized that a book designed to present a com-

410

170 Mass. at 20, 48 N.E. at 770.

420 Id. at 22, 48 N.E. at 771.
411 177 Mass. at 272, 59 N.E. at 56.

422 196 U.S. at 396 (intent relevant when further acts necessary to cause crime).
413 Id. at 402.
4 Id. at 396.
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prehensive view of the common law42 5 required a different structure than a judicial decision. But his decisions as a judge were informed by the fundamental principles of The Common Law. He
relied on external standards of intent in the Espionage Act decisions and deferred to legislators and juries as agents of the community, even when he questioned the wisdom of the legislation4 26 or
42 7
doubted the basis for the verdict.
Understandably, Holmes was much less reluctant to incorporate directly into his decisions those portions of The Common Law
that elaborated these principles as part of an examination of substantive areas of law. The borrowing so evident in his prewar attempt opinions is equally apparent in Schenck, Frohwerk, and
Debs. In The Common Law, Holmes maintained that "acts, taken
apart from their surrounding circumstances, are indifferent to the
law"; 4 18 in Schenck, he claimed that "the character of every act
depends upon the circumstances in which it was done. 4 29 In The
Common Law, Holmes concluded that most "acts are -rendered
criminal because they are done under circumstances in which they
40
will probably cause some harm which the law seeks to prevent";
in Schenck, he based liability on "whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent. ' 431 In The Common Law,
Holmes asserted that intent should be evaluated by the tendency
of acts, including utterances, to harm;43 2 in Schenck, Frohwerk,
and Debs, he judged the intent requirement of the Espionage Act
by the tendency of words rather than through an effort to uncover
the defendants' actual states of mind. In Schenck, he observed
that "the document would not have been sent unless it had been
intended to have some effect, ' 43 3 and in Debs, more pointedly, he
emphasized that the use of words "tending to obstruct the recruiting service" was evidence that Debs "meant that they should have
425 See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 16, at 1.
428 See, e.g., Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 278 (1915); see also supra note 318 and

accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 208-09 (1919); see also supra
notes 342-44 and accompanying text.
428 O.W. HOLMES, supra note 16, at 54.
429

249 U.S. at 52.

410 O.W. HOLMES, supra note 16, at 75.
431249 U.S. at 52.
432

See, e.g., O.W.

433

249 U.S. at 51.

HOLMES,

supra note 16, at 66, 138.
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Holmes thought this point too obvious "to need ci-

tation of the books,' 4 5 but The Common Law could have provided
excellent authority. For Holmes, the phrase "clear and present
danger," like the word "tendency," was another way of evaluating
the proximity between an act and the forbidden crime that might
justify punishing an attempt.
Without explicitly so stating, Holmes apparently considered
the speeches and articles punished in the Espionage Act cases as
attempts requiring additional acts to cause the substantive evil.
The lawyers for Debs had especially emphasized that the connection between the indicted speech and an actual obstruction of the
war effort was far from direct.43 6 But Holmes had a familiar
method of dealing with this problem: he applied the variables he
had identified in The Common Law and had employed in the prewar attempt cases. Immediately following the sentence in Schenck
containing the words "clear and present danger," Holmes added
the phrase he had used in discussing the relation between intent
43 7
and attempt in Swift: "It is a question of proximity and degree.

In the Espionage Act cases, as in Kennedy, Holmes was particularly concerned about the seriousness and the degree of apprehension by the community of the potential danger. Obstruction of the
438
war effort, like the "great harm likely to result from poison,

justified the imposition of liability for an attempt at a point more
remote than usual from the actual crime. As Holmes observed in
Schenck, though the defendants "in many places and in ordinary
times" might have been "within their constitutional rights," "many
things that might be said in time of peace"
lose this constitutional
49
protection "[w]hen a nation is at war.'

Holmes's decisions in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs demonstrate his continued deference to majority will and to the external
standards of liability that he believed necessary to enforce it. As in
his earlier attempt cases, he applied throughout these decisions the
concepts, and often the precise terminology, he had already derived from these fundamental principles in The Common Law. He
did not seem to regard the wartime speeches and writings against
the draft and the war as significantly different from the solicitation
, 249 U.S. at 216.
435Id.
434See supra text accompanying notes 243-58 (discussing Stedman and Roe briefs in

Debs); see also O.W. HOLMES, supra note 16, at 56.
437 Compare Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 with Swift, 196 U.S. at 402.
"4 Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 22, 48 N.E. 770, 771 (1897).
43,249 U.S. at 52.
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to light a fire in Peaslee.440
Views rooted in his earliest and most sustained thinking about
the law best account for Holmes's insensitivity to the free speech
claims made by prewar scholars, by Hand in Masses, and by
Stedman and Roe in their briefs for Debs. These libertarians insisted that the "bad tendency" theory could not support the democratic values protected by the first amendment. Holmes's contempt
for "the dogma of equality" and his belief that law should sacrifice
individual rights to the community's will did not predispose him to
accept this libertarian ideology.441 On the contrary, the "clear and
present danger" phrase in Schentck, like his other external measures of liability, translated into legal standards the deference to
community will Holmes derived from his Social Darwinism. It is
ironic that a test considered for decades to be a libertarian standard of first amendment interpretation originated in the view that
the will of the majority, whether right or wrong, could limit individual freedom by imposing external standards of liability.
E.

The Confirming Evidence of Holmes's Correspondence

Holmes's correspondence in 1918 and 1919 vividly confirms
that the views he expressed in The Common Law directly influenced his approach to the Espionage Act cases. In June 1918-a
year after Masses and nine months before Schenck, Frohwerk, and
Debs-Hand and Holmes met by chance on a train and talked
about "tolerance." Hand regretted that he "gave up" too easily
during this conversation and wrote Holmes three days later to
"take [his] stand." Hand advocated tolerance of dissent because
opinions are "never absolutes"; they are "at best provisional hypotheses, incompletely tested. '442 "[Free speech," Holmes replied,
"stands no differently than freedom from vaccination, 443 which
440 See generally Arnold, supra note 402, at 76 (concept of criminal attempt unworkable "without reference to the thing attempted").
441 Holmes often refused to apply constitutional limitations to protect civil liberties.

See Rogat, supra note 370, at 250; see also Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion (pts. 1 & 2), 15 STAN.L. RE V. 3, 254 (1962-63) (analyzing Holmes's restrictive opinions in
cases involving aliens and the Civil War amendments). His famous "right-privilege distinction" often provided the technical justification for this refusal. See generally Van Alstyne,
The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 H~aiv. L. REv.
1439 (1968).
442 Letter from Learned Hand to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (June 22, 1918) (Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., Papers, Box 43, Folder 30, Harvard Law School Library) [hereinafter
cited as Holmes Papers], reprintedin Gunther, supra note 14, at 755-56, and in 1 HOLMESLASKi LETTERS 159 n.2 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
44' Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Learned Hand (June 24, 1918) (Hand
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the Supreme Court, in a decision joined by Holmes, had permitted
a legislature to restrict through a law requiring compulsory vaccinations. 4 " Although people usually would not "care enough" to
suppress speech, "if for any reason you did care enough you
wouldn't care a damn for the suggestion that you were acting on a
provisional hypothesis and might be wrong. 4 45 Holmes closed his
letter to Hand by saying that he "used to define the truth as the
majority vote of that nation that can lick all others. So we may
' 46
define the present war as an inquiry concerning truth.'
In the wake of his Espionage Act decisions less than a year
after this exchange of letters with Hand, Holmes had a flurry of
correspondence about free speech. He expressed serious reservations about the wisdom of the prosecutions under the Espionage
Act.447 He "greatly regretted" 4 8 his "misfortune" 449 in having the
"disagreeable task"'450 of writing the opinions, and he suspected
that the Chief Justice had assigned them to him in part because he
favored free speech more than any of his colleagues. 5 1 Particularly
because the war had ended, he "wondered that the Government
should press the [Debs] case to a hearing before us, as the inevitable result was that fools, knaves, and ignorant persons were bound
to say he was convicted because he was a dangerous agitator and
that obstructing the draft was a pretence.' 45 Holmes thought the
federal judiciary had become "hysterical about the war,"'453 and
Papers, supra note 357, Box 103, Folder 24), reprintedin Gunther, supra note 14, at 756-57.
"' Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
45 Letter from Holmes to Hand, supra note 443. After sharing Hand's letter with Harold Laski, Holmes reiterated this point: "In most matters of belief we are not cocksure - we
don't care very much - and we are not certain of our power. But in the opposite case we
should deal with the act of speech as we deal with any other overt act that we don't like."
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Harold Laski (July 16, 1918), reprinted in 1
HOLMEs-LAsKI L-rzRs, supra note 442, at 160-61.
46 Letter from Holmes to Hand, supra note 443. Holmes apologized for his "levitical
speech," id., but this letter did not indicate that he had changed his mind. Cf. O.W.
HOLMES, Natural Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPEtRs 310 (1920) (Holmes's definition of

truth).
447

Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Harold Laski (March 19, 1919), re-

printed in 1 HOLMEs-LASKI Larrmis, supra note 442, at 189-90.
448

Id.

Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Sir Frederick Pollock (June 17, 1919),
reprinted in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETrERn 14-15 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
450 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Baroness Moncheur (April 4, 1919)
(Holmes Papers, supra note 442, Box 36, Folder 4).
451 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Sir Frederick Pollock (April 5, 1919),
reprinted in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LErTRas, supra note 449, at 7-8.
411Id.; see letter from Holmes to Laski, supra note 447; letter from Holmes to
449

Moncheur, supra note 450.
45S Letter from Holmes to Laski, supra note 447.
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hoped that President Wilson would pardon many of those convicted.45 4 But as to the legal questions before the Supreme Court
in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, Holmes repeatedly emphasized
that he had no doubts.45 5
Holmes maintained that the Espionage Act itself was constitutional, and even wise policy during the war,45 6 although he acknowledged that he had dealt "somewhat summarily" with the
first amendment in the Espionage Act cases. 57 He declared himself
generally "for aeration of all effervescing opinions-there is no way
so quick for letting them get flat." During a war, however, he did
not "think it unreasonable to say we won't have obstacles intentionally put in the way of raising troops-by persuasion any more
''458
than by force.
Holmes gave conflicting indications about how he would have
voted had he been a member of the jury in Debs. Holmes seems to
have told people what he thought they wanted to hear.4 59 Holmes
did make clear, however, that his vote as a hypothetical juror was
irrelevant to his role as a judge. As long as there was any evidence
to support the jury findings, Holmes did not believe a judge could
overturn them. Even when he conceded that the jury may have
based its conviction of Debs on impermissible considerations,
4 60
Holmes emphasized that he could not go behind the verdict.

45 Id.; letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Sir Frederick Pollock (April 27, 1919),
reprinted in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETrERS, supra note 449, at 10-11.
4"5 See letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Herbert Croly (May 12, 1919) (not
mailed to Croly but enclosed with letter to Laski), reprinted in 1 HOLMEs-LASKI LE-rVERS,
supra note 442, at 202-04; letter from Holmes to Laski, supra note 447; letter from Holmes
to Moncheur, supra note 450; letter from Holmes to Pollock, supra note 454; letter from
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to John P. Wigmore (June 7, 1919) (Holmes Papers, supra note
442, Box 36, Folder 4).
"'5 Letter from Holmes to Croly, supra note 455; see letter from Holmes to Pollock,
supra note 454 (Espionage Act constitutional).
'57Letter from Holmes to Pollock, supra note 451.
418 Letter from Holmes to Croly, supra note 455.
459 Mark Howe has observed that Holmes may have been "driven by an unusual longing
for recognition," or "at least a strenuous eagerness for achievement, and perhaps an excess
of anxiety for credit." M. HowE, supra note 370, at 85.
Holmes wrote or left the impression with liberals that as a juror he would have voted to
acquit Debs. See letter from Zechariah Chafee, Jr., to Judge Charles F. Amidon (Sept. 30,
1919) (Chafee Papers, supra note 189, Box 4, Folder 1); letter from Holmes to Croly, supra
note 455; letter from Holmes to Laski, supra note 447. Yet in a letter to Dean Wigmore,
Holmes gave his opinion that the jury finding was correct. Letter from Holmes to Wigmore,
supra note 455. Wigmore subsequently blasted Holmes for his Abrams dissent. See Wigmore, Abrams v. U.S.: Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Thuggery in War-Time and
Peace-Time, 14 ILL. L. REV. 539 (1920).
460 See, e.g., letter from Holmes to Croly, supra note 455 ("I cannot doubt that there
was evidence warranting a conviction on the disputed issues of fact."); letter from Holmes to
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Nor was Holmes moved by complaints that jury determinations of probable consequences undermined free speech. Stedman's
petition for rehearing in Debs, which again advanced this argument, was unsuccessfule4 6 1 as were similar criticisms by Learned
Hand and Ernst Freund.46 2
Within weeks of the Espionage Act decisions, Hand wrote
Holmes again. Promising that his letter would be "positively my
last appearance in the role of liberator," Hand expanded on the
letter he had sent the previous summer. Hand did not agree that
speech might be punished simply because "the result is known as
likely to follow"; even a "reasonable forecast" of the effect of
speech should not make the speaker liable. Hand observed that
free speech "cases actually occur when men are excited" and that
"juries are especially clannish groups[, which] . . . won't much regard the difference between the probable result of the words and
the purposes of the utterer." As a matter of historical fact, Hand
emphasized, the test of motive sanctioned by Holmes allowed juries to "intimidate" and "scare" many people who might have
"moderate[d] the storms of popular feeling" in 1918. Although he
doubted its future, Hand adhered instead to the test he set forth in
Masses: that liability for speech begins when words are "directly
'463
an incitement.
Ernst Freund, whose prewar treatise, The Police
Power,4 64 proposed a direct incitement -standard that anticipated
Hand's approach in Masses,4 6 5 wrote a more extensive critique of
Debs in the May 3, 1919, issue of The New Republic. 16 Freund
accused Holmes of taking "the very essentials of the entire problem for granted." According to Freund, "to be permitted to agitate
at your own peril, subject to a jury's guessing at motive, tendency
and possible effect, makes the right of free speech a precarious
gift. '46 7 Freund indicated that the Espionage Act itself was uncon-

Pollock, supra note 451 ("How it was with the jury of course I don't know."); see also letter

from Chafee to Amidon, supra note 459.
6' Defendant's Petition for Rehearing at 2-4, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919).
4"2 See infra text accompanying notes 463-75.
463 Letter from Learned Hand to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (late Mar. 1919) (Holmes
Papers, supra note 442, Box 43, Folder 30), reprintedin Gunther, supra note 14, at 758-59.
"I bid a long farewell," Hand wrote toward the end of his letter, "to my little toy ship which
set out quite bravely on the shortest voyage ever made." Id.
4

E. FREuND, THE POLICE POWER (1904).

See Rabban, supra note 4, at 572.
,4' Freund, supra note 14, reprinted in 40 U. CHi. L. Rav. 239.
467 Id. at 14, reprinted in 40 U. CHI. L. Rzv. at 240.
465
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stitutional because it insulated from judicial review jury findings
"of

a conceivable

psychological nexus between words and
deeds.
The "checking function" of the jury, Freund added, may
protect the people from unpopular exercises of governmental
power, but it "fails where government policies are supported by
majority opinion. 46 9 He was horrified that Holmes could not distinguish between shouting "fire" in a crowded theater and "political offenses." Freund concluded that Holmes's analysis of free
speech must consist of "unsafe doctrine if it has47 0to be made plausible by a parallel so manifestly inappropriate.
Holmes responded to Hand with a puzzled letter in which he
stated on three separate occasions that he did not see how Hand's
direct incitement standard differed from his own test in
Schenck.47' But Holmes had no such difficulties in recognizing
46 8

48 Id. at 14, reprinted in 40 U. CH.

L. REv. at 241. This comment bears a striking

resemblance to the criticisms by Theodore Schroeder, the principal figure in the Free
Speech League, of punishing speech because of its speculative psychological tendency. See
Rabban, supra note 4, at 577 & n.346. Freund's subsequent commendation of Schroeder's
writings to Chafee suggests that Freund's thinking on this subject had been influenced by
Schroeder. See letter from Ernst Freund to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (Aug. 13, 1919) (Chafee
Papers, supra note 189, Box 14, Folder 10).
4" Freund, supra note 14, at 14, reprinted in 40 U. CHI. L. Rv.at 241. A recent comprehensive article identifies the centrality of the "checking value" of the First Amendment,
defined as "the value that free speech, a free press, and free assembly can serve in checking
the abuse of power by public officials." Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment
Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 523, 527.
"I' Freund, supra note 14, at 14, reprinted in 40 U. Cm. L. REv. at 241.
471 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Learned Hand (April 3, 1919) (Hand
Papers, supra note 357, Box 103, Folder 24), reprinted in Gunther, supra note 14, at 759-60.
Holmes correctly understood Hand to agree that an obstruction need not be successful in
order to violate the Espionage Act. He incorrectly inferred, however, that this agreement
precluded any inconsistencies between their approaches. Holmes apparently did not recognize that Hand, in a more restrained manner, had made essentially the same criticisms as
Freund. Id.
Holmes's inability to understand his differences with Hand might have originated, at
least in part, from Hand's statement: "I haven't a doubt that Debs was guilty under any rule
conceivably applicable." Letter from Hand to Holmes, supra note 463. Gunther finds this
comment "hard to credit" in light of the remainder of this letter, Hand's other correspondence, and the text of Masses. He attributes it to "Hand's extraordinary deference to
Holmes" and views it "as an effort to seem to agree with the result while trying to persuade
the master of the error of his reasoning." Gunther, supra note 14, at 739-40.
I suspect that this explanation, though plausible, is both incomplete and too generous
to Hand. Hand, fearful of jeopardizing his valued relationship with Holmes, may have been
more timid than respectful. It is also revealing that Hand, while subsequently praising
Holmes's dissent in Abrams, thought the majority might have been correct "on the facts."
Letter from Learned Hand to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (Dec. 3, 1919) (Chafee Papers, supra
note 189, Box 4, Folder 1), reprinted in Gunther, supra note 14, at 762-63. These statements are puzzling. Combined with his unnecessarily restrictive decisions in Nearing and
Eastman, see supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text, they suggest that Hand may not
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Freund's pointed objections to his opinion in Debs. When Harold
Laski asked if he had been "at all influenced ' 472 by Freund's article on Debs in The New Republic, Holmes replied that he
"thought it rather poor stuff." He elaborated by enclosing with his
response to Laski a letter he had drafted to Herbert Croly, the
editor of The New Republic, but had decided not to send "as some
themes may become burning. '47- Holmes wrote in his draft to
Croly that "Freund's objection to a jury 'guessing at motive, tendency and possible effect' is an objection to pretty much the whole
body of law, which for thirty years I have made my brethren smile
by insisting to be everywhere a matter of degree. '474 Holmes cited
earlier antitrust and criminal cases for support and quoted his previous statement that "the law is full of instances where a man's
fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subse4 75
quently estimates it, from matters of degree."
This correspondence reinforces Holmes's subsequent letter to
76
Chafee about the origins of the "clear and present danger" test.
Even in the face of criticism from Hand and Freund, Holmes continued to rely on the fundamental and broadly applicable principles he had set forth in The Common Law and had applied during
four decades as a judge to all areas of the law. The very example in
Schenck that Freund perceptively found so inappropriate underscores Holmes's consistency. Indeed, Holmes may well have been
thinking of the solicitation to light a fire in Peaslee when he wrote
in Schenck that the first amendment would not protect "falsely
147
shouting fire in a theatre.' 7
VI.

ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.: THE SCHOLAR AS ADVOCATE

Zechariah

Chafee's article, Freedom of Speech in

War

have been as libertarian as his decision in Masses and much of his related correspondence
might indicate. Perhaps the thinking that produced Hand's restrictive decision in United
States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), af'd, 341 U.S. 495 (1951), was taking shape
even in the period when he wrote Masses.
,17Letter from Harold Laski to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (March 18, 1919), reprinted

in 1 HOLms-LAsKI LarRS, supra note 442, at 201-02.
473Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Harold Laski (May 13, 1919), reprinted
in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LE'rERs, supra note 442, at 202.
474Letter from Holmes to Croly, supra note 455.
475Id. (citing Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) (Holmes, J.) (antitrust
case)). After this sentence in Nash, Holmes cited for support two of his decisions as a state
judge, Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 178 (1884) (manslaughter case), and Commonwealth v. Chance, 174 Mass. 245, 252, 54 N.E. 551, 554 (1899) (murder case).
476 Letter from Holmes to Chafee, supra note 366.
477 249

U.S. at 52.
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Time, 78 was the most comprehensive and influential response to
Holmes's Espionage Act decisions. Chafee made clear at the beginning of his article that he would not "confine" himself to a technical analysis of the Espionage Act. 47 9 He set as his "main task" an
explanation of "the nature and scope of the policy which finds expression in the First Amendment,

' 48 0

a subject he had begun to

Republic481

explore in The New
four months before Holmes decided Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs. To accomplish this task,
Chafee often found it "worth while to forsake the purely judicial
discussion of free speech, and obtain light upon its meaning from
the history of the constitutional clauses and from the purpose free
'48 2
speech serves in social and political life.

Chafee had good strategic reasons to look beyond the law.
Freedom of Speech in War Time was not a work of dispassionate
scholarship. Horrified by the repression of free speech during
World War I, Chafee had become a committed civil libertarian
before he wrote this article. 8 3 Not surprisingly, his published conclusions about the policy and purpose of the first amendment reflected his new-found libertarian ideology. But Chafee also allowed
this ideology to distort his discussion of history and judicial precedent. Unlike Ernst Freund, who directly attacked Holmes's decision in Debs as inconsistent with a proper understanding of the
policies embodied in the first amendment,484 and unlike several
478

Chafee, Harvard,supra note 2.

479

Id. at 934.
Id. at 935.

480

Chafee, New Republic, supra note 2.
Chafee, Harvard,supra note 2, at 945.
483 See Chafee, supra note 39; Prude, Portraitof a Civil Libertarian:The Faith and
Fear of Zechariah Chafee, Jr., 60 J. Am. HIsT. 633, 634-38 (1973).
4 Freund, supra note 14, reprintedin 40 U. Cm. L. Rav. 239; see supra text accompanying notes 464-70 (discussing Freund's criticisms of Holmes). Like Chafee, Freund maintained that "in the long run sound law cannot be inimical to sound policy." "A country can
ill spare," he added, "the men who when waves of militant nationalism run high do not lose
the courage of their convictions." Freund, supra note 14, at 15, reprinted in 40 U. CHI. L.
REV. at 242. In response to a critique of his article in a subsequent issue of The New Republic, Freund defended his mixture of policy and law: "Where the Constitution establishes a
political principle as it does in the First Amendment, it is inevitable that considerations of
policy should be touched upon in discussing questions of law ....
You cannot deal with
the Espionage Act without having some notion of what the right of free discussion demands." 19 NEw REPUBLIC 151-52 (1919).
Freund made the mistake of concluding that American historical practice had been "so
tolerant of political liberty" that there had been no occasion prior to the Espionage Act to
apply the legal principles governing political speech. Freund, supra note 14, at 14, reprinted
in 40 U. CH. L. REV. at 240. Moreover, in his influential prewar treatise Freund did not
criticize judicial decisions that tended to weaken some of his more optimistic conclusions
about the condition of free expression in the United States. See Rabban, supra note 4, at
481
482
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prewar scholars who vociferously criticized restrictive decisions by

their judicial contemporaries, "85 Chafee tried within the limits of
plausibility to conform history and precedent to his own interpretation of what the first amendment should mean. To do so, he

often had to sacrifice scholarly accuracy to libertarian ideology."
Written under the guise of scholarship, Freedom of Speech in War
Time was essentially a work of propaganda.4 8 7 Chafee's libertarian
misconstruction of "clear and present danger" was but one example of his sacrifice of scholarship to ideology. 4" Holmes, who in
The Common Law had himself strained history to serve very different personal views on law and society,4 8 9 soon found it convenient to rely on Chafee's misconstruction of his own language in
Schenck.9 0
A.

Chafee's Interpretation of the First Amendment

Chafee considered the first amendment "a declaration of national policy in favor of the public discussion of all public questions." 49 1 He elaborated this most central position in a paragraph
492
he privately described as "key":
562 n.254, 567-68 nn.284-85. But Freund never engaged in the misconstruction of history
and precedent that often characterized Chafee's article. For example, Freund conceded that
the framers did not intend to abolish the crime of seditious libel, although he did maintain
that the first amendment should now be construed to preclude punishment for that crime.
E. FREUND, supra note 464, at 508; see id. at 569-70.
48 See Rabban, supra note 4, at 561-62.
46 As a result of conservative opposition to his devastating and impassioned critique of
the trial in the Abrams case, see Chafee, Contemporary State Trial, supra note 2, Chafee
was "tried" in 1921 by a "Committee to Visit the Law School." See 35 HARv. L. Rav. 9-10
(1921). After this "trial," which absolved Chafee of any conscious errors, Chafee agreed to
publish several corrections and further statements in the HarvardLaw Review. Id. at 10-14;
see Irons, "FightingFair". Zechariah Chafee, Jr., the Department of Justice, and the
"Trial at the Harvard Club," 94 HARv. L. RaV. 1205 (1981). See generally A. SuTsHAN,
THE LAW AT HARVARD 250-58 (1967). Chafee's main accuser had originally criticized him for

alleged, though undefined, inaccuracies in Freedom of Speech in War Time, but eventually
focused his attack on A ContemporaryState Trial. Irons, supra, at 1213, 1228-30. Chafee's
opponents were motivated by political rather than scholarly concerns; it is nevertheless of
some historical interest that, judged solely by standards of accuracy, they picked on the
wrong article.
487 Cf. Prude, supra note 483, at 641-42 (Chafee's writings are "educational," appealing
"less to technical legal precedent than to the pragmatic, commonsense considerations of
self-interest.").
488 See infra text accompanying notes 551-66.
41 See supra note 376 (describing Holmes's misleading use of history in The Common
Law).

')4 See infra text accompanying
notes 680-83.
491 Chafee, Harvard,supra note 2, at 934.
492Statement of Zechariah Chafee, Jr., about his work on freedom of speech (Chafee
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The true meaning of freedom of speech seems to be this.
One of the most important purposes of society and government is the discovery and spread of truth on subjects of general concern. This is possible only through absolutely unlimited discussion, for . . . once force is thrown into the
argument, it becomes a matter of chance whether it is thrown
on the false side or the true, and truth loses all its natural
advantage in the contest. Nevertheless, there are other purposes of government, such as order, the training of the young,
protection against external aggression. Unlimited discussion
sometimes interferes with these purposes, which must then be
balanced against freedom of speech, but freedom of speech
ought to weigh very heavily in the scale. The First Amendment gives binding force to this principle of political
wisdom. 9 3
As Chafee insisted in private correspondence, "a policy of sifting out truth" justifies the inevitable risk that speech may interfere with proper objectives. Following the approach of Hand in
Masses, he acknowledged that "all discussion opposed to the government is bound to have some effect in delaying the progress of
the war, however slight." Chafee, like Hand before him, concluded
that "the first amendment was designed to insure that that risk
'49 4
should be taken.'
Chafee also argued that the repression of speech during World
War I provided excellent empirical support for his position. He asserted that "an opponent makes the best cross-examiner" in public
affairs as well as in legal proceedings. Recent history proved that it
was a "disastrous mistake to limit criticism to those who favor[ed]
the war.' 495 Anyone who discussed secret treaties during the war,
Chafee pointed out, ran the risk of a jail term, but "[o]pen discussion would have made it impossible for the President to be ignorant of them until he went to Paris. '49 6 War objectives, he added,

Papers, supra note 189, Box 29, Folder 22).
493Chafee, Harvard,supra note 2, at 956-57 (footnote omitted). The importance of this
"key" paragraph to Chafee is emphasized by its verbatim appearance in his earlier New
Republic article, Chafee, New Republic, supra note 2, at 67, and in his subsequent book, Z.
CHAFEE, supra note 2, at 34.
44 Letter from Zechariah Chafee, Jr., to Alfred Bettman (Oct. 16, 1919) (Chafee Pa-

pers, supra note 189, Box 14, Folder 3); see supra text accompanying notes 158-62 (Hand's
similar reasoning in Masses).
"'9 Chafee, Harvard,supra note 2, at 958.
4" Letter from Chafee to Bettman, supra note 494; see Chafee, Harvard,supra note 2,
at 958-59.
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often change completely, as the fluctuating government positions
during World War I amply illustrated. Chafee considered such
reevaluations and reformulations of national policy healthy, and he
maintained that they should be influenced by the freest possible
expression of all divergent views. Chafee criticized the prevalent
judicial construction of the Espionage Act for ignoring this social
interest in the search for truth, and for regarding free speech "as
merely an individual interest, which must readily give way like
other personal desires the moment it interferes with the social interest in national safety."49' 7
B.

Chafee's Rejection of the "Bad Tendency" Test

Chafee concluded that "the most essential element of free
speech is the rejection of bad tendency as the test of a criminal
utterance."4 9 He observed that the application of this test by a
jury rather than a judge protects popular attacks on government
but has relatively little value for dissidents "in times of war or
threatened disorder when the herd instinct runs strong."49 9 For
Chafee, the test of criminality was more important than the locus
of decision. Rather than allocating the determination of "bad tendency" to the jury, he preferred the substitution of a more protective standard. "The real issue in every free-speech controversy,"
Chafee stressed, is "whether the state can punish all words which
have some tendency, however remote, to bring about acts in violation of law, or only words which directly incite to acts in violation
of law." 5 0
Chafee attempted throughout Freedom of Speech in War
Time to demonstrate that the first amendment precluded the "bad
tendency" test. He claimed, referring to the American colonial experience, that the men who wrote the first amendment "intended
to wipe out the common law of sedition, and make further prosecu"97 Chafee, Harvard,supra note 2, at 959. He also alluded to "the national value of the
opposition in former wars." Id.
498 Id. at 953. Chafee did not discuss the "bad tendency" test in his New Republic
article, Chafee, New Republic, supra note 2, perhaps because he considered this topic too
technical for a magazine with a general readership. But see supra text accompanying note
467 (Freund article in The New Republic criticizes "bad tendency" test).
499Chafee, Harvard,supra note 2, at 949. "Sedition prosecutions," Chafee pointed out,
"went on with shameful severity in England after Fox's Libel Act had given the jury power
to determine criminality." The discredited Sedition Act of 1798, he added, also "entrusted
criminality to the jury." Id. at 948 (footnote omitted). Chafee cited the jury verdict in Debs
as an illustration of this point, noting that the personal and economic backgrounds of the
jurors made them particularly unsympathetic to Debs. Id. at 949 n.60.
500Id. at 948.
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tions for criticism of the government, without any incitement to
law-breaking, forever impossible in the United States of
America. ' 50 1 He further asserted, without any citation of authority,
that the free speech clause eradicated punishment of words "for a
supposed bad tendency long before there is any probability that
they will break out into unlawful acts" and abolished the doctrine
of constructive intent, which infers "intent from the bad tendency
of the words on the ground that a man is presumed to intend the
consequences of his acts. ' 50 2 The "bitterly resented" Sedition Act
of 1798 revived these doctrines, again reducing intent to an inference fronj the supposed "bad tendency" of words. 8 Yet the law
"proved so disastrous" 5 " that this discredited approach was never
again applied until 1917.05 According to Chafee, "we can with certitude declare that the First Amendment forbids the punishment
' 50 6
of words merely for their injurious tendencies.
Chafee maintained that the Espionage Act was constitutional
on its face. 0 Following Hand's lead in Masses, Chafee found "not
a word in the 1917 Espionage Act to show that Congress did
change the ordinary tests or make any speech criminal except false
statements and incitement to overt acts." 08 Hand's opinion in
Masses applied the "normal" 50 9 and "ordinary" 51 0 test for punishing speech, whereas the reversal by the Second Circuit, perhaps
unwittingly, 51 ' established the "old-time doctrine of indirect causa5 12
tion in the minds of district judges throughout the country.
The Second Circuit thereby rejected the "common-law test of incitement" and "deprived us of the only standard of criminal
speech there was, since there had been no well-considered discussion of the meaning of free speech in the First Amendment."' 3 In
most subsequent Espionage Act decisions, Chafee unhappily reported, "bad tendency has been the test of criminality. ' 51 4 A few

"I Id. at 947.
02

Id. at 949; see id. at 951.

:03 Id. at 952-53.
04

Id. at 953.

5' Id. at 952.
06 Id. at 960.
8:0

Id.

Id. at 963.
:o9 Id. at 961.
810 Id. at 963.
808

812

Id. at 964 n.108.

12 Id. at 964.
818
24

Id.
Id. at 968.
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but Chafee found "astounding" the

"large number of cases which ignore the clear meaning of the statute" as interpreted by Hand. 1 Judicial misconstruction of the Espionage Act, Chafee complained, made its application worse than
the Sedition
Act of 1798, which at least allowed truth as a
517
defense.

Chafee found hope, however, in Holmes's opinion in Schenck,
particularly in its formulation of "clear and present danger." According to Chafee, this standard "substantially agrees" with
Hand's opinion in Masses and with Chafee's own "investigation of
the history and political purpose of the First Amendment."5 8
Holmes retreated in Debs by affirming the verdict based on the
"natural tendency and reasonably probable effect" of speech," 9
but Chafee remained confident that the "clear and present danger"
'52 0
standard would be "a good test for future free speech cases.

C. Chafee's Misinterpretation of Legal History
Chafee was correct in identifying the "bad tendency" test as
the chief threat to his interpretation of the purpose and meaning
of the first amendment. Yet his reconstruction of first amendment
history to preclude the "bad tendency" test was inaccurate and
misleading, often in ways that Chafee himself must have recognized. Chafee was on the safest ground in his discussion of the
original meaning and early history of the first amendment; notwithstanding a subsequent major study maintaining that the framers did not intend the first amendment to abolish seditious libel or
to require a direct incitement standard,521 Chafee could rely for his
5'sId. at 965.
"I' Id. at 961 n.93.
517Id. at 965.
518 Id. at 967.

519Id. at 968 (emphasis in original).
520Id. at 969; cf. infra text accompanying notes 551-66 (discussing Chafee's interpretation of "clear and present danger").
521 L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960). Levy maintains that in interpreting the
original meaning of the first amendment Chafee and others attempted to "recreate" the past

"so that its image may be seen in a manner consistent with our rhetorical tradition of free-

dom, thereby yielding a message which will instruct the present." Id. at 2-3. Though directed toward Chafee's discussion of the framers' intent, Levy's observation applies equally
well to Chafee's treatment of more recent first amendment history, including the Espionage

Act decisions.
Some scholars have questioned Levy's conclusions about the framers' original understanding of the first amendment. A recent comprehensive article challenges Levy's interpretation of the press clause and helps resuscitate Chafee's earlier views. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 455 (1983); see also Kalven, The New York
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contrary interpretation on several important scholars who wrote

just prior to World War

1.522

Chafee's interpretation of later developments and the Espionage Act cases, however, could not be supported. Chafee was
clearly aware of the prewar tradition of judicial hostility to free
speech that often relied on the "bad tendency" test he claimed had
disappeared after the demise of the Sedition Act of 1798. The prewar scholars, cited by Chafee to support his analysis of the purpose
and history of the first amendment, 523 themselves criticized the reliance of contemporary judicial decisions on the "bad tendency"
test to reject free speech claims. 524 Moreover, Chafee himself had
read these decisions.5 25 His general neglect of them while asserting
that they were not sufficiently rigorous or plentiful "to develop any
definite boundary between lawful and unlawful speech" 52 6 promoted the historical fiction that the "failure" of prior courts left
the federal judges who decided the Espionage Act cases without
any standards of first amendment interpretation. This fiction allowed Chafee to make the false claim that these judges were able
"to impose standards of their own" 527 and promote a "revival of
'528
the doctrines of indirect causation and constructive intent.
D. The Meaning of the Common Law
Having read the restrictive prewar decisions, Chafee was also
inaccurate in asserting that Hand's direct incitement test was the
"ordinary" standard at common law. Hand himself, while discussing in Masses the "normal" role of free speech in a democracy, did
not claim the support of the common law. 529 Hand's test originated
in the values he derived from his readings in philosophy and political theory. His discussion of history in Masses "was essentially im-

Times Case: A Note On "The Central Meaning Of The First Amendment", 1964 SuP. CT.
REv. 191, 221 n.124; Anastaplo, Book Review, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 735 (1964).
"2 See Rabban, supra note 4, at 586-87 (observing Chafee's reliance on prewar
scholars).
:23 See id. at 586-89.
524 See id. at 559-79 (discussing views of prewar scholars).
515 Chafee, supra note 39, at 2.
528 Chafee, Harvard,supra note 2, at 944.
527 Id. at 959.
:2 Id. at 965.
529 See 244 F. at 539-40. In United States v. Nearing, 252 F. 223, 227-28 (S.D.N.Y.
1918), however, Hand did claim that the common law supported his Masses standard and
that the reversal of Masses by the Second Circuit required "an added measure of criminal
liability." Id.
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pressionistic."5 30 Indeed, when faced with writing the Masses decision Hand was concerned that he "didn't know anything about the
history of the subject" and had to "fire off" his "own funny ideas
about what ought or oughtn't to be."'53' After reading Chafee's
book, Hand realized "it was well that I knew no more than I did.
Like the heathen I was saved by my invincible ignorance."32
Moreover, Ernst Freund, whose prewar treatise foreshadowed
Hand's decision in Masses in its advocacy of the direct incitement
standard, 533 claimed that the Espionage Act itself "revives and perpetuates the defects of the common law. '534 Freund objected to
any application of "the notoriously loose common law doctrines
of
5 35
conspiracy and incitement to offenses of a political character.
Nonetheless, Chafee adhered to his claim that Hand in Masses
and Holmes in Schenck were simply restating traditional commonlaw doctrine. Chafee's views are best revealed in his important exchange of correspondence with Alfred Bettman, the lawyer who
had written the government's briefs in Schenck, Sugarman,
Frohwerk, and Debs.5 3 6 Bettman wrote Chafee in September 1919
to congratulate him on the publication of Freedom of Speech in
War Time and "to state that I agree most heartily with all that
you say, subject to a few points." Bettman identified as a "doubtful point" a conclusion which he considered implicit in Chafee's
article and which he had already rebutted in his reply to Roe in
Debs.5 37 Bettman understood Chafee to maintain that the likelihood of jury verdicts of guilty in Espionage Act prosecutions ren-

530
531

Gunther, supra note 14, at 727; see id. at 740.
Letter from Learned Hand to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (Dec. 3, 1920) (Chafee Papers,

supra note 189, Box 4, Folder 20), reprinted in Gunther, supra note 14, at 768.
532 Letter from Learned Hand to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (Jan. 2, 1921) (Chafee Papers,
supra note 189, Box 4, Folder 20), reprinted in Gunther, supra note 14, at 769.
:33 See supra text accompanying notes 464-65.
34 Freund, supra note 14, at 14, reprinted in 40 U. CM. L. REV. at 241.
531 Id. at 6, reprinted in 40 U. CHI. L. REV. at 240. In The Police Power, see supra note
464, Freund identified his direct incitement standard with "the principles of the common
law." He cited only one case for support. Id. at 510 (citing Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1, 12 N.E.
865, aff'd on other grounds, 123 U.S. 131 (1887)). Freund apparently changed his mind
about the meaning of the common law between the publications of his treatise and his article on the Debs case, perhaps because so many decisions in the intervening years had applied the "bad tendency" test. See Rabban, supra note 4, at 533-36, 543-48 (discussing judicial reliance on "bad tendency" test).
53S Bettman reported that during the war he had been "in immediate charge" of the
prosecutions under the Espionage Act and had written many of the briefs "(subject, of
course, to some touching up by my immediate chief, Mr. O'Brian)." Letter from Alfred
Bettman to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (Sept. 20, 1919) (Chafee Papers, supra note 189, Box 14,
Folder 3).
Ws7
See supra text accompanying notes 286-89 (discussing Bettman's reply to Roe).
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dered unconstitutional an otherwise constitutional law. "The principle of indirect causation or presumptive intent," Bettman
stressed in rejecting this view, "are [sic] a part of the criminal law,
and I do not see how the First Amendment can be construed as
eliminating, without express legislative decree, those accepted general principles of the criminal law in cases based upon verbal or
written utterances." Whether an exception to this rule should be
granted "to a particular class of cases," based on the probability of
erroneous jury verdicts or other considerations, is "a question of
'5 38
legislative policy and not constitutional law.
In a subsequent letter, Bettman even acknowledged that a
constitutional provision restraining jury discretion might be
needed, but he denied that the first amendment could be interpreted to serve this function. "That the individual needed protection against the jury," he added, "was a thought which could
hardly have occurred to the framers of the amendment." Bettman
believed that the constitutional guarantee of free speech should
"unquestionably" prevent any legislative attempt "to suppress the
absolutely free discussion of past, present and future governmental
policies" and officials, and admitted that many Espionage Act convictions violated this conception of the first amendment. 5 9 He criticized federal judges in some of these cases for having "lost their
heads," for giving "unfair charges," and for not exercising sufficient "control over the juries." 5"0 He hoped that in at least one of
the Espionage Act cases still pending the Supreme Court would
hand down a decision that "will assist the Department of Justice
during the next war in counteracting the pressure of public intolerance." 5" 1 But Bettman maintained that neither criminal nor constitutional law mandated restrictions on jury determinations of presumptive intent.
Chafee remained unconvinced. In his response to Bettman, he
elaborated the interpretation he had set forth in his article. 4 2

"' Letter from Bettman to Chafee, supra note 536.
M'Letter from Alfred Bettman to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (Oct. 27, 1919) (Chafee Papers,
supra note 189, Box 14, Folder 3).
540Id.
541

Id. Bettman cited Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (prohibiting suspen-

sion of writ of habeas corpus), as the case that served this purpose after the Civil War.
Letter from Bettman to Chafee, supra note 539. Judge Amidon made a similar point. "We
were in need of something which should have been as corrective in the case of the present
war," he wrote Chafee, "as Ex Parte Milligan was in the case of the Civil War." Letter from
Judge Charles F. Amidon to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (June 5, 1920) (Chafee Papers, supra
note 189, Box 4, Folder 1).
5 2 Letter from Chafee to Bettman, supra note 494.
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Chafee acknowledged that the first amendment did not "eliminate
the ordinary principles of the common law with regard to utterances." Yet in a confused discussion of doctrine, Chafee disagreed
with Bettman's view that "the principle of indirect causation is
part of the criminal common law relating to utterance." Chafee
recognized that "there is always a chain of possible events between
an utterance and actual interference with the activities of government," and added that the test of criminality is "just a question of
degree how short that chain must be." Chafee concluded that the
"common law has fixed that point with reasonable certainty at the
place where the utterance furnishes a clear and present danger of a
criminal act, to use the language of Justice Holmes in the Schenck
case." He even conceded that the common law allowed presumptions of intent from the character of acts. But Chafee rejected, as a
deviation from the common law, any test of causation based on
'54 3
"the natural and reasonably probable effect of the utterances.

He seemed to equate direct incitement with direct causation.
Chafee, like Holmes, 44 failed to recognize that Hand's direct incitement test, by focusing on words rather than on probable effects, differed
significantly from the test of "clear and present
' '5 5

danger.

14

Whatever the confusion caused by his erroneous conflation of
the very different views of Hand and Holmes, Chafee persisted in
his misinterpretation of the common law. Even after a Harvard
Law Review note, 54 6 which Chafee himself considered "able and
thoughtful,

' 547

pointed out that the test of "natural tendency and

reasonably probable effect" was neither unusual nor "inherently
vicious,"5"4 and after Holmes remarked in his dissent in Abrams
that the word intent was "vaguely used in ordinary legal discussion,

' 54 9

Chafee still insisted that "the ordinary language of crimi-

nal solicitation and attempt" precludes reliance on "remote bad
543 Id.
'4
See supra text accompanying note 471 (Holmes's difficulty in understanding Hand's
alternative views on free speech).
"' But see infra note 594 and text accompanying notes 594-601 (Chafee's eventual recognition of difference between views of Hand and Holmes).
"' Note, The Espionage Act and the Limits of Legal Toleration,33 HARv. L. R-v. 442
(1920).
Chafee, Contemporary State Trial, supra note 2, at 771.
'8
Note, supra note 546, at 443. This note criticized the conception of the first amendment expressed by Chafee in Freedom of Speech in War Time, and concluded that the final
determination of any test of the criminality of speech might "safely be left" with the jury.
Id. at 446-48.
'" Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 626 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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tendency and possible incidental consequences." '5 0
E.

Chafee and the Creation of the Libertarian Myth About
"Clear and Present Danger"

After freeing himself from the burdens of history and precedent, Chafee, with even more ingenuity and disingenuousness,
developed his clever and erroneous interpretation of "clear and
present danger." Chafee opened his analysis of the four Espionage
Act cases decided by the Supreme Court in March 1919 with the
shockingly inaccurate statement that Sugarman, Schenck, and
Frohwerk "were clear cases of incitement to resist the draft, so
that no real question of free speech arose. 5 51 He did not discuss
the facts of any of these cases; to have done so would have undermined this crucial conclusion. Chafee then focused on Schenck,
which on its facts presented the weakest free speech claim, 52 because it contained Holmes's "fullest discussion" 553 of the first
amendment.
Chafee quoted much of the crucial final paragraph of Schenck.
He maintained that this quotation, especially the sentence containing the phrase "clear and present danger," "substantially agrees"
with the libertarian interpretation of free speech he had already
set forth earlier in his article. Chafee admitted:
It is unfortunate that 'the substantive evils' are not more specifically defined, but if they mean overt acts of interference
with the war, then Justice Holmes draws the boundary line
very close to the test of incitement at common law and clearly
makes the punishment of words for their bad tendency
impossible.55 4
Chafee did not explain why the definition of substantive evils as
overt acts of interference with the war entails the substitution of
an incitement test for the "bad tendency" approach. For the remainder of his analysis, moreover, Chafee neglected this provisional "if" and assumed that Holmes did conceive of "clear and
present danger" as a libertarian replacement for "bad tendency."
Chafee provided no support for his assumption that Holmes actu50 Chafee, ContemporaryState Trial, supra note 2, at 770; cf. id. at 773 (objecting to
"bad tendency" as "test of criminality").
511 Chafee, Harvard,supra note 2, at 967 (footnote omitted).
::2
See supra text accompanying note 319.
3 Chafee, Harvard,supra note 2, at 967.
54 Id. (emphasis added).

1983]

Emergence of First Amendment Doctrine

1295

ally meant what Chafee said he might have meant, except to cite
Peaslee.5 5 Chafee maintained that in using the words "proximity
and degree" in Schenck as well as in Peaslee, Holmes recognized
556
"the close relation between free speech and criminal attempts.
In Chafee's view, Peaslee held that attempts "must come dangerously near success" to be punished. 557 But the Peaslee opinion itself stated only that the issue is whether they "come near enough
to the accomplishment of the substantive offense," a determination
which "may vary with circumstances." 55 8 And Holmes made clear
throughout all his discussions of criminal attempts that the seriousness of the threatened crime, whether a fire, a murder, or an
obstruction of the war effort, is a crucial circumstance. 559 In any
event, attention to the probable effects of speech, however direct
the relationship between speech and crime, is essentially a variant
of the "bad tendency" test.5 6
After reading an unjustifiable libertarian meaning into "clear
and present danger" and identifying it as the "Supreme Court
test, ' 561 Chafee characterized Debs as a deviation from this proper
standard. If Holmes had applied the "clear and present danger"
test in Debs, Chafee maintained, "it is hard to see how he could
have been held guilty. 5 62 Chafee also recognized that Holmes, by
accepting "the verdict as proof that actual interference with the
war was intended and was the proximate effect of the words used,"
had allowed Debs to be convicted "merely because the jury
thought his speech had a tendency to bring about resistance to the
draft. '568 "If the Supreme Court test is to mean anything more
than a passing observation," Chafee concluded, "it must be used to
upset convictions for words when the trial judge did not insist that
56
they must create 'a clear and present danger' of overt acts."1'
Chafee did not analyze Frohwerk at all, perhaps to avoid having to explain away another embarrassing "deviation" from the
"clear and present danger" standard. It is ironic as well as fitting
that a comment by Bettman underlines Chafee's devious treatment

115 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267, 59 N.E. 55 (1901)).
56 Chafee, Harvard,supra note 2 at 967.
557

Id. at 963.

558 177 Mass. at 271-72, 59 N.E. at 56.
59 See supra text accompanying notes 406, 420, 438-39.
40 See Gunther, supra note 14, at 720-21, 724.
661 Chafee, Harvard,supra note 2, at 968.
512 Id. at 967-68.
"3 Id. at 968.
54 Id.
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of Frohwerk. Bettman, even while defending the legal standards
Holmes applied in Debs, maintained that "Frohwerk is one of the
clearest examples of the political prisoner." Frohwerk's articles,
Bettman wrote Chafee, were clearly "an advocacy of a change in
governmental policy as distinguished from advocacy of obstruction
of existing governmental policy, and seemed to me therefore to fall
within the protection of the constitutional guaranty of free speech
and press." Bettman was puzzled that Chafee cited Frohwerk as a
case in which the first amendment was not involved, "in other
words, as one of the justified convictions. ' 56 5 In fact, any attention
to Frohwerk would have made it even harder for Chafee to maintain that "clear and present danger" was "anything more than a
passing observation" in elaboration of the "bad tendency"
test that
566
phrase.
this
using
by
rejected
had
Holmes
he claimed
F.

Chafee as Advocate

Chafee's libertarian understanding of the first amendment
made much of his writing more hortatory and argumentative than
objective and analytical. Freedom of Speech in War Time often
reads more like a legal brief, or even a sermon, than a law review
article. In the last paragraph of his article, the appearance of scholarly restraint that Chafee had tried, with varying degrees of success, to maintain gave way to a moving statement of his strong libertarian values:
Those who gave their lives for freedom would be the last
to thank us for throwing aside so lightly the great traditions
of our race. Not satisfied to have justice and almost all the
people with our cause, we insisted on an artificial unanimity
of opinion behind the war. Keen intellectual grasp of the
President's aims by the nation at large was very difficult when
the opponents of his idealism ranged unchecked while the
men who urged greater idealism went to prison. In our efforts
to silence those who advocated peace without victory we prevented at the very start that vigorous threshing out of fundamentals which might to-day have saved us from a victory
without peace.""
Perhaps because he found himself writing less as a scholar
111 Letter from Bettman to Chafee, supra note 539.
"'Perhaps chastened by Bettman's comment, Chafee did discuss Frohwerk in his
book. See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 2, at 15-16, 88, 90.
567 Chafee, Harvard,supra note 2, at 973.
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than as an advocate of civil liberty, Chafee emphasized throughout
his article his reliance on policy as well as on law. Probably for the
same reason, he often left ambiguous the extent to which any particular argument was based on either. At times, Chafee seemed to
equate the two. In his "key" paragraph, Chafee claimed that the
'568
first amendment gives "binding force" to "political wisdom.
Later, in declaring that the first amendment precludes the "bad
tendency" test, Chafee confidently maintained that the "history of
the Amendment and the political function of free speech corroborate each other and make this conclusion plain." 56 9 More frequently, Chafee resorted to independent arguments from policy to
reinforce his legal analysis. Near the beginning of his article, he
stated his intention to look beyond purely constitutional issues.
The first amendment, he suggested, not only establishes the constitutional boundaries of free speech, but also serves as "an exhortation and a guide for the action of Congress inside that boundary."
The fundamental policies embodied in the first amendment
"should make Congress reluctant and careful in the enactment of
all restrictions upon utterance, even though the courts will not re' 570
fuse to enforce them as unconstitutional.
As part of an effort "to cover his bet on the intention of the
framers, ' 57 1 Chafee maintained that "the meaning of the First
Amendment did not crystallize in 1791," but had developed over
time.57 2 "The framers," Chafee acknowledged, "would probably
have been horrified at the thought of protecting books by Darwin
or Bernard Shaw, but 'liberty of speech' is no more confined to the
speech they thought permissible than 'commerce' in another clause
is limited to the sailing vessels and horse-drawn vehicles of
1787. '57 3 "Whether or not the Sedition Act was unconstitutional,"
568Id. at 957; see supra notes 492-93 and accompanying text (quoting "key"
paragraph).
Chafee, Harvard,supra note 2, at 960.
870 Id.
at 934.
571 Auerbach, The Patrician as Libertarian:Zechariah Chafee, Jr. and Freedom of
Speech, 42 NEW ENG. Q. 511, 522 (1969). "For Chafee," Auerbach adds, "the contemporary
social interest in freedom of expression was a more compelling justification than the historical evidence which he took to substantiate the validity of his position." Id. at 523.
172 Chafee, Harvard,supra note 2, at 954.
573Id. at 954-55. Chafee cited Holmes to support his statement about the growth of the
law. Id. at 955 & n.73 (citing Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914)). Chafee
even admitted that "people in general at the time these guarantees were framed had no very
definite idea of what they meant, and so were frequently swayed by the passion of the moment or by English precedents, which should have had no application to American conditions." Letter from Zechariah Chafee, Jr., to Edward S. Corwin (Jan. 3, 1921) (Chafee Papers, supra note 189, Box 14, Folder 7); cf. Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARv. L. REv. 891, 898

The University of Chicago Law Review

1298

[50:1205

Chafee also asserted (after making clear his own view that it was),
"it surely defeated the fundamental policy of the First Amendment, the open discussion of public affairs. ' 57 4 Similarly, after
minimizing the importance of prewar free speech cases, Chafee
warned that many of them "seem to ignore so seriously the economic and political facts of our time, that they are precedents of
very dubious value. ' 57 5 And, while maintaining that the language
of the Espionage Act was constitutional, he reiterated that "freedom of speech is not only a limit on Congressional power, but a
by the courts in applying constitutional statpolicy to be observed
57 6
utes to utterance.
Neither did Chafee think that current understandings should
limit the meaning of the first amendment. In response to Edward
S. Corwin's defense of jury determinations of "bad tendency," he
argued that "to give the Constitution a real meaning, it is necessary to look at the functional value of freedom of speech and not
merely at contemporary practice. 5 7 7 Indeed, Chafee confided to
Learned Hand that even the "best test we can find. . . will sometimes break down," making "channels outside the law" the ultimate safeguard for free speech. Chafee's goal, he informed Hand,
was "to produce greater tolerance in Judges and jurors and the
public at large, so that when the next emergency arises we shall be
better prepared . . . ,,571 Freedom of Speech in War Time is better understood as an effort toward that goal than as a work of conventional scholarship. 7 9
Chafee's advocacy of his erroneous interpretation of "clear and

(1949) (reviewing A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14) ("framers had no very clear idea as to
what they meant by 'the freedom of speech or of the press' ") [hereinafter cited as Chafee,
Book Review].
57 Chafee, Harvard,supra note 2, at 953.
'11 Id. at 944-45.
:76

Id. at 960.

Letter from Chafee to Corwin, supra note 573.
Letter from Zechariah Chafee, Jr., to Learned Hand (March 28, 1921) (Hand Papers, supra note 357, Box 15, Folder 26), reprintedin Gunther, supra note 14, at 773.
57,
"In endeavoring to oppose suppressive measures," Chafee wrote in 1949, "I have
found it best to keep on the level of wisdom and policy as much as possible .... The First
Amendment comes into the discussion chiefly as a powerful means of persuasion. If persuasion fails, then the First Amendment will be invoked in the courts, but that is a last resort."
Chafee, Book Review, supra note 573, at 894. Chafee criticized Meiklejohn for placing all his
opposition to suppression "on a constitutional position which is extremely dubious." Id.
This characterization certainly applies to Chafee's own construction of "clear and present
danger," although, as the discussion in the text indicates, Chafee did not place his entire
argument on constitutional ground. But neither did Meiklejohn rely exclusively on the
Constitution.
77

678
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present danger" is the most important and dramatic evidence of
his campaign for a more libertarian conception of the first amendment. Chafee apparently made a conscious and pragmatic decision
to become a propagandist for the most libertarian construction he
could derive from Justice Holmes's Espionage Act decisions even
though he personally favored the approach used by Learned Hand
in Masses, the opinion that helped start him on his free speech
work. 8 In Freedom of Speech in War Time, Chafee gave Hand
lavish praise for his decision in Masses, calling him "the judge who
has given the fullest attention to the meaning of free speech during
the war." '8 1 After analyzing Masses at length, Chafee concluded
that "[t]here is no finer judicial statement of the right of free
speech.35 82 He later dedicated Freedom of Speech to Learned
58
Hand.
Chafee's praise of Holmes was much more restrained. He
found it "regrettable that Justice Holmes did nothing to emphasize
the social interest behind free speech, and show the need of balancing even in war time." 58 The statement in Schenck that war
may render illegal otherwise permissible speech, Chafee observed,
was a vestige of Holmes's belief that force defined truth. Chafee
disagreed: "It is not by giving way to force and the majority that
truth has been won." Holmes's "liberalism," he wrote,585"seems held
in abeyance by his belief in the relativity of values.
Despite these reservations, Chafee never wavered from his adherence to "clear and present danger. ' 586 In fact, notwithstanding
the generally "inconclusive 58 7 nature of the Supreme Court's Espionage Act decisions, he confidently asserted that if this standard
80 Letter from Zechariah Chafee, Jr., to Learned Hand (Oct. 25, 1920) (Hand Papers,
supra note 357, Box 15, Folder 26), reprinted in Gunther, supra note 14, at 766-77.
681 Chafee, Harvard,supra note 2, at 960.
"2

Id. at 962.

supra note 2, at iii; cf. letter from Chafee to Hand, supra note 580 (asking Hand for permission to dedicate book to him).
Chafee, Harvard,supra note 2, at 968. To the argument that "freedom of speech
cannot be invoked to break down the war power," Chafee responded:
[T]he First Amendment is just as much a part of the Constitution as the war clauses,
and ... it is equally accurate to say that the war clauses cannot be invoked to break
down freedom of speech. The truth is that all provisions of the Constitution must be
construed together so as to limit each other.
Id. at 955.
"' Id. at 969. Chafee cited a current article by Holmes, NaturalLaw, supra note 446,
which repeats without citation some basic themes from The Common Law.
56' See, e.g., Chafee, Harvard, supra note 2, at 969 ("clear and present danger" a "good
test for future free speech cases").
U87 Id.
663Z. CHAFEE,
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had been announced in the summer of 1917, rather than in the
spring of 1919, "there would have been many more acquittals" after Espionage Act prosecutions in the lower federal courts.5 s8
Chafee tried to bolster his misconstruction of "clear and
present danger" by assimilating it to Hand's incitement standard.5 9 At one point in his article, Chafee accurately concluded
that Hand's test in Masses "places outside the limits of free speech
one who counsels or advises others to violate existing laws." 590 Yet
Chafee incorrectly stated at another point that this test would
punish speech where there is "strong danger that it will cause injurious acts." 591 In his article, as in his letter to Bettman, 592 Chafee
distorted Hand's objective standard "based on the nature of the
utterance itself"593 into a requirement that the relationship between words and actions be immediate and direct. As a result,
Chafee was able to equate Schenck and Masses and to cite both in
support of his own fundamental opposition to the "bad tendency"
test of indirect causation.
Despite this forced assimilation of Schenck to Masses, Chafee
acknowledged throughout his career both that Holmes's "clear and
present danger" language could not be entirely reconciled with
Hand's incitement standard and that Hand's approach was better
as well as different. Hand wrote Chafee just after he finished reading Freedom of Speech59 to clarify the difference Hand had al-

ways recognized between himself and Holmes:
I am not wholly in love with Holmesy's test and the reason is
this. Once you admit that the matter is one of degree, while
you may put it where it genuinely belongs, you so obviously
make it a matter of administration, i.e., you give to Tomdickus

Id. at 968.
supra text accompanying note 518.
590 Chafee, Harvard,supra note 2, at 962.
589 See

591

Id. at 961.

See supra text accompanying notes 544-45.
593 Letter from Learned Hand to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (Jan. 8, 1920) (Chafee Papers,
592

supra note 189, Box 4, Folder 20), reprinted in Gunther, supra note 14, at 764-66.
8"
Freedom of Speech itself was more frank than Freedom of Speech in War Time in
acknowledging the differences between Hand and Holmes. In language inserted into his earlier discussion of the Espionage Act cases, perhaps responding to correspondence from Hand
himself, see supra note 593, Chafee pointed out, "Justice Holmes interprets the Espionage
Act more widely than Judge Hand, in making the nature of the words only one element of
danger, and in not requiring that utterances shall in themselves satisfy an objective standard. Thus he loses the great administrative advantages of Judge Hand's test." Z. CHAFE_,
supra note 2, at 89. Chafee did not retreat, however, from his defense of "clear and present
danger." Compare id. with Chafee, Harvard,supra note 2, at 967.
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andharry, D.J., so much latitude [Hand here wrote and struck
out "as his own fears may require"] that the jig is at once up.
Besides their Ineffabilities, the Nine Elder Statesmen, have
not shown themselves wholly immune from the "herd instinct" and what seems "immediate and direct" to-day may
seem very remote next year even though the circumstances
surrounding the utterance be unchanged. I own I should prefer a qualitative formula, hard, conventional, difficult to
evade. 9
"I agree with you," Chafee wrote in response, "that Holmes' distinction would prove unworkable in many cases. The Jury would
go over it rough shod." Hand's test, Chafee added, "is surely easier
to apply." 9" In a letter written almost thirty years later to Alexander Meiklejohn, Chafee acknowledged the importance and distinctiveness of Hand's approach in Masses, and indicated his continuing preference for the incitement standard over Holmes's "clear
and present danger" test.59 7 Chafee was even more direct in his
Thirty-Five Years with Freedom of Speech, where he wrote: "I
still like better Judge Learned Hand's phrase . . . 'direct incitement to violent resistance.' "598
Chafee may not have fully appreciated all the contrasts in the
positions of Holmes and Hand, 599 but he did recognize that they
had significantly different views on free speech, and he retained a
lifelong preference for Hand's. Chafee must have decided that the
best chance of obtaining judicial support for this view was to argue
from language already accepted by a unanimous Supreme Court
rather than to promote a better standard, which, as its author himself realized, had "met with almost unanimous disapproval by
other Federal judges,"6' 0 0 including the Justices of the Supreme
01
Court.
Hand indicated his own approval of Chafee's approach after
reading Freedom of Speech: "You have, I dare say, done well to
Letter from Hand to Chafee, supra note 532.
596

Letter from Chafee to Hand, supra note 578; see supra note 594 and accompanying

text.
5'7 Letter from Zechariah Chafee, Jr., to Alexander Meiklejohn (Nov. 23, 1948) (Chafee
Papers, supra note 189, Box 2, Folder 16), quoted in part in Gunther, supra note 14, at 747
n.153.
:,8 Chafee, supra note 39, at 8-9.
'" See supra text accompanying notes 542-45, 592-93.
:00 Letter from Hand to Chafee, supra note 593.
,01See supra notes 309-63 and accompanying text (discussing Schenck, Frohwerk, and
Debs).
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take what has fallen from Heaven and insist that it is manna
rather than to set up any independent solution.

6 02

Chafee ac-

knowledged his pragmatic motivation in less explicit terms by replying that "we ought to take the best test we can find even
though it will sometimes break down.

60 3

A generation later Chafee

seemed to suggest that Holmes himself had made a similar pragmatic compromise in writing Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs. He

wrote Meiklejohn in 1948 that "Holmes could not possibly have
convinced his colleagues that all speech which tended to produce
evasion of the draft was immune." In any event, Chafee remained
certain that these decisions, whether an expression of Holmes's
personal views or the best he could get his colleagues to accept,
had "saved" the United States from the excesses of most Espionage Act prosecutions and opinions and had "kept down suppression during World War

11. '' 604

Chafee's strenuous and effective

public support for a standard whose weaknesses he acknowledged
in private is the most striking manifestation of the pragmatism
that lay behind his entire approach to the first amendment. 0 5
Chafee's transformation of "clear and present danger" was
adopted almost immediately by Justices Holmes and Brandeis. By
the time Holmes wrote his Abrams dissent in November 1919, just
:02

Letter from Hand to Chafee, supra note 532.

603 Letter from Chafee to Hand, supra note 578.
60 Letter from Chafee to Meiklejohn, supra note 597. Chafee repeated this point in his
review of Meildejohn's book, Chafee, Book Review, supra note 573. Chafee, the lawyer, condescended to Meiklejohn, the philosopher:
Even if Holmes had agreed with Mr. Meiklejohn's view of the First Amendment, his
insistence on such absolutism would not have persuaded a single colleague, and scores
of men would have gone to prison who have been speaking freely for three decades.
After all, a judge who is trying to establish a doctrine which the Supreme Court will
promulgate as law cannot write like a solitary philosopher. He has to convince at least
four men in a specific group and convince them very soon. The true alternative to
Holmes's view of the First Amendment was not at all the perfect immunity for public
discussion which Mr. Meiklejohn desires. It was no immunity at all in the face of
legislation.
Id. at 900-01. Chafee complained that Meildejohn showed "no realization of the long uphill
fight which Holmes had to wage in order to give free speech its present protection." Id. at
901. In these comments, Chafee was defending himself as well as Holmes.
005 Prude observes that "clear and present danger," despite Chafee's reservations about
its value, had the "crucial advantage" of acceptance by a unanimous Supreme Court in
Schenck. "For this reason, if for no other, Chafee was content to make the test the core of
his legal position on free speech. . . ." Prude, supra note 483, at 641. Gunther accepts the
plausibility of this "pragmatic ground," but he also suggests that Chafee "may not have
fully appreciated the differences" between Hand and Holmes, and may have also become
"an unwitting captive of the Holmes mythology he had created." Gunther did not explore
these possibilities further because he focused on "Hand's thinking" rather than on Chafee's
"perceptions and motivations." Gunther, supra note 14, at 747-48.
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eight months after Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs and five months
after Chafee's article in the Harvard Law Review, Holmes had accepted as his own the "manna" into which Chafee had converted
this phrase. Brandeis relied even more explicitly on Chafee's interpretation of "clear and present danger" in the first amendment
opinions he began to write in 1920.
VII.

JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE
MODERN FIRST AMENDMENT TRADITION

Soon after writing the opinions for a unanimous Supreme
Court in the first group of Espionage Act decisions, Holmes and
Brandeis, relying heavily on Chafee, parted company with the
Court majority in first amendment cases. Holmes's dissent in
Abrams v. United States, 0 6 which was joined by Brandeis, marks
the turning point in the Supreme Court's treatment of the first
amendment. This dissent, for the first time in the history of Supreme Court adjudication of free speech issues, added meaningful
technical and theoretical content to first amendment guarantees.
By November 1919, the date of the Abrams decision, Holmes and
Brandeis had joined the ranks of the postwar civil libertarians and
had begun to express their new values in constitutional terms.
Holmes continued to support these values throughout the 1920's,
but he often seemed ambivalent about them and occasionally exhibited vestiges of his earlier, less sympathetic attitudes. Brandeis,
on the other hand, enthusiastically promoted and expanded the
libertarian innovations introduced by Holmes in Abrams. In his
opinions from Schaefer v. United States60 7 in 1920 through
Whitney v. California0 8 in 1927, Brandeis developed a first
amendment jurisprudence that laid the groundwork for the current
Supreme Court position, announced in Brandenburg v. Ohio6 0 9 in
1969.
A.

The Majority Decisions from Abrams through Whitney

The majority of the Supreme Court remained true to the restrictive tradition that spanned World War I. While Holmes and
Brandeis broke dramatically with precedent, including their own
decisions in Schenck, Sugarman, Frohwerk, and Debs, the major6'6 250
40? 251
4
274
408 395

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

616, 624 (1919).
466, 482 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
444 (1969).
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ity applied the restrictive prewar analysis in every major first
amendment case during the next decade: Abrams v. United
6 12
6 11
States,6 10 Schaefer v. United States, Pierce v. United States,
Gilbert v. Minnesota,61 3 United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social
Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson,1 14 Gitlow v. New York,""
and Whitney v. California.16 These cases were generally prosecuted under the Espionage Act or an analogous state statute. Gitlow and Whitney punished radicals for violating state statutes that
prohibited criminal advocacy or criminal syndicalism. The seven
majority opinions, although citing prewar precedents with some
frequency, '7 relied particularly on Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs,
the most recent, and certainly in the Espionage Act prosecutions,
the most relevant precedents. None of the later decisions referred
explicitly to "clear and present danger."6' s
The majority opinion in Abrams was entirely consistent with
Holmes's decisions in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs earlier that
year.6 1 9 Holmes in Debs concluded that Schenck had "disposed of"
all first amendment issues,62 0 and Justice Clarke, writing for the
majority in Abrams, held that objections to the constitutionality of
the Espionage Act were "definitely negatived" by Schenck and
Frohwerk.21 Consistent with Goldman 2 and with Holmes's prior
decisions, Clarke treated Abrams as presenting only evidentiary
questions; he found that there was "some evidence, competent and
substantial, before the jury, fairly tending to sustain the
s
6 23
verdict.
The defendants in Abrams were Russian immigrants who had
published and distributed leaflets in English and Yiddish. These
leaflets castigated President Wilson for sending American troops
610 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
611 251 U.S. 466 (1920).
0-2 252 U.S. 239 (1920).
613254 U.S. 325 (1920).
61 255 U.S. 407 (1921).
615 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
a6 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (overruled in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
617 See Rabban, supra note 4, at 591 n.430.
618 Indeed, some of these later majority decisions seem consciously to paraphrase
Holmes's language in Schenck to avoid using the words "clear and present danger." See
Pierce, 252 U.S. at 250; Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 669.
619 Others have pointed out this consistency. See Gunther, supra note 14, at 742;
Ragan, supra note 14, at 43-44.
60 United States v. Debs, 249 U.S. 211, 215 (1919).
621 250 U.S. at 619.
622 Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918).
613 250 U.S. at 619; see also id. at 624.
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into Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution and urged a general
strike in protest. The defendants had been charged and convicted
under the 1918 amendments to the Espionage Act for conspiring
and attempting to harm the prosecution of the war. Justice Clarke
conceded that the "primary purpose and intent 624 of these "defendant alien anarchists"' 25 might have been "to aid the cause of
the Russian Revolution,"6 26 an activity not proscribed by any law.
Yet just as Holmes held that Debs's "general program" could not
protect his speech if even an "incidental" and "indirect" part
tended to encourage the obstruction of recruitment,6 27 Clarke determined that Abrams could be punished for the "obvious effect"
of his language-"defeat of the war program of the United
States."'6 2 Holmes had said in Debs that the use of "words tending
to obstruct the recruiting service [is evidence that the defendant]
meant that they should have that effect. ' 2 According to Clarke,
"[m]en must be held to have intended, and to be accountable for,
63 0
the effects which their acts were likely to produce.
The other majority opinions in the 1920's reiterated these familiar themes. Interlacing legal analysis with emotional outbursts,
the opinions used the "bad tendency" doctrine as the means to
punish radicals who had made a "travesty" 31 of the first amendment by invoking its provisions "to justify the activities of anarchy
'63 2
or of the enemies of the United States.
B.

Holmes's Dissent in Abrams: The Constitutional Divide

Holmes's dissent in Abrams broke from this continuing restrictive tradition. His landmark opinion relied on statutory and
constitutional construction as well as discussions of policy at the
highest levels of generality. Yet Holmes stressed, "I never have
seen any reason to doubt that the questions of law that alone were
before this Court in the cases of Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs...
were rightly decided, ' 6 3 a position he reiterated in his private correspondence. Abrams, he wrote several friends, provided the occa-

414

Id. at 621.

Id. at 623.
Id. at 621.
67 249 U.S. at
642250 U.S. at
21 249 U.S. at
410 250 U.S. at
61 254 U.S. at
421 251 U.S. at
633 250 U.S. at
'=

6

214-15.
621.
216.
621.
333.
477.
627 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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sion for him to state the limits of the doctrine he had already set
forth in his first Espionage Act decisions." 4
Holmes's actual language in Abrams belies these claims. In
fact, his dissent in Abrams met many of the criticisms of his earlier
decisions by Hand, Freund, and especially Chafee.6 35 After con-

cluding that the government had failed to prove that the defendants in Abrams had the requisite intent to hinder the prosecution of the war, Holmes acknowledged "that the word intent as
vaguely used in ordinary legal discussion means no more than
knowledge at the time of the act that the consequences said to be
intended will ensue."63 6 An even weaker definition of intent, he
added, forms the basis for civil and criminal liability at common
law. A man could be punished "if at the time of his act he knew
facts from which common experience showed that the consequences would follow, whether he individually could foresee them
or not.

63 7

Holmes himself had used these ordinary and vague con-

ceptions of intent, which he had already analyzed in The Common
Law and applied in his earlier decisions on the general law of attempts, to justify his deference to the jury determinations of guilt
in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs. 6 3s Yet in Abrams, Holmes main-

tained that the word "intent" in the amended statute must be construed "in a strict and accurate sense." Any other interpretation,
he insisted, would be "absurd."6 39 Under this strict construction,
"a deed is not done with intent to produce a consequence unless
that consequence is the aim of the deed." Even when the probable
result is obvious, intent can be ascribed to a specific act, including
speech, only when the attempt to achieve a potential consequence
is the "proximate motive" for the performance of that act.6 40
This new definition signaled Holmes's rejection of indirect intent, the doctrine which had formed the basis for his decisions in
Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs as well as for the majority's opinion
in Abrams. Holmes now called "absurd" the analysis he himself
had used previously. "To say that two phrases taken literally
' Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Sir Frederick Pollock (Dec. 14, 1919),
reprintedin 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LarrERs, supra note 449, at 32; letter from Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., to Mrs. John Chipman Gray (Dec. 10, 1919) (Holmes Papers, supra note 442,
Box 36, Folder 5); letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Albert J. Beveridge (Dec. 8,
1919) (Holmes Papers, supra note 442, Box 36, Folder 5).
See supra sections V.E and VI.
636 250 U.S. at 626.
637 Id. at 626-27.
6: See supra section
39

640

250 U.S. at 627.
Id.

IV.B (discussing Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs).
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might import a suggestion of conduct that would have interference
with the war as an indirect and probably undesired effect," Holmes
concluded in Abrams, "seems to me by no means enough to show
an attempt to produce that effect. 6 41 Application of this reasoning
might have precluded the convictions of Frohwerk and Debs.
Holmes also used his dissent in Abrams to restate the "clear
and present danger" standard in language that conformed to
Chafee's misconstruction of its original meaning in Schenck and
that paralleled Holmes's own redefinition of intent:
I do not doubt . . .that by the same reasoning that would
justify punishing persuasion to murder, the United States
constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will
bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the
United States constitutionally may seek to prevent. The
power undoubtedly is greater in time of war than in time of
peace because war opens dangers that do not exist at other
times.
But as against dangers peculiar to war, as against others,
the principle of the right to free speech is always the same. It
is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to
bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the
expression of opinion where privatq rights are not concerned.
Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to change the mind
6 42
of the country.
And Holmes added in the concluding paragraph of his opinion:
I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts
to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe
to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten
immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes
of the law that an immediate check is required to save the
country .... Only the emergency that makes it immediately
dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants making any exception to the sweeping command, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech."
In Abrams, as in Schenck, Holmes still viewed speech as a cat41
's

"3

Id. at 629.
Id. at 627-28.
Id. at 630-31.
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egory of attempt and continued to rely on his thinking about the
general law of criminal attempts. The circumstances in which
speech is uttered, including the proximity and seriousness of the
threatened danger as well as the intent of the speaker, remained
important. But in Abrams, Holmes infused into his restatement of
"clear and present danger" new elements that afforded greater
protection for speech. Most strikingly, he now maintained that the
proximity of the danger from speech must be "clear and imminent," not just "clear and present." He used variations of "immediate" and "imminent" with remarkable frequency throughout his
dissent, and even appended "forthwith" and "pressing" for additional emphasis. 6 "
Subtle variations in language in Abrams also indicated that
Holmes was less willing than in Schenck to defer to legislative
judgments of what constitutes the "substantive evils" that justify
the punishment of speech threatening their occurrence. In
Schenck, Holmes referred to "the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent" 645 without anywhere indicating the limits of
this congressional power. In Abrams, by contrast, Holmes rephrased this passage in words which significantly modify its meaning: "certain substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent. ' 646 By adding the word "certain,"
Holmes allowed that even some admittedly substantive evils cannot be invoked to restrict freedom of expression. And Holmes may
have included "constitutionally," modifying "seek," in order to
stress that the Constitution limits the government's right to prevent evil. By substituting "the United States" for "Congress,"
moreover, Holmes suggested that these constitutional limitations
apply to all branches of government, thereby insinuating a justification for judicial review of congressional legislation without announcing a new standard that would have seemed inconsistent
with the great deference manifested by his prewar and Espionage
Act decisions. He now stressed that "Congress certainly cannot for.' Staughton Lynd has persuaded me that the word "imminent" is not inherently more
protective than the word "present." If Holmes had used the phrase "clear and imminent
danger" in Schenck and had substituted "clear and present danger" in Abrams, Abrams
would still strike readers as the more protective decision and the word "present" would
seem to convey more immediacy than the word "imminent." But the development of
Holmes's views on free speech between Schenck and Abrams convinces me that Holmes
intended his new formulation of "clear and imminent danger" in Abrams to be more protective than the "clear and present danger" language in Schenck. The fact that Holmes appended additional words of immediacy in Abrams reinforces my interpretation.
249 U.S. at 52.
64
250 U.S. at 627 (emphasis added).
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and, for the

first time, referred to the first amendment as a "sweeping command. 8'

48

Perhaps Holmes no longer firmly believed that the ma-

jority could legitimately exercise whatever power it deemed efficient to obtain desired results.
In addition to incorporating immediacy as part of the "clear
and present danger" test and to providing more support for judicial review of the constitutional limitations on legislative action,
Holmes appeared to identify in Abrams the distinction between
"public" and "private" speech stressed by prewar scholarly commentary on the first amendment." 9 In restating this test, Holmes
implied that "where private rights are not concerned,"650 Congress
has less power to punish speech, a point he neglected to make in
Schenck, Frohwerk, or Debs. Holmes seems finally to have accepted that speech on matters of public affairs deserves added protection and cannot be viewed in the same manner as a simple solicitation to do a private wrong. And he now rejected as historically
inaccurate the government's claim that the first amendment did
not abolish the common-law crime of seditious libel,6
6 52
had ignored the previous March.

51

a claim he

Holmes's concluding paragraph in his Abrams dissent, which
contains the most eloquent and best remembered passages in this
famous opinion, suggests that he himself recognized the vast
change in his views on free speech during the eight months since
he wrote Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your
power and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you
think the speech impotent, as when a man says that he has
squared the circle, or that you do not care whole-heartedly for
the result, or that you doubt either your power or your premises. But when men have realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they
"' Id. at 628.
" Id. at 631.
"See Rabban, supra note 4, at 564-66.
:5o 250 U.S. at 628.
,1 Id. at 630.
2'See supra notes 259-60 and 293-97 and accompanying text (briefs in Debs arguing
whether first amendment prohibits punishing common-law seditious libel).
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believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and
that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.
Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation
upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.653
It is remarkable that this paragraph, which includes a. stirring defense of free speech, opens with a sentence that declares, "Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical."
The "but" which introduces Holmes's libertarian language comes
only in the fourth sentence. The second and third sentences, moreover, bear a remarkable similarity to the contents of Holmes's letters to Hand and Laski defending his decisions in Schenck,
Frohwerk, and Debs, and to The Common Law.6 " The text begin-

ning with the word "but," the most general and least technical portion of the entire dissent, seems as much a confession of personal
conversi6n as a statement of constitutional law. Holmes, perhaps
unselfconsciously, appears to be commenting on himself and those
of his contemporaries who came to a belated appreciation of the
value of free speech. More specifically, "fighting faith" may well
refer to the American support of World War I, a faith which was
"upset" in the aftermath of the war when many, including
Holmes's good friends at The New Republic,e55 began to doubt
"the very foundations of their own conduct." Only with the disillusionment that followed the war did these men begin to believe,
above all, "that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas." Holmes here acknowledged that "the best test of
truth" is not "the majority vote of that nation that can lick all
others,"6 56 but "the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market."
Holmes's redefinition in Abrams of the central terms of his
prior first amendment jurisprudence reflected a corresponding readjustment in his personal ideology. Yet Holmes, despite these important libertarian innovations, retained significant vestiges of his
lifelong beliefs. He reapplied rather than abandoned his Social
653

65

250 U.S. at 630.
See supra section V.

6" See supra note 38 and text accompanying notes 38-40.
656 Letter from Holmes to Hand, supra note 443.
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Darwinism. He tested truth by the "power" of thought to prevail
in the "competition of the market" of ideas, and did not specify
the value of free speech to the individual or to society. Nor did he
conceive of the first amendment as the legal expression of democratic political theory. 57 He still believed in the survival of the
fittest, but he was now willing to let ideas battle each other rather
than brute force. Holmes's dissent in Abrams did not constitute a
complete transformation of his prior thought. " " But in contrast to
his admittedly summary treatment of the first amendment in the
first Espionage Act cases,6"9 Holmes strove in Abrams to develop
meaningful protection for free speech. He even concluded his dissent, in an uncharacteristic display of modesty, by stating, "I regret that I cannot put into more impressive words my belief that in
their conviction upon this indictment the defendants were deprived of their rights under the Constitution of the United
States." 6 0
C.

Explanations for Holmes's Transformation in Abrams

What led Justice Holmes to change his views on free speech so
dramatically between his opinions for a unanimous Supreme Court
in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs and his dissent in Abrams just
eight months later? This question is difficult to answer with precision, largely because there were so many factors that might have
influenced him. Certain factual differences between Abrams and
the first Espionage Act cases might have prompted Holmes to
write his dissent. Current events during those eight months might
have alerted Holmes, as they alerted many others, to the importance of freedom of expression. And the criticisms of his earlier

See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 70-77.
",Holmes had, in fact, always recognized that for the fittest to survive all competitors
must be given a reasonable chance of success. In his earliest writing, he maintained that the
exercise of power should be tempered by sensitivity to the shifting equilibrium among social
forces. See M. HowE, supra note 370, at 46-47. This view led him to dissent from an 1896
Massachusetts decision granting an injunction against picketing. Holmes did not base his
opinion on the abstract value of free expression, but on the determination that picketing
was essential "if the battle" between capital and labor "is to be carried on in a fair and
equal way." Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 108, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Holmes also seemed to acknowledge, in The Common Law and in private correspondence, that judges must sometimes determine the majority will by evaluating longrange rather than immediate desires. M. HowE, supra, at 174-75. And in The Common Law
he briefly identified the public interest in the dissemination of information. O.W. HOLMES,
supra note 16, at 137, 139.
" See supra text accompanying note 457.
250 U.S. at 631.
:67
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Espionage Act decisions, particularly from men as prominent and
respected as Chafee, Freund, and Hand, could have affected his
thinking in Abrams, even in ways which Holmes himself might not
have recognized.
As Holmes pointed out in his dissent in Abrams, the indictment under which the defendants were convicted alleged that they
intended their publications to encourage resistance to American
participation in World War I. Holmes maintained, after reviewing
the texts of the defendants' leaflets, that their only object was "to
help Russia and stop American intervention there against the popular government-not to impede the United States in the war that
it was carrying on."661 "An intent to prevent interference with the
revolution in Russia," Holmes remarked, "might have been satisfied without any hindrance to carrying on the war in which we
were engaged. 6' 62 The fact that Alfred Bettman used similar reasoning to oppose the prosecution in Abrams, even while justifying
the government's position in Schenck and Debs,6 63 provides further
evidence that the absence of a state of war with Russia was an
actual basis, and not just a rationalization, for Holmes's dissent in
Abrams.
More generally, the opposition to the war expressed by the defendants in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs might have seemed
much more threatening to Holmes than the objections by the defendants in Abrams to American interference in the Russian
Revolution. Holmes characterized the facts of Abrams as involving
"the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown
man"'" and later described the pamphlets as "poor and puny anonymities."66 In such circumstances, Holmes maintained, "nobody
can suppose" that this publication "would present any immediate
danger that its opinions would hinder the success of the government arms or have any appreciable tendency to do so.166 6 Schenck,
by contrast, was an important official of the Socialist Party, and
:61Id. at 629.
Id. at 628. Holmes elaborated on this reasoning for Pollock several weeks later:
[E]ven if there were evidence of a conspiracy to obstruct, etc., the overt act laid must
be an act done to effect the object of the conspiracy and it seems to me plain that the
only object of the leaflets was to hinder our interference with Russia. I ought to have
developed this in the opinion. But that is ancient history now.
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Sir Frederick Pollock (Dec. 14, 1919), reprinted
in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 449, at 32.
:'3 Letter from Bettman to Chafee, supra note 539.
" 250 U.S. at 628.
665 Id. at 629.
666 Id. at 628.
402
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Debs was the most famous socialist in the United States. Though
Frohwerk, like Abrams, was an unknown, Holmes, like much of the
legal community, viewed Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs as an interconnected trilogy, which probably made it difficult for him to consider Frohwerk on its own facts. Abrams, the only Espionage Act
case decided the following fall, provided a better context than
Frohwerk for Holmes to recognize and point out that less risk existed than in Schenck or Debs. It is also possible that Holmes,
writing in dissent, felt able to express his personal opinions on
freedom of expression more freely than when he wrote on behalf of
all the Justices, many of whom had more restrictive views on the
67
subject.
Contemporary developments, many of which collectively
formed part of the "Red Scare" of 1919-1920, might also have
made Holmes more sensitive to the value of free speech by November 1919 than he had been the previous March. The national debate over the Versailles Peace Treaty, which reached its peak in
the summer and early fall of 1919, convinced many, perhaps including Holmes, that their enthusiasm for the war had been misplaced.66 8 Retrospective doubts about the wisdom of the war might
have made the opposition voiced earlier by defendants in Espionage Act cases seem less threatening to the national interest. At
the same time, the popular mood of repression that contributed to
the convictions of the Espionage Act defendants had culminated in
the hysteria of the "Red Scare" in the months between Schenck
and Abrams. The creation of the Communist Third International
in March 1919, designed to encourage worldwide proletarian revolutions, intensified the preexisting domestic fear of radicals and
greatly assisted the efforts of American business interests and patriotic societies to identify postwar labor conflicts with communist
activity.66 9 Widespread industrial unrest, which began in January
1919 with a general strike in Seattle, culminated in the Boston Police Strike in September, the nationwide steel strike, also in September, and the nationwide coal strike in November. The violence
that accompanied these strikes was exaggerated and sensationally
reported by the national news media. The strikes and the publicity
Chafee wrote Meiklejohn that Holmes's dissent in Abrams "is plainly an expression
of personal faith such as he could not make when he was speaking for other men as well as
for himself in the Schenck case." See letter from Chafee to Meiklejohn, supra note 597.
"e See W. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 32, at 50-65.
e" See id. at 67; R. MURRAY, supra note 34, at 15-18, 92-94, 121-22.
667
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they generated further identified labor with radicalism. 70 A series
of unsuccessful attempted bombings around May Day, 1919, an apparently coordinated effort directed at a variety of prominent
Americans, including Justice Holmes, and explosions within an
hour of each other in eight different cities about a month later,
also encouraged popular alarm about radicals.6 7 1 By the fall of
1919, virtually anyone who did not succumb to the prevailing hysteria ran the risk of being labeled a radical. 7 It was during this
period, for example, that Frankfurter and Chafee were under pressure to resign from the Harvard Law School. 7 3
The excesses of the postwar hysteria produced a libertarian
counterreaction. Many who had been unconcerned with civil liberties now recognized their importance. For example, as the "Red
Scare" grew in 1919, The New Republic increasingly emphasized
the value of free speech.6 7 4 By the end of the year, Roger Baldwin,
after more than two years of failure, finally was able to convince
significant numbers of nonpacifist liberals to join the civil liberties
movement and form the ACLU. 5 Even Alfred Bettman, while he
defended his briefs for the government in Schenck and Debs, concluded his letter to Chafee in September 1919 by complimenting
him on his defense of free speech during the postwar repression. 76
It seems likely that the events which made many of his friends
and contemporaries more sensitive to the value of free speech affected Justice Holmes as well. 6 His letters rarely referred to the
hysteria, perhaps because he considered it unworthy of his interest.
But when Holmes heard that Frankfurter's position at Harvard
might be in jeopardy because influential people considered him too
radical, he promptly wrote President Lowell praising Frankfurter
670 See R. MURRAY, supra note 34, at 122; see also W. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 32, at
73-76; P. MURPHY, supra note 31, at 69-76. See generally R. MURRAY, supra note 34, at 12265.
611 See W. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 32, at 71-72; P. MURPHY, supra note 31, at 65; R.
MURRAY, supra note 34, at 68-81.
672 See R. MURRAY, supra note 34, at 166-67.
'3 See A. SUTHERLAND, supra note 486, at 250-58; Irons, supra note 486, at 1206; Lash,
supra note 39, in F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 39, at 29.
674 See supra note 38 and accompanying text and sources cited therein.
675 See supra text accompanying note 40.
676 Letter from Bettman to Chafee, supra note 536.
677 Edmund Wilson surmises that Holmes, long lonely for intellectual companionship,
found it through his friendship with the postwar liberals. These liberals "stimulated and
entertained him as well as gave him the admiration he craved." E. WILSON, supra note 370,
at 775. Wilson believes that their influence may have "counted for something with Holmes
in his opinions after the first World War in cases in which the issue of free speech was
involved." Id. at 772.
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for contributing to "the ferment which is more valuable than an
endowment." 78 Indeed, in his own book on Holmes, Frankfurter
later maintained that this "period of hysteria undoubtedly focused
the attention of Mr. Justice Holmes on the
practical consequences
6 79
of a relaxed attitude toward" free speech.

It also seems probable that the reactions to his earlier Espionage Act decisions by Chafee, Freund, and Hand contributed to
the more libertarian approach Holmes took in Abrams. The impact
of Chafee on Holmes is easiest to trace. Harold Laski, who was well
acquainted with both Chafee and Holmes, invited both men to tea
in late July 1919, midway between Schenck and Abrams. Laski,
who had given Holmes a copy of Freedom of Speech in War Time
before this meeting, wrote Chafee that "we must fight on it." 680
Unfortunately, no record of this meeting appears to exist. But
Chafee, in a letter to Judge Amidon the following September, commented on his summer conversation with Holmes. Chafee came
away from this encounter with the impression that he did not convince Holmes about several key points in his article. Although
Chafee was certain that Holmes, as a juror, would have voted to
acquit Debs, Chafee reported that Holmes "is inclined to allow a
very wide latitude to Congressional discretion in the carrying on of
the war" and "further thinks that he could not have gone behind
the jury verdict in the Debs case." Chafee applied to Holmes the
criticism he had expressed in his article against federal district and
circuit court judges. He called Holmes a "failure" for his "omission
to state the principles" by which to judge free speech claims."8
Holmes, though apparently not converted by his initial reading of Freedom of Speech in War Time or by his summer meeting
with Chafee, soon began to agree with him. 2 Holmes's dissent in
67$

Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to A. Lawrence Lowell (June 2, 1919), re-

printed in 1 HOLmES-LAsKI LETTERS, supra note 442, at 211 n.2. A letter from Holmes to
Frankfurter took a different tack. Holmes, after assuring Frankfurter that "I believe in academic freedom," quickly added that "a professor's conduct may affect the good will of the
institution to which he belongs." A professor would not be doing "his whole duty if he
merely indulged his spontaneity-even in a case where he had opinions that required courage to state and that he thought it desirable to make known. He must weigh this harm that
he may do to his employer while he takes his employer's pay." Letter from Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., to Felix Frankfurter (Dec. 4, 1919) (Holmes Papers, supra note 442, Box 36,
Folder 5).
67 F. FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 79 (2d ed. 1961).
80 Letter from Harold Laski to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (July 23, 1919) (Chafee Papers,
supra note 189, Box 14, Folder 15).
61 Letter from Chafee to Amidon, supra note 459.
'
Evidently, Holmes did not correspond about his meeting with Chafee and Laski until 1920. After receiving a copy of Chafee's book, Freedom of Speech, Holmes wrote Laski
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Abrams, written less than four months after this talk, provides the
best evidence of Chafee's influence. Most strikingly, after omitting
any reference to "clear and present danger" in Frohwerk and Debs,
Holmes reformulated this phrase in Abrams in a way which indicated that he now interpreted these words more as Chafee had
misconstrued and glorified them than as he himself had originally
used them in Schenck.
The Abrams dissent incorporated other views of the first
amendment advocated by Chafee, Hand, and Freund, but missing
from Holmes's own prior decisions. Holmes emphasized in Abrams
the relationship between free speech and the search for truth, recognized its importance even during a war, and conceded that the
first amendment is inconsistent with the common law of seditious
libel. Although Holmes required "specific intent" in Debs as well
as Abrams, his stress in Abrams on a "strict" construction of intent responded to the concerns of Chafee, Hand and Freund about
employing vague standards to evaluate the legality of speech. Perhaps most importantly, Holmes accepted in Abrams the independent judicial role they all had advocated. For the first time,
Holmes indicated that he had abandoned his reflexive deference to
legislative or jury determinations affecting the exercise of free
speech. No longer treating the Espionage Act cases as "routine
criminal appeals," 683 he now seemed to appreciate their constitutional dimension.
It is impossible to determine which of these plausible influences actually account for the libertarian innovations Holmes introduced in his Abrams dissent. Holmes himself did not help solve
this puzzle. He never directly acknowledged that he had altered his
interpretation of the first amendment between his initial Espionage Act decisions and Abrams. In fact, many of his statements
indicate that he considered his dissent in Abrams a logical extension of Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs. The language of the dissent,
however, contradicts Holmes's claims to consistency. All or some of
these factors, consciously or unconsciously, might have helped
change his views. Though the reasons remain uncertain, the signifithat "the preliminary extracts in [the] Harvard Law Review" were "first rate." Letter from
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Harold Laski (Dec. 17, 1920), reprinted in 1 HOLMEs-LAsKI
LETRERs, supra note 442, at 297. In a letter earlier that year to Sir Frederick Pollock,

Holmes mentioned that Chafee "is said to be a very good man" and, referring to his talk
with Chafee the previous summer, described him as "unusually pleasant and intelligent."
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Sir Frederick Pollock (June 21, 1920), reprinted
in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETrERS, supra note 449, at 45.
"I Kalven, supra note 14, at 238.
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cant transformation in Holmes's approach to freedom of expression is evident.
D. Holmes After Abrams
Holmes's dissent in Abrams, written against an unacknowledged tradition of judicial hostility to the value of free speech, constituted the first significant libertarian construction of the first
amendment in the history of the United States Supreme Court.
For the next decade, Holmes and Brandeis dissented in almost
every first amendment case. After Abrams, the leadership passed
to Brandeis, who wrote most of the dissenting opinions and made
the major doctrinal advances. Holmes did not retreat from the
views he expressed in Abrams and generally went along with Brandeis, but Holmes's limited writing on the first amendment after
Abrams demonstrates that he never entirely escaped from the attitudes revealed in his prior restrictive decisions. Nor did he ever
again attain the eloquence that accompanied his conversion in
Abrams.
In his dissent in Gitlow v. New York,684 Holmes repeated the
immediacy requirement he imported into the "clear and present
danger" test in Abrams. The publications at issue in Gitlow,
Holmes reasoned, referred to "some indefinite time in the future"
and did not constitute "an attefnpt to induce an uprising against
government at once." He warned against punishing speech at a
point "too remote from possible consequences," and he concluded
that "no present danger" existed.685 After quoting his statement of
"clear and present danger" in Schenck as "the criterion sanctioned
by the full Court, 6' 86 he maintained, consistently with the argument of Chafee's scholarly writings, that the majority in Abrams
had "departed from"68 7 its true meaning. Holmes refused to accept
Abrams and Schaefer as having "settled the law" because the
"convictions" he expressed in his Abrams dissent "are too deep." e
He closed his dissent in Gitlow by protesting that "the indictment
alleges ... publication and nothing more,"6 9 the very objection
raised by Stedman and ignored by the entire Court in Sugarman

268 U.S. at 652 (1925).
Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
4" Id.
at 672.
"7 Id. at 673.
4

$Id.
4"

Id.
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and Debs.6 90
In other cases after Abrams, Holmes dissented on first amendment grounds. Despite decades of precedent to the contrary, 91 including many cases in which he had concurred, Holmes maintained
in Leach v. Carile92 that the Postmaster General had violated the
first amendment by prohibiting the delivery of mail to a company
advertising its "Organo Tablets" as a general cure. "If the execution of this law does not abridge freedom of speech," Holmes concluded, "I do not quite see what could be said to do so."'e' 3 In
United States v. Schwimmer,6 94 Holmes dissented from the majority's decision to deny a pacifist's petition for naturalization. Although the petitioner "found the United States nearest her ideals
of a democratic republic" and "expressed steadfast opposition to
any undemocratic form of government, ' 695 the majority concluded
that her pacifism made her ineligible for citizenship. "The fact that
she is an uncompromising pacifist with no sense of nationalism but
only a cosmic sense of belonging to the human family," Justice
Butler wrote for the majority, "justifies belief that she may be opposed to the use of military forces as contemplated by our Constitution and laws."619 Because a person holding such views would be
"disposed" to encourage the harmful and sometimes unlawful activites engaged in during World War I by "those who described
themselves as pacifists and conscientious objectors, 6 97 the majority determined that it "was bound by the law to deny her application."6 8 Holmes disagreed. He acknowledged that the petitioner's
views "might excite popular prejudice, but if there is any principle
of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment
than any other it is the principle of free thought-not free thought
for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we
6 99
hate."
Despite his adherence to the libertarian views he first set forth
in Abrams, Holmes lagged behind Brandeis throughout the 1920's.
7 0 0 Brandeis, in a forceful dissent, mainIn Gilbert v. Minnesota,
690 See supra text accompanying notes 243-49, 309-13, 347-51.
691 See Rabban, supra note 4, at 526-29 (discussing prewar Post Office cases).
92

258 U.S. 138 (1922).

693 Id. at 141 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
69

279 U.S. 644 (1929).

"Id.
at 647.
'"
Id. at 651-52.
"' Id. at 652.
68 Id. at 653.
69 Id.
at 654-55 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
700 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
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tained that federal constitutional law invalidated a state sedition
statute.70 1 When Brandeis sent Holmes the draft of his dissent,
Holmes replied on its cover: "I think you go too far." Holmes wrote
70 2
Brandeis that he would instead "concur in result on the record.

Holmes also did not go as far as Brandeis in United States ex
rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson.703
Both Holmes and Brandeis dissented from the majority's affirmance of Postmaster General Burleson's decision to revoke, under
the authority of the Espionage Act, the second-class mailing privileges of the Milwaukee Leader, a socialist newspaper. Holmes began his separate, shorter, and less forceful dissent by indicating
that he had initially intended to vote with the majority and had
changed his mind only after reading Brandeis's dissent.704 He
wrote a friend two days before the publication of this decision that
Brandeis's "printed argument convinced me contrary to my first
impressions."7 0 5

Holmes's dissent in Gitlow, although it reaffirmed immediacy
as a component of the "clear and present danger" test, similarly
failed to express a principled commitment to libertarian values.
Holmes revealed in Gitlow the extent to which Social Darwinism
still dominated his views. "If in the long run the beliefs expressed
in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community," Holmes stated, "the only meaning
of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have
their way."70 6 As in Abrams, Holmes emphasized the defendant's
relative powerlessness and his "redundant discourse."707 In a subsequent letter to Laski, Holmes referred to his dissent in Gitlow as
"a page of slack on the right of an ass to drool about proletarian
dictatorship."70 8 These comments do not reflect real appreciation
of the social and individual benefits of free speech.
Id. at 334 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Note from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Louis D. Brandeis (Louis D. Brandeis
Papers, Box 5, Folder 13, Harvard Law School Library) [hereinafter cited as Brandeis Papers, Harvard].
101
101

703255 U.S. 407 (1921).

Id. at 436-37 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Mrs. Gray (Mar. 5, 1921) (Holmes Papers, supra note 442, Box 36, Folder 7).
100 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see Cover, The Left, the Right, and the
First Amendment, 40 MD.L. REv. 349, 383 n.118 (1981) (Social Darwinism a source for the
"notion that in minorities may reside the seed for future growth of society").
104
100

,o,268 U.S. at 673.
108Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Harold Laski (June 14, 1925), reprinted
in 1 HOLMES-LAsKI LETRs, supra note 442, at 752 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
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Holmes's short dissent in Gitlow also left unanswered a major
challenge to the "clear and present danger" test raised by the majority opinion. According to the majority, this test governed only
cases, such as those brought under the Espionage Act, "where the
statute merely prohibits certain acts involving the danger of substantive evil, without any reference to language itself, and it is
sought to apply its provisions to language used by the defendant
for the purpose of bringing about the prohibited results.

70 9

If the

legislature itself, as in Gitlow, makes the determination that "utterances of a certain kind involve such danger of substantive evil
that they may be punished, the question whether any specific utterances coming within the prohibited class is likely, in and of itself, to bring about the substantive evil, is not open to consideration.

7 10

The test announced by Holmes in Schenck, the majority

concluded, "has no application"7 11 to Gitlow. Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney two years later explicitly rejected this deference
to legislative judgments about the danger of speech as a substan-

tive evil,7 1 but Holmes's own dissent in Gitlow, while revealing his

disagreement with the majority's reasoning, simply ignored this
713
important limitation on his opinion in Schenck.

Finally, in Schwimmer, Holmes made a special point of calling
"unfounded" any anxieties that the petitioner might follow the
bad example of Schenck in a future war. "Her position and motives," Holmes asserted, "are wholly different from those of
Schenck.7 1 4 He maintained that "Quakers have done their share

to make the country what it is," and accused the majority of wanting "to expel them because they believe more than some of us do
in the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount. 71 5 Holmes's insistence that Schenck was appropriately punished suggests that his
admirable defense of Quakers was not a libertarian statement of
the general importance of free expression.
VIII. THE

CONTRIBUTION OF BRANDEIS

Justice Brandeis, much more than Justice Holmes, developed
the theoretical justifications for a libertarian judicial construction
709 268 U.S. at 670-71.
710

Id. at 670.

711 Id. at 671.

72 See infra text accompanying notes 850-52.
"I See Rogat, supra note 370, at 217.
714 279 U.S. at 654 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
715Id. at 655.
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of the free speech clause of the first amendment. In a remarkable
series of opinions from 1920 through 1927, Brandeis, relying extensively on Chafee's scholarship, elaborated and expanded the libertarian innovations of Holmes's dissent in Abrams without adopting
Holmes's lingering Social Darwinism. Unlike the aloof Holmes, detached from and often contemptuous of human efforts to change
society, Brandeis became an activist who combined a genuine humanitarianism with a firm belief in individual dignity and autonomy. As often as Holmes was impressed by the acquisition and exercise of power in the struggle for existence, Brandeis was outraged
by its abuse. Even when Holmes recognized that power exceeded
its legitimate limits, he found it difficult to identify with its victims. As one of Holmes's law clerks summed up the difference between the two Justices, "Brandeis feels sympathy
for the op71 6
pressed, Holmes contempt for the oppressor.

Brandeis wrote five major first amendment opinions in the
1920's: four dissents and one concurrence that was essentially a
dissent. 17 In all of these opinions, he analyzed the ideological
foundations of the first amendment in significantly greater detail
than did Holmes during the same period. Instead of adopting
Holmes's focus in Abrams on the "free trade in ideas" and the
"competition of the market" in the search for truth, Brandeis emphasized the intrinsic importance of free speech.7 18 He stressed its

value to the individual as well as to society. Above all, Brandeis
considered free speech an essential prerequisite of a democracy. 719
716 Lockwood, Justice Holmes-Year 1928-29, at 9 (Felix Frankfurter Papers, Box 146,
Library of Congress). Lockwood did not know the source of this quotation, but had heard it
attributed to a foreigner. Id. at 8."Whoever stated it," he added, "sensed something very
deep in Holmes's character." Id. at 9.
717 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (concurring); United States ex rel.
Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 417 (1921) (dissenting); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334 (1920) (dissenting); Pierce v. United States,
252 U.S. 239, 253 (1920) (dissenting); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482 (1920)
(dissenting).
71 See Cover, supra note 706, at 373 (listing implications of Holmes's language and
suggesting contrasts with Brandeis's approach); cf. id. at 377 (comparing Holmes's view that
"truth will prevail in some market place of ideas" with Brandeis's emphasis on the importance of speech to "deliberative politics"). Cover adds that Holmes "had failed to specify,
save metaphorically, how the struggle of ideas was related to the production of truth or
decision in the polity. The market metaphor was anti-political." Id. at 381.
719 For Cover, id. at 377, Brandeis's "chief free speech refrain" is the theme that "free
input is necessary to deliberative politics." See also id. at 363 ("ultimate objective" of
Holmes and Brandeis was "the order necessary to achieve the deliberative politics of popular government"); cf. id. at 380, 383, 385-86. The centrality of this theme should not overshadow other important elements of Brandeis's first amendment jurisprudence. Brandeis
also stressed that freedom of expression is a fundamental right of individuals, a position
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Brandeis followed Holmes in accepting "clear and present danger"
as the constitutional standard for his libertarian values, but he expanded its meaning beyond even Chafee's construction and combined it with Hand's incitement test. Brandeis supported his theoretical positions with concrete examples rooted in the events that
led to the Espionage Act prosecutions. In marked contrast to his
7 20
his opinions in the 1920's addressed and
decision in Sugarman,
agreed with the arguments made by the defendants in the initial
Espionage Act cases, particularly in the briefs by Stedman and
Roe in Debs.7 21 Brandeis was the first Justice after the war 2 2 to
assert that the first amendment applies to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Responding, as Holmes did not, to the majority's reasoning in Gitlow, 72 ' he also supported judicial review of
legislative determinations that certain categories of speech are
themselves substantive evils.
A.

Brandeis Before the War

Brandeis, like most postwar civil libertarians, was essentially
uninvolved with free speech issues during the prewar period. Brandeis had achieved widespread prominence as a reformer before the
war, but, consistent with the thrust of the progressive movement,
he focused on the economic issues which seemed so pressing in the
early twentieth century rather than on civil liberties. He was a
leader of the older school of progressive thought that resisted the
concentration of power advocated by later progressives such as
Herbert Croly and his followers at The New Republic, and translated into a political program by Theodore Roosevelt's "New Nationalism."7'24 The pithy titles of Brandeis's collections of essays,
that helped connect his views on politics and economics. See infra sections VIIJ.A (discussing Brandeis's belief that capitalism fosters the individuality necessary for economic selfsufficiency and political liberty) and VIII.D.4 (discussing "theoretical foundations" of Brandeis's views on free speech); cf. L. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 579
(1978) (Brandeis "did not make the mistake of reducing freedom of speech to its instrumen-

tal role in the political process").
720 249 U.S. 182 (1919); see supra text accompanying notes 309-13 (discussing
Sugarman).
721 249 U.S. 211 (1919); see supra text accompanying notes 243-69 (discussing briefs).
72' Dissenting in Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 463-65

(1907), Harlan maintained that the free speech and free press clauses of the first amendment apply to the states through the privileges and immunities and due process clauses of
the fourteenth amendment. See infra note 853 (discussing Harlan's dissent in Patterson).
723 See supra text accompanying note 709 (discussing distinction by the majority in

Gitlow between legislation directed at language itself and legislation directed at acts).
724 See generally C. FORCEY, supra note 32. The phrase "New Nationalism" was borrowed from Croly's book, The Promise of American Life (1909). Learned Hand mailed this
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The Curse of Bigness7 2 5 and Other People's Money,726 convey the
gist of his concerns. His activities against banks and oil trusts, his
opposition to railroad mergers, and his investigations into the corruption of government officials by big business involved him in
many of the major issues on the progressive agenda and brought
him a national reputation as "the people's lawyer." Brandeis was
also instrumental in the creation of the United States Commission
on Industrial Relations, and he became an important ally and a
close friend of Senator Robert M. La Follette, a visible and, for a
time, powerful progressive politician. 27
The same values that generated Brandeis's commitment to economic reform account for his later contributions to first amendment doctrine. Brandeis had a fundamental belief in capitalism
that transcended purely economic considerations.7 21 He believed
that the free enterprise system has moral worth; that the struggle
to make a living develops character by fostering individuality, self-

book to Theodore Roosevelt in the spring in 1910. C. FORCEY, supra note 32, at 123. "I do
not know when," Roosevelt wrote Croly the following July, "I have read a book which I felt
profited me as much as your book on American life." Quoted in id. at 124-25. Although
Forcey believes that most historians have overemphasized the relationship between Croly
and Roosevelt, he does not dispute Croly's influence, and he acknowledges the substantial
similarities between Croly's ideas and Roosevelt's political program. Id. at 127-39. M. PETERSON, THE JEFFERSON IMAGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND 340-42 (1960), contains an excellent
short analysis of Croly's thought.
Because Brandeis rejected the "New Nationalism," he refused to be associated with the
New Republic circle. C. FORCEY, supra note 32, at 207-08. Indeed, Brandeis actively supported Woodrow Wilson against Roosevelt in 1912 because he considered the "New Nationalism" a program that perpetuated the evils of monopolies by merely transferring them
from private to public control. See D. AARON, MEN OF GOOD HOPE 250-51, 281-82 (1951); A.
MASON, BRANDEIS, A FREE MAN'S LIFE 375-84 (1946); M. UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS AND
THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION 73 (1981). One eminent scholar of the progressive period, however, concludes that a shared belief "in an outer ring of rules and an inner core of administrative management" overshadowed the relatively minor differences between the WilsonBrandeis "New Freedom" and the Croly-Roosevelt "New Nationalism." R. WiEBE, supra
note 31, at 218.
7125L. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS (1934).
726 L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY (1914).
727 A. MASON, supra note 724, contains a thorough discussion of Brandeis's progressive
activities. J. WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE: 1900-1918, at 181, 185
(1968), describes Brandeis's role in creating the United States Commission on Industrial
Relations. B. LA FOLLETTE & F. LA FOLLETrE, 1 ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE 289-91, 586-87
(1953), reveals the close relationship between the La Follette and Brandeis families. See
also 2 LETTERS OF Louis D. BRANDEIS 329 n.2 (M. Urofsky & D. Levy eds. 1972) (editors'
note) [hereinafter cited as 2 BRANDEIS LETTERS].
728 Abrams, Brandeis and the Ascendancy of Corporate Capitalism,Introduction to L.
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY (Harper Torchbook edition 1967), includes an exceptionally penetrating analysis of the moral roots of Brandeis's political and economic thought.
See id. at xx, xxvi, xxxvi; see also R. ABRAMS, CONSERVATISM IN A PROGRESSIVE ERA 55-59
(1964).
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reliance, personal responsibility, and an appreciation of freedom
essential to a democracy. 729 According to Brandeis, economic and
political liberty are inextricably connected; jeopardizing one
threatens the other. He argued that economic self-sufficiency is a
prerequisite to political freedom. Brandeis did not attack capitalism itself, only the centralization that, in the name of capitalism,
endangered its soul and the democratic virtues it produced. He
complained that the representatives of corporate capitalism were
"playing the industrial game with loaded dice. 7 30 He did not want
to change the game, but only to make sure that people played by
the traditional fair rules. The dominance of monopolies and trusts
loaded the dice against the common man and destroyed the character of both the powerful and the dependent.
Brandeis fought the "curse of bigness" produced by corporate
conglomerations and glorified the individual struggles of entrepreneurs. He criticized bankers for relying on "other people's money"
instead of their own efforts, not for wanting to get rich. Although
Brandeis was confident that the dissolution of economic concentration would create "industrial efficiency," he placed greater emphasis on the anticipated personal and social benefits. Even more important than efficiency, he argued, are industrial and political
liberty.7 31 These views help resolve the apparent contradiction between his successful striving for personal wealth and his later activities as an opponent of big business. Brandeis was a classic capitalist who was deeply disturbed that corporate power threatened
the system of free enterprise that, in his opinion, made the United
States a great nation.
Despite his essentially traditional ideology, Brandeis's almost
religious commitment to individual dignity and his certainty about
the connection between economic and political liberty made him
much more sensitive than most of his contemporaries to the range
of problems faced by people subject to the pressures of corporate
capitalism. Brandeis, like most progressives, viewed the economic
organization of society as the primary problem facing the country.
At the same time, he was concerned about the repression of civil
728

See, e.g., letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Winthrop Talbot (April 16, 1912), re-

printed in 2 BRANDEIS LETTERS, supra note 727, at 586-89; letter from Louis D. Brandeis to
Charles Richard Crane (Nov. 11, 1911), reprintedin 2 BRANDEIS LETTERS,supra note 727, at
510-11.
131 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Norman Hapgood (Feb. 27, 1911), reprintedin 2
BRANDEIS LETTERS, supra note 727, at 412.
731 1 FINAL REPORT AND TESTIMONY OF COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, S. Doc.

No. 415, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 1003 (1917) (testimony of Mr. Brandeis).
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liberties, including free speech, in the industrial world. Brandeis
protested the treatment of I.W.W. members during a strike in
Lawrence, Massachusetts. He maintained that "citizens and aliens
have, under the guise of administering or enforcement of the law,

been denied civil rights.' 7 32 The use of police as strikebreakers, he
added, created disrespect for law and encouraged violence.7 3' Bran-

deis argued that the indiscriminate use of injunctions would produce unacceptable restrictions on free speech,7 ' and he criticized
the Massachusetts courts for often straining the facts to interpret
peaceful picketing as including illegal threats or intimidation. 73 5
Though concerned about these abuses, Brandeis explicitly rejected the goals of the I.W.W. and other radical groups. He used
the I.W.W. strikes as an argument in favor of establishing the
United States Commission on Industrial Relations. 7 6 He hoped
that the Commission would discover the underlying causes of industrial unrest and suggest social reforms to prevent its recurrence.73 7 Unlike Schroeder and Roe, who concentrated on free
speech issues, Brandeis emphasized the solution of industrial
problems in his testimony before the Commission. 7 8 Brandeis

wanted to stop the growth of the I.W.W. by bringing its members
into the mainstream of society. He was scared of the I.W.W. and
cited its successes to demonstrate that "conservative trade unionism is essential to the maintenance of law and order. 73 9 Brandeis
helped organize a National Civic Federation, which he hoped
would create "some conservative substitute for radical measures, '740 and opposed violations of the law by the rich and the

73,

Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Jocelyn Paul Yoder (Feb. 26, 1912), reprintedin 2

BRANDEIS LETTERS, supra note 727, at 563.

M" Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Charles Warren Clifford (July 11, 1912), reprinted
in 2 BRANDEIS LETrERS, supra note 727, at 646-47.
73"Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Norman Hapgood (Oct. 14, 1908), reprinted in 2
BRANDEIS LETTERS, supra note 727, at 210-11.
73'Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to E.R. Thayer (May 20, 1912) (Brandeis Papers,
Harvard, supra note 702, Box 14, Folder 11).
73'Letter from Brandeis to Yoder, supra note 732.
73'Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to William Howard Taft (Dec. 30, 1911), reprintedin
2 BRANDEIS LETTERS,supra note 727, at 531-35. This letter was signed by many other prominent people. See 2 BRANDEIS LETTERS, supra note 727, at 535 n.2.
738Compare testimony of Louis D. Brandeis (Vol. I at 991-1011; Vol. VIII at 7657-81)
with testimony of Theodore Schroeder (Vol. XI at 10,840-52, 10,866-96) and testimony of
Gilbert E. Roe (Vol. XI at 10,468-93), FINAL REPORT AND TESTIMONY OF COMMISSION ON
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, S. Doc. No. 415, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917).
71"Letter from Brandeis to Talbot, supra note 729.
740Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Ralph Montgomery Easley (July 16, 1907), reprinted in 2 BRANDEIS Las-rs, supra note 727, at 13. See also J. WEINSTEIN, supra note
727, at 17.
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powerful because he feared that they would breed "anarchical and
socialistic sentiment. ' 741 Brandeis emphasized his opposition to so-

cialism. The concentration of authority in the state, in his opinion,
posed the same threats to the individual as private economic
power. 742
Like most people who later became prominent civil libertarians, Brandeis never held radical views or participated in any extensive way in defending freedom of speech before World War I.
Brandeis also shared the background and status of those later converts: he had finished first in his class at Harvard Law School and
had become a rich and respected corporate lawyer in Boston. By
the first years of the twentieth century, however, Brandeis had
turned most of his prodigious energy from his lucrative law practice, which had already made him a millionaire, to his fight against
the concentration and abuse of economic power.743 Through these
activities he came to understand contemporary social conditions
that escaped the attention of most postwar civil libertarians until
some time during or after the war.
B. Brandeis and Freedom of Expression: 1918-1920
Brandeis's background and beliefs suggested to many that he
would take the lead in protecting freedom of expression as soon as
he joined the Supreme Court in 1916. Letters to Brandeis throughout 1918 from a variety of people concerned with the suppression
of free speech after the American entry into World War I testify to
the widespread assumption that he would be sympathetic: Felix
Frankfurter wrote Brandeis from Bisbee, Arizona to describe the
efforts*of mine owners to "monopolize patriotism" while violating
the civil rights of miners during an I.W.W. strike;744 Amos Pinchot,
a prominent civil libertarian, asked him to write to President Wilson or Attorney General Gregory to protest the continuing prose71 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to William Lawrence (May 14, 1908), reprintedin 2
BRANDEIS LETTERS, supra note 727, at 152.
7 2 For example, Brandeis disapproved of the German system of compulsory insurance
as not being "in harmony with the American ideas of individual liberty." Instead, Brandeis
argued, a worker should be able to earn sufficient wages to afford insurance "through his
own efforts" and thereby develop "strength of character and self-control." Letter from Louis
D. Brandeis to John Edward Pember (Feb. 4, 1908), reprinted in 2 BRANDEIS LETTERS,
supra note 727, at 74.
713 A. MASON, supra note 724, at 77-106.
7'4 Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Louis D. Brandeis (Oct. 20, 1917) (Louis D. Brandeis Papers, Box WW 1-1, University of Louisville Archives) [hereinafter cited as Brandeis
Papers, Louisville].
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cution of the editors of The Masses and enclosed his own letter of
protest to Wilson; 45 the Liberty Defense Union solicited Brandeis
to contribute to a defense fund to pay the legal costs of defendants
charged with violating the Espionage Act and sent him literature
describing the repression of free speech and free press under the
authority of that law;74 6 a personal friend of the Brandeis family,

stymied by "the ban on free speech," sought advice on how "radical and liberal and not necessarily pacifist groups" could organize
to support a democratic settlement of the war along the lines outlined by President Wilson; 47 Senator La Follette's son, Phil, wrote
to "Uncle Louis" protesting accusations of disloyalty against him
and fellow officers while he was serving in the Army in Oklahoma
and trying to find a way to fight in France; 74s Samuel Eliot Morison, a former neighbor and a lecturer in history at Harvard, asked
Brandeis to request an investigation of similar charges made
against him;74 9 and a man imprisoned for making allegedly pro-

German remarks, despite having frequently attempted to register
for the draft, wrote Brandeis from prison "in behalf of hundreds of
more or less innocent victims of war furor and hysteria.

' 750

Two of

the few federal district court judges who tried to protect civil liberties during the war wrote to Brandeis in 1918 about the Espionage
Act prosecutions: Judge Amidon sent Brandeis a copy of oral observations he had made during sentencing in an Espionage Act
case,7 51 and Judge Anderson mailed Brandeis a copy of a letter he
had written to Attorney General Gregory because he wanted to
share the same thoughts with Brandeis. 752 Brandeis also kept ex7'5 Letter from Amos Pinchot to Louis D. Brandeis (May 24, 1918) (Brandeis Papers,
Louisville, supra note 744, Box WW 3-1).
7' Letter from Liberty Defense Union to "Dear Friend" (July 1, 1918) (Brandeis Papers, Louisville, supra note 744, Box WW 3-1).
747 Letter from Gertrude L. Winslow to Louis D. Brandeis (Oct. 3, 1918) (Brandeis Papers, Louisville, supra note 744, Box WW 3-1).
74 Letter from Phil La Follette to Louis D. Brandeis (Nov. 6, 1918) (Brandeis Papers,
Louisville, supra note 744, Box WW 3-1).
74 Letter from Samuel Eliot Morison to Louis D. Brandeis (Sept. 1, 1918) (Brandeis
Papers, Louisville, supra note 744, Box WW 3-1).
780 Letter from William K. De Blocq to Louis D. Brandeis (Nov. 19, 1918) (Brandeis
Papers, Louisville, supra note 744, Box WW 3-1h).
751 Letter from Charles F. Amidon to Louis D. Brandeis (Aug. 5, 1918) (Brandeis Papers, Louisville, supra note 744, Box WW 2-1).
751 Letter from George W. Anderson to Louis D. Brandeis (Dec. 7, 1918) (Brandeis Papers, Louisville, supra note 744, Box WW 5-6). "The country and a good many of the Federal Courts," Anderson observed, "have gone as crazy as the Federalistic party and the Federal Courts did after the Alien and Sedition Laws of 1798." He pleaded with Gregory "not
[to] suppress free speech any more." Letter from George W. Anderson to T.W. Gregory
(Dec. 7, 1918) (Brandeis Papers, Louisville, supra note 744, Box WW 5-6). Responding to
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tensive files of clippings from the trade, labor, and general press, in
which he highlighted reports of free speech violations as well as the
statement in defense of conscientious objection made in open court
by Roger Baldwin after being sentenced to jail."'s
It is unclear whether Brandeis responded to most of these letters. He did write a short letter of support to Senator La Follette
in November 1918, the day after a Senate investigating committee
dropped its charges against him for delivering an antiwar speech
soon after the United States had entered World War 1.754 Brandeis
did not comment, however, on the merits of either the investigation or La Follette's defense.7 5 5 In early 1919 Brandeis rejected a
request that he meet with people associated with the National
Civil Liberties Bureau, the direct predecessor of the ACLU, to discuss the Espionage Act prosecutions and censorship of the press. 56
But by the end of 1919 he compared contemporary events in the
United States to the Spanish Inquisition and added: "The intensity of the frenzy is the most hopeful feature of this disgraceful
exhibition;-of hysterical, unintelligent fear-which is quite foreign to the generous American nature. It will pass like the Know75
' 7
nothing days, but the sense of shame and of sin should endure.
In a letter to Learned Hand in January 1920, Brandeis expressed
his view that "we are over the worst of the reaction, or rather, we
have a counter current moving." The expulsion of elected Socialists by the New York State Assembly, he observed, "was fortunate

Gregory's fears about communism, Anderson asserted that its dangers "cannot be successfully met by adopting Junker tactics and morals," which would be more likely to produce
communism than "the unaided efforts of a lot of soap-box orators." "The American citizen,"
Anderson added, "has a constitutional right to be a blank fool, at any rate in time of
peace,--and that includes the right to show himself to be a blank fool by and through
winged words." Id.
753 See Brandeis Papers, Louisville, supra note 744, Box WW 7-1. While in private
practice, Brandeis represented Baldwin's father, who owned a shoe business. When Roger
Baldwin was searching for a career after college, Brandeis advised him to become a social
worker, advice Baldwin followed. Baldwin, supra note 33, at 39, 40.
'54 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Robert M. La Follette (Nov. 24, 1918), reprinted
in 4 LE rs
oF Louis D. BRANDEIS 364 (M. Urofsky & D. Levy eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited
as 4 BRANDEIS LETFRS]. These charges might have led to La Follette's expulsion from the
Senate.
75 Brandeis expressed happiness that "the burdens which long weighed so heavily" on
La Follette were lifting and that he would be free to take his place of leadership "in the
struggle for democracy in America." Id.
7" Note by Louis D. Brandeis (Feb. 27, 1919) on letter from Elizabeth Walton to Louis
D. Brandeis (Feb. 25, 1919) (Brandeis Papers, Louisville, supra note 744, Box WW 8-3b).
757 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Susan Goldmark (Dec. 7, 1919), reprinted in 4
BRANDEIS LE=Rs,

supra note 754, at 441.
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in its disgraceful excess. ' 'T
75
C.

Brandeis and the Unanimous Supreme Court Decisions in the
Initial Wartime Cases

Despite his general concern for individual rights and the evidence he received that prosecutions under the Espionage Act,
among other examples of widespread intolerance, threatened freedom of expression throughout the country, Brandeis joined the
unanimous Supreme Court in the Selective Draft Law decisions
and in the initial Espionage Act cases. Indeed, Brandeis wrote for
the Court in Sugarman,759 the case which, together with Schenck,
Frohwerk, and Debs, constituted the first group of Espionage Act
opinions.
In a fascinating series of uninhibited conversations with Felix
Frankfurter between 1921 and 1924,70 Brandeis commented on
many aspects of his work as a Supreme Court Justice. Some of
these conversations suggest reasons why he did not dissent in the
first cases brought under the Selective Draft Law and the Espionage Act. In August 1921, Brandeis told Frankfurter:
I have never been quite happy about my concurrence in [the]
Debs and Schenck cases. I had not then thought the issues of
freedom of speech out-I thought at the subject, not through
it. Not until I came to write the Pierce and Schaefer dissents
did I understand it."'
This revealing admission, however satisfying to Brandeis as a subsequent justification, seems unconvincing as a full explanation.
Brandeis may not have "thought through" free speech issues until
he wrote his own dissents, but neither had he been as unsophisticated about them as his later comment to Frankfurter suggests.
Brandeis had to decide to dissent before actually writing the opinions that forced him to analyze the meaning of freedom of expression in greater detail. Why then did he make this initial decision
for the first time in Abrams rather than in Goldman, Kramer,
Sugarman, or Debs?
7'1 Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Learned Hand (Jan. 20, 1920), reprinted in 4
BRANDEIS LETTERS, supra note 754, at 445.
7" Sugarman v. United States, 249 U.S. 182 (1919).
7, Transcript of conversations between Louis D. Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter (Manuscript in Brandeis Papers, Harvard, supra note 702, Box 114, Folder 14) [hereinafter cited
as Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations]. Frankfurter took notes on these conversations. See
F. FRANKFURTER, A REGISTER OF His PAPERS IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 7 (1971).
701

Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, supra note 760, at 23.
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As in determining the reasons for the shift in Holmes's approach between his first Espionage Act decisions and Abrams, it is
impossible to answer this question with certainty. Some clues
emerge from other portions of Brandeis's conversations with
Frankfurter. Brandeis shared the consensus of the Justices that
dissents should be suppressed whenever possible. In most cases, he
told Frankfurter, "there is a good deal to be said for not having
dissents-you want certainty and definiteness and it doesn't matter terribly how you decide as long as it is settled." Brandeis did
not apply this general rule strictly in constitutional cases, where
dissent has a "special function" because "nothing is ever settled. 7 62 Yet even in constitutional cases, there may be reasons to
reject an inclination to dissent. Writing too many dissents can exasperate the other Justices, and "you may have a very important
case of your own as to which you do not want to antagonize [others
by dissenting] on a less important case. 7 63 Brandeis took this consideration very seriously. In his first years on the Court, he kept
elaborate statistics on total opinions, total dissents, how many Justices dissented, and how often each Justice was the sole dissenter.7 64 Brandeis also indicated to Frankfurter that the threat of
a dissent could provoke the majority to meet the potential dissenter's major objections by modifying an initial draft. The result,
even if less than ideal, could be worth the compromise.765 The
pressure of other work could also deter a Justice from dissenting,
even one as conscientious and efficient as Brandeis. 66 Majority
opinions assigned to Holmes presented additional problems because "Holmes shoots down so quickly and is disturbed if you hold
him up. 7 67 As a result, "often there is not time to think out and
• ..talk things over with him. 76 8 Brandeis emphasized to Frankfurter that "silence does not mean actual concurrence. . . I sometimes endorse an opinion with which I do not agree, 'I

acquiesce.'

"769

Despite these general reservations about the wisdom of dissents, Brandeis's own statistics clearly demonstrate that he dis762 Id.
763Id.

at 16.
at 18.

71, See statistics in Brandeis Papers, Harvard, supra note 702, Box 114, Folder 4 [hereinafter cited as Brandeis Statistics].
765 See Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, supra note 760, at 9-10.
766 Id. at 26.

787

Id. at 18.

"7

Id.; see id. at 26.

769 Id. at 8-9.
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sented during this period as much as any Justice on the Court.7 70
Nonetheless, Brandeis joined a unanimous majority in the initial
wartime cases, and he even wrote the Court's decision in
Sugarman. He did not dissent in a first amendment case until he
joined Holmes in Abrams.
Other explanations seem more plausible. Brandeis's support of
the war might have impaired his ability to review with detachment
the free speech claims of its opponents. Brandeis was an active
proponent of Woodrow Wilson's war policies. Even while sitting on
the Supreme Court he advised senior government officials, including Wilson himself, on the conduct of the war.7 1 Though Brandeis
may have become concerned about the evidence of suppression
that came to his attention during 1918, much of it from people he
respected, the hostility to the war expressed by the defendants in
the Supreme Court cases may have seemed to Brandeis to be qualitatively different-and more threatening-from the examples provided by his friends and correspondents.
Even after the war, when Brandeis admitted to Frankfurter
his regrets about his concurrences in Holmes's first Espionage Act
decisions, he indicated that he still approved the convictions. His
second thoughts were limited to the legal theory Holmes employed:
I would have placed the Debs case on the war power-instead
of taking Holmes' line about "clear and present danger." Put
it frankly on the war power-like [the] Hamilton case (251
U.S.)-and then the scope of espionage legislation would be
confined to war. But in peace the protection against restriction of freedom of speech would be unabated. You might as
well recognize that during a war- [here Frankfurter interrupted with the words "all bets are off"]. Yes, all bets are off.
But we would have a clear line to go on. I didn't know enough
in the early cases to put it on that ground.7 2
See Brandeis Statistics, supra note 764.
See A. MASON, supra note 724, at 518-27.
77 Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, supra note 760, at 23. In Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919), Brandeis, writing for a unanimous
Court, upheld the War-Time Prohibition Act as a valid exercise of the war power. Although
the statute was enacted after the Armistice with Germany, a peace treaty had not yet been
signed and it could not be said "that the man power of the nation ha[d] been restored to a
peace footing." Id. at 163. Asserting that "to Congress in the exercise of its powers, not least
the war power upon which the very life of the nation depends, a wide latitude of discretion
must be accorded," Brandeis concluded that the Act had not ceased to be valid because of
"changed circumstances." Id; see also Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1920)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (state statute prohibiting interference with military enlistment
void because interferes with Congress's exclusive war power); cf. Cover, supra note 706, at
77

71
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Brandeis probably never "thought through" the earlier cases
when he wrote his later dissents. If he had, he probably would have
come to the conclusion that none of the Espionage Act cases could
be meaningfully distinguished on their facts. Abrams, Schaefer, s
Pierce,7 and Milwaukee Publishing Company,7 5 like Schenck,
Sugarman, Frohwerk, and Debs, all involved similar language used
by radicals before the end of the war. Brandeis's continued acceptance of the first convictions, even after his dissents in analogous
cases, points to his prowar views as the determining influence when
the Selective Draft Law and the initial Espionage Act cases were
before the Court. Brandeis's subsequent suggestion of the war
power as the doctrinal basis for affirming the convictions in
Schenck and Debs underlines the importance of the war in his
thinking about these cases.
D.

Brandeis and the Elaboration of Libertarian Doctrine

Even if Brandeis had been less affected by his active support
of the war, his conversations with Frankfurter reveal how difficult
it would have been for him to dissent alone in cases of such importance and visibility, especially from decisions written by Holmes,
his most likely ally. Whether Brandeis "acquiesced" in or actually
agreed with Holmes's earlier opinions, by the date of the Abrams
decision many of the factors that led Holmes to dissent could have
had a similar impact on Brandeis, who always had been more sympathetic to the value of free speech. And when Brandeis first wrote
his own dissents in 1920, he began to "think through," with substantial assistance from Chafee's scholarly writings, the legal issues
associated with his libertarian attitudes. Beginning with Schaefer,
Brandeis expanded the protection for speech introduced by
Holmes in Abrams. Brandeis's first amendment opinions
culminated with his concurrence in Whitney776 in 1927, when he
combined a revitalized "clear and present danger" standard with
the incitement approach advocated by Hand in Masses. The result
was a level of protection for freedom of expression that was not
exceeded by a majority of the Supreme Court until Brandenburgv.

375 n.95 (noting that Act's prohibition "bore only an indirect relation to the war effort").
77 Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920).
7' Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920).
75 United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burlson, 255
U.S. 407 (1921).
77' Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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Ohio7 7 in 1969.
1. Factual and Statutory Analysis. In his first amendment

opinions, as in most of his writings and in marked contrast to
Holmes, Brandeis grounded his conclusions on meticulous attention to factual detail. 77 81 Brandeis particularly revealed this trait in

Schaefer and Pierce, his initial dissents in Espionage Act cases.
The year after he wrote these dissents Brandeis told Frankfurter
that in the "Schaefer and Pierce cases I made up my mind I would
put it all out, let the future know what we weren't allowed to say
in the days of the war and following." 9 He accomplished this goal
by thoroughly examining the antiwar publications in both cases
and by relating them to the explicit language of the Espionage Act.
He warned against analyzing portions of a document out of context 80 and quoted at length from the publications which formed
the basis for the defendants' convictions.81
The defendants in Schaefer were officers of small newspapers
published in German in Philadelphia. 82 They often reprinted and
rewrote articles that had already appeared elsewhere.78 s In his dissent, Brandeis analyzed four of the articles for which the defendants were convicted. 84 An article reprinted from a Berlin newspaper, Brandeis observed, was similar to other reprints from the
press of Germany circulated by patriotic societies in the United
States "to arouse the American fighting spirit." He thought it inconceivable that the "coarse and heavy humor" of this article
"could rationally be held to tend even remotely or indirectly to
obstruct recruiting.

'785

Brandeis also claimed that the defendants

were incorrectly convicted under the falsity provision of the Espionage Act. He pointed out that the government, instead of attempt777

395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).

77'

Brandeis reported to Frankfurter that Holmes "highly approves the inquiry into and

reference to facts as the basis of my opinions." Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, supra
note 760, at 14. Brandeis apparently criticized Holmes for not paying enough attention to
facts. Holmes wrote Laski that Brandeis "drove a harpoon into my midriff by saying it
would be for the good of my soul to devote my next leisure to the study of some domain of
fact." Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Harold Laski (May 18, 1919), reprintedin
1 HOLMEs-LAszI Lu-rmis, supra note 442, at 204.
779 Frankfurter-Brandeis Conversations, supra note 760, at 23.
710 Pierce, 252 U.S. at 256 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 483-84
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
78" Pierce, 252 U.S. at 256-64; Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 484-85, 487, 488-92.
711 251 U.S. at 468.
I Id. at 486 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
7, Brandeis limited his analysis to 4 of the 15 publications set forth in the indictment
so that he would not "unduly prolong" his opinion. Id. at 484.
M Id. at 486.
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ing to prove the actual falsity of any article, generally demonstrated only that certain reprinted articles differed in some respect
from their original form. According to the government, this variation itself constituted falsity.786 Resorting to his legendary thoroughness, Brandeis discovered that one charge of falsification resulted from an error by the government translator or draftsman in
reproducing the German original in the English indictment. 8 7
Other claims of falsification consisted of the omission in a reprint
of a single sentence from the original 788 and a mistranslation of
'789
"breadlines" as "breadriots.
Brandeis emphasized that the Espionage Act punishes only
those false statements made "'with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United

States or to promote the success of its enemies.'

',790

Such false

statements could include misinformation about government
finances, war preparations, or military operations. 91 But most of
the defendants' publications, Brandeis stressed, were not false, and
the mistranslation of one word in a lengthy passage, even if considered a false report, could not possibly have interfered with the war
effort. The other publications contained in the indictment, he
added, "were likewise impotent to produce the evil against which
the statute aimed. '792 Brandeis concluded that suppressing such
publications as false reports would "subject[] to new perils the
7 93
constitutional liberty of the press.
In Pierce,Brandeis maintained more explicitly than he had in
Schaefer that the defendants' antiwar statements, alleged by the
government to be false under the Espionage Act, were expressions
of opinion whose accuracy could not be determined. He stressed
that a statement or report could be punished as false only if it is
"capable of being proved false in fact," is actually "proved to be
false," and is "known by the defendant to be false when made or
conveyed." Brandeis acknowledged that expressions of opinion
could justify convictions under other clauses of the Espionage Act,
but he insisted that "an opinion is not capable of being proved

784

Id. at 486-87.

787Id.
7" Id.
189Id.
790 Id.
102Id.
792 Id.
7,3Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

488.
489.
492.
492 (quoting language of Espionage Act).
492-93.
493.
494.
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false in fact,"'7 9' however "grossly unfair
as an interpretation of
7' 95
facts or even wholly unfounded in fact.
Brandeis, cleverly and with typical industry, found and quoted
from the one prewar decision that supported his distinction between false facts and opinions.7 9 6 He pointed out that even historians, with the advantages of training and perspective, are unable to
agree on the identity and relative importance of causes of a war.
According to Brandeis, "the contributing causes cannot be subjected, like a chemical combination in a test tube, to qualitative
and quantitative analysis so as to weigh and value the various elements . . . .
Laymen discussing contemporary wars, he implied, could not be expected to do better than professional historians.79 8 Indeed, Brandeis claimed that senators and congressmen
debating the war resolution disagreed with President Wilson's justification for American participation and expressed many of the
same views for which the defendants in Espionage Act cases were
convicted.7 9 9 Statements alleging that the power and interests of
capitalists produced the American intervention in World War I,
Brandeis maintained, "were an interpretation and discussion of
public facts of public interest." He added that "even the President's address, which set forth high moral grounds justifying our
entry into the war, may not be accepted as establishing beyond a
reasonable doubt that a statement ascribing a base motive was
criminally false." 800 Brandeis observed that Wilson had himself
written before he became President that "'[t]he masters of the
Government of the United States are the combined capitalists and
manufacturers of the United States.' ,,0o1 He also pointed out that
the defendants, as "mere distributors of the leaflet," could not be
charged with actual knowledge of its contents and were therefore
immune from punishment even if the contents could conceivably
be deemed false.802
According to Brandeis, the intent of the leaflet that consti7"

252 U.S. at 255-56 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

795

Id. at 266.

Id. at 267 (quoting American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S.
94, 104 (1902) (claims by Christian Scientists are "mere matters of opinion upon subjects
which are not capable of proof as to their falsity" and therefore cannot be deemed statutory
7

frauds)); see Rabban, supra note 4, at 542 (discussing Magnetic Healing).
797 Pierce, 252 U.S. at 267 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
708 Id.

7" Id. at 267-69.
800 Id. at 269.
01 Id. at 270-71 (quoting W. WmSON, THE NE W FREEDOM 57 (1913)).
802 Pierce, 252 U.S. at 270.
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tuted the evidence in Pierce was simply to promote socialism.8 03
He conceded that it contained "lurid and perhaps exaggerated" descriptions of the horrors of war and that its arguments might be
"shallow and grossly unfair."8 04 But he emphasized that the leaflet
should not be "construed as criminal incitement to disobey the existing law" merely "because the argument presented seems to
those exercising judicial power to be unfair in its portrayal of existing evils, mistaken in its assumptions, unsound in reasoning or
intemperate in language."8 0 5 Similar reasoning by other judges
would have precluded most Espionage Act convictions.
2. Extending the "Clear and Present Danger" Standard.
Throughout his first amendment opinions, particularly in Schaefer
and Whitney, Brandeis extended the protection of the "clear and
present danger" test. In his dissent in Schaefer, he characterized
this standard, announced by a "unanimous court" in Schenck, as a
"rule of reason" whose correct application demanded "good judgment" and "calmness." 806 Brandeis in Schaefer, like Holmes in
Abrams, included the requirement of immediacy in his definition
of "clear and present danger," a requirement that was missing
from Holmes's opinion for a unanimous Court in Schenck. Brandeis stressed that the "clear and present danger" test precluded
judging speech by its "remote or possible effect."' 0 7 Reflecting the
actual origins of this approach, Brandeis cited Chafee's Freedom of
Speech in War Time rather than any of Holmes's prior opinions. 08
In Whitney, Brandeis completed the retrospective assimilation
of Abrams into Schenck that Holmes had begun. While adopting
almost the exact language Holmes used in restating "clear and
present danger" in Abrams, Brandeis cited Schenck, Holmes's
original and significantly different formulation.8 0, 9 And after pointing out that the Supreme Court "has not yet fixed the standard by
which to determine" 1 0 the meaning of "clear and present danger,"
Brandeis tried to go beyond the "rule of reason" he announced in
Schaefer. He developed the immediacy criterion, declaring that
there could be no "clear and present danger" "unless the incidence
$03 Id. at

271.
804Id. at 272.
805Id. at 273.
808 Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 482-83 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
8$0Id. at 486.

808 Id. (citing Chafee, Harvard,supra note 2, at 963 and claiming that "this court has
declared" what "Professor Chafee has shown").
809 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
810 Id. at 374.
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of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before
there is opportunity for full discussion." More significantly, Brandeis added a new requirement of gravity. "Prohibition of free
speech and assembly is a measure so stringent," he maintained,
"that it would be inappropriate as the means of averting a relatively trivial harm to society." 811 For example, he found it inconceivable that a statute could constitutionally punish advocacy of
trespassing as a felony even if a case presented an imminent danger of an actual trespass. For Brandeis, the likelihood that speech
will cause some violence or destruction of property does not make
it unlawful unless there is "probability of serious injury to the
State."8 12 In effect, Brandeis transformed "clear and present danger" into an exception to a general rule forbidding restrictions on
free speech."13
3. Combining "Clear and Present Danger" with Incitement.
As he strengthened the "clear and present danger" test, Brandeis
combined it with Hand's direct incitement standard. In Schaefer,
Brandeis focused attention on the "nature and possible effect of a
writing. 8' 1 4 Though he acknowledged that external evidence may
sometimes be necessary to demonstrate circumstances giving a
document "a particular significance or effect," he stressed that the
government had not introduced any such evidence. Unlike Holmes
in Frohwerk, who upheld the conviction on an admittedly weak record because he would not reexamine the strength of the government's evidence, Brandeis urged reversal in Schaefer because the
"writings here in question must speak for themselves."81 5 In
Pierce,Brandeis again looked to "the nature of the words used and
the circumstances under which they were used."8' 16 Indeed, Brandeis concluded that the language of the leaflet, "far from counselling disobedience to the law, points to the hopelessness of protest. 8 1 7 With respect to the surrounding circumstances, Brandeis
stressed that the defendants did not begin distribution until a
judge in another case involving the same leaflet had directed an
811 Id. at 377.
812
813

Id. at 378.
In their conversations, Brandeis told Frankfurter that the "right to your education

and to utter speech is fundamental except clear and present danger." Brandeis-Frankfurter
Conversations, supra note 760, at 21; see Cover, supra note 706, at 381 (identifying "clear
and present danger" test as "exception").
814 251 U.S. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
I Id. at 484.
816252 U.S. at 271 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
817

Id. at 272.
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acquittal,81 8 and that they never circulated it to members of the
armed forces. 19
Brandeis cemented the combination of these two standards in
Whitney. Citing Hand's decision in Masses, Chafee's book, and a
decision by Amidon, 820 Brandeis conceded that "[e]very denunciation of existing law tends in some measure to increase the
probability that there will be some violation of it." But Brandeis,
developing the conclusions of these authorities, added that "even
advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of
incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy
would be immediately acted on." To prove the existence of a "clear
and present danger," he required a showing "either that immediate
serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the
past conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was
'82
then contemplated. '
Without the doctrinal confusion of Chafee's forced assimilation of Schenck and Masses, Brandeis's first amendment opinions
in the 1920's, particularly his concurrence in Whitney, joined as
alternative tests Hand's analysis of the content of language and a
protective version of Holmes's focus on possible consequences. He
thereby anticipated the current standard for free speech, announced by the Court in Brandenburgv. Ohio 22 and subsequently
82 3
reaffirmed.
4. Theoretical Foundations. Like Chafee, Brandeis stressed
the ideological underpinnings of the legal standards he espoused.
He harnessed his meticulous attention to fact and his subtle reconstructions of the "clear and present danger" standard to a libertarian theory of the first amendment as a pillar of individual rights
and democratic government. The result, the analytical and rhetorical brilliance of his first amendment opinions in the 1920's, has
never been equalled, and Whitney, his most developed opinion, defies paraphrase.
Analysis of the first amendment provided a natural vehicle for
818 Id. at 271.

819Id. at 273.
820 274 U.S. at 376 n.3 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing Masses, 244 F. at 540; United
States v. Fontana 4-5 (D.N.D. 1918) (Interp. of War Stat. Bulletin 148); Z. CHAPEE, supra,
note 2, at 46-56, 174).
821 Whitney, 274 U.S. 376.
822 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). In Brandenburg,the two tests are concurrent and
not alternative. See infra text accompanying notes 902-12 (discussing Brandenburg).
8" See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam).
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Brandeis to express his fundamental values. Brandeis attributed to
the leaders of the Revolutionary War and to the framers of the
Constitution the personal qualities he most admired. He described
them as "courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the
power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes
of popular government.

' 82 4

Brandeis drew support for his defense

of free speech from his confidence in rational thought. "It is the
function of speech," he declared, "to free men from the bondage of
irrational fears." Even "[f]ear of serious injury cannot alone justify
suppression of free speech and assembly." As Brandeis pointed
out, "[m]en feared witches and burnt women." 825 Free speech
makes "men free to develop their faculties,"82 the ultimate purpose of government. "If there be time to expose through discussion
the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
7
silence.1

2

Brandeis believed that free speech provides personal "happiness," but, following Chafee and earlier scholars, he particularly
stressed that "freedom to think as you will and to speak as you
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth" and thus to the proper functioning of democratic government.828 Repressing speech abridges the "fundamental right of
free men to strive for better conditions through new legislation and
new institutions."82' Indeed, Brandeis concluded that a citizen's

exercise of free speech is a duty as well as a right because it is even
"more important to the Nation than it is to himself." 830 According
to Brandeis, the framers, expressing their faith "in the power of
reason as applied through public discussion,"881 proposed the first
amendment to "preserve the right of free speech both from suppression by tyrannous, well-meaning majorities and from abuse by
irresponsible, fanatical minorities."882

Just as Brandeis viewed the "frank expression of conflicting
$'4
Whitney, 274 U.S.
8

Id. at 376.

"

Id. at 375.
Id. at 377.

&

Id. at 375.

at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).

"' Pierce, 252 U.S. at 273 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
830 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 338 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375
(Brandeis, J., concurring) ("public discussion is a political duty").
83 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
"2 Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 482 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Whitney, 274 U.S. at
376 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (first amendment protects against "the occasional tyrannies of
governing majorities").
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opinions" as providing "the greatest promise of wisdom in governmental action," so also he warned that "in suppression lies ordinarily the greatest peril."8 3 3 Claiming to speak for the framers,
Brandeis asserted
that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate;
that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety
lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances
and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil
counsels is good ones. 8 4
Brandeis acknowledged that a real emergency can justify the repression of speech when there is not time to "permit reliance upon
the slower conquest of error by truth." ' But "unless the incidence
of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before
there is opportunity for full discussion"'8 36 and so dangerous that it
threatens "serious injury to the State, 8 37 Brandeis maintained
that the proper deterrents to crime "are education and punishment
for violations of the law, not abridgement of the rights of free
speech and assembly."888
5. Identifying Threats to Free Speech. Throughout these
opinions, Brandeis chastised agencies of official authority that had
suppressed speech during and after the war. Brandeis remarked in
Schaefer that "powers assumed to have been conferred upon the
postal ,authorities" had allowed serious curtailment of free
speech. 8 9 He focused on this issue in Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co.,840 where the postmaster, as in Masses, had
invoked the Espionage Act to declare an antiwar journal nonmailable. Brandeis worried that the Postmaster General could "become
the universal censor of publications '8 4 1 and concluded that if the
Constitution permits administrators to deny second-class mailing
privileges through an act of official discretion, "there is little of
Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 338 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
85 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 338 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
838 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
837 Id. at 378; see also id. at 373 (free speech may be restricted "in order to protect the
State from destruction or from serious injury, political, economic or moral").
838 Id. at 378.
Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 494 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
810 United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255
U.S. 407 (1921).
" Id. at 423 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
833

834 Whitney,
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substance in our Bill of Rights and in every extension of governmental functions lurks a new danger to civil liberty."' 2
Brandeis also criticized jury convictions and judicial silence in
Espionage Act prosecutions. According to Brandeis, the jury in
Schaefer convicted the defendant "not merely for disloyal acts but
for a disloyal heart; provided only that the disloyal heart was evidenced by some utterance. ' 843 He warned that "an intolerant majority, swayed by passion or by fear, may be prone in the future, as
it has often been in the past, to stamp as disloyal opinions with
which it disagrees." ' 8 " Similarly, Brandeis maintained that the jury
conviction in Pierce, by construing antiwar opinions as false statements of fact, effectively denied "small political parties freedom of
criticism and of discussion in times when feelings run high and the
questions involved are deemed fundamental. ' 8 4 5 Brandeis conceded in Schaefer that the jury has a wide field in which to exercise its judgment, but he emphasized that the trial judge must
withdraw a case from a jury if no calm person could reasonably
conclude that the "clear and present danger" standard had been
met. If the trial judge fails to exercise this responsibility, Brandeis
added, the appellate court must correct the error.8 6 Ironically,
Brandeis, who clearly thought the convictions in Schaefer and
Pierce could not be supported by the evidence, was not so sure in
Whitney, where he found sufficient testimony establishing a conspiracy "to commit present serious crimes.Y84 7 As a result, Brandeis's most stirring defense of free speech took the form of a concurring opinion supporting a conviction under the California
Syndicalism Act.84

'" Id. at 436. According to Brandeis, "Congress may not through its postal police power
put limitations upon the freedom of the press which if directly attempted would be unconstitutional." Id. at 430-31.
"' Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 493 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
"4 Id.
at 495. Justice Clarke concluded his separate dissent in Schaefer by disagreeing
with both the majority decision and the Brandeis-Holmes dissent. According to Clarke, the
case did not involve threats to "law and order" or to "freedom of the press." Id. at 501
(Clarke, J., dissenting). But he did agree with Brandeis and Holmes that a "flagrant mistrial" had occurred, and he criticized the majority for failing to exercise its power "to correct, in this calmer time, errors of law which would not have been committed but for the
stress and strain of feeling prevailing in the early months of the late deplorable war." Id.
'" Pierce, 252 U.S. at 269 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
846 Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Pierce,252 U.S. at 271
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (judges may not, in "absence of evidence," permit jury findings of

guilt).
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 379 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id. at 372. The opinion that became Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney was originally drafted, see Brandeis Papers, Harvard, supra note 702, Box 44, Folder 10 (Oct. 1,
84
84
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Perhaps most importantly, Brandeis did not automatically defer to legislation declaring speech illegal. Brandeis criticized the
Minnesota statute at issue in Gilbert, which he characterized as
"an act to prevent teaching that the abolition of war is possible,"
because it restricted such speech whatever the circumstances,
rather than "in a particular emergency, in order to avert a clear
and present danger."8 " Brandeis elaborated this point in Whitney.
Responding to the majority's opinion in Gitlow, 5° he admitted
that a legislature may directly prohibit speech it deems dangerous.
But Brandeis insisted that "the enactment of the statute cannot
'851
alone establish the facts which are essential to its validity.
Whenever a litigant claims a violation of free speech, Brandeis
maintained, legislation, even if sustained by a lower court, "creates
merely a rebuttable presumption" of legality. This presumption
can be overcome if, under the circumstances of a particular case, a
danger is not sufficiently imminent or serious. 5 2
6. Expanding Federal Jurisdiction Over Speech. Probably
prompted by Chafee, Brandeis also took the lead on the postwar85s

1926), as a dissent in a similar case, Ruthenberg v. Michigan. His original concurrence in
Whitney referred to Ruthenberg, "decided this day," for its reasoning. Id. Shortly before
these two cases were to be announced, however, Ruthenberg died, and the Supreme Court
dismissed his case. Ruthenberg v. Michigan, 273 U.S. 782 (1927).
Brandeis's law clerk, James Landis, had compared Ruthenberg and Whitney in a covering letter enclosing a revised draft of the Ruthenberg dissent. Landis pointed out that both
cases involved "the right of assembly" and statutes that "are practically analogous." But
Landis also observed differences between their facts. "The advocacy in the Whitney case
was more direct. The meeting was not secret; there was evidence to show Miss Whitney's
active participation in the framing of the doctrines; the intent immediately to propagate
these doctrines; the advocacy of them to persons thitherto unfamiliar with them." Some or
all of these considerations apparently influenced Brandeis to concur in Whitney despite his
dissent in Ruthenberg, although Landis himself maintained that in both cases "there is no
advocacy of immediate acts of violence." Landis assumed that "the principles enunciated in
the Ruthenberg dissent are sufficient to resolve the Whitney case, and that you will be limited to showing their applicability to the facts of the case." Letter from J.M. Landis to Louis
D. Brandeis (Aug. 21, 1926) (Brandeis Papers, Harvard, supra note 702, Box 44, Folder 7);
cf. Cover, supra note 706, at 384-85 (describing factual differences between Ruthenberg and
Whitney).
", Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 334 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
150 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
see supra text
accompanying notes 709-13 (discussing Gitlow).
851 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
82 Id. at 379. Landis made many of these points in a memorandum to Brandeis on
Ruthenberg v. Michigan, 273 U.S. 782 (1927). Memorandum from J.W. Landis to Louis D.
Brandeis (Oct. 10, 1926) (Brandeis Papers, Harvard, supra note 702, Box 44, Folder 10); see
supra note 848 (discussing Ruthenberg).
85' Dissenting from Justice Holmes's majority opinion in Patterson v. Colorado ex rel.
Attorney General, 205 U.S. 454 (1907), Justice Harlan had maintained that prior to the
fourteenth amendment "the rights of free speech and a free press" were already guaranteed
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Supreme Court in advocating expanded federal jurisdiction over
free speech issues. Brandeis, the lone dissenter in Gilbert in 1920,
relied on the supremacy of federal law to support his conclusion
that the Minnesota sedition statute violated the first amendment.
In addition, he suggested in Gilbert s " and later declared in
Whitney, s55 that freedom of speech constitutes part of the substan-

tive "liberty" protected against state deprivation by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Brandeis's comments on these issues in Gilbert apparently reflected Chafee's influence. Dean Acheson, who served as law clerk
to Brandeis during the term that the Supreme Court decided Gilbert, wrote Chafee, his former law professor, to inform him that
the Court was considering this case. Chafee responded, in a letter
written less than a month before the Court released its opinion, by
sending Acheson the page proofs of chapter two of Freedom of
Speech.s 56 Chafee complained to Acheson that, except for one dis-

sent in a state court opinion, he had "as yet got no one to agree
with my constitutional argument that the state powers over opposition to war are no stronger than state power over intrastate railroad rates, so that when Congress acts, the states must drop out."
Chafee pointed out that Gilbert raised the additional issue of
"whether the 14th Amendment guarantees freedom of speech from
state action" and observed that Holmes had declined to consider
this issue in Fox v. Washington.857 Chafee questioned the practical
advantages of relying on the fourteenth amendment to protect
speech, even assuming judicial acceptance of the state action rationale. In view of the Supreme Court's earlier Espionage Act decisions, he saw no basis for thinking that it would find free speech
"violated [in] any way" by the Minnesota statute. Chafee was more
optimistic that the "nationalistic" Supreme Court "would not
favor the way state legislation would and to some extent did block
the discussion of policy of the federal government," although he
by the first amendment as "attributes of national citizenship." Id. at 464. The privileges and
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, he added, extended these guarantees
against state action. Id. Harlan closed his dissent by further declaring that free speech and a
free press are liberties protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
at 465. Harlan's dissent, however, constituted the sole exception to the prewar decisions by
the Supreme Court resisting the incorporation of first amendment guarantees into the fourteenth amendment. See Rabban, supra note 4, at 525-26.
85 254 U.S. at 343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
274 U.S. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
'"
Letter from Zechariah Chafee, Jr., to Dean Acheson (Nov. 20, 1920) (Brandeis Papers, Harvard, supra note 702, Box 5, Folder 12).
85- 236 U.S. 273 (1915); see Rabban, supra note 4, at 534-36 (discussing Fox).
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thought this the weaker of his two arguments theoretically. 85 8
Despite Acheson's own "rather fundamental doubts" 859 about
both of these arguments, Brandeis's dissent in Gilbert closely paralleled Chafee's letter to Acheson, which is contained in Brandeis's
files. Brandeis rejected the view that the first amendment applies
only to federal action and therefore cannot justify Supreme Court
interference with a state statute upheld as a police measure by the
state's highest court. "The state law," Brandeis reasoned, "affects
directly the functions of the Federal Government." 860 He maintained that freedom of speech about these functions is a "privilege
and immunity" of national citizenship which states could not curtail even before the fourteenth amendment became law. 61 Because
the federal government has the "superior responsibility" for preserving government, it also has the "superior right" to determine
whether the national interest requires the suppression of free
speech about governmental affairs. 62 The "exclusiveness" of this
federal power, Brandeis stressed, "springs from the very roots of
political sovereignty." 86 3 According to Brandeis, the Minnesota
statute was inconsistent with federal law both before and after
Congress passed the Espionage Act. Before the Espionage Act,
"Congress still permitted free discussion" about the advisability of
enlistment, and the Espionage Act itself, unlike the Minnesota
statute, "did not prohibit the teaching of any doctrine."' "
Although Brandeis based his dissent in Gilbert on the exclusive federal power to regulate discussion of federal functions,6 5 he

:"
859

Letter from Chafee to Acheson, supra note 856.
Memorandum from Dean Acheson to Louis D. Brandeis (Nov. 19, 1920) (Brandeis

Papers, Harvard, supra note 702, Box 5, Folder 12).
:10 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 336 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 337.
112 Id. at 338. Brandeis underlined this point by citing cases involving regulation of
interstate commerce. Id. at 339 (citing Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148
U.S. 312, 329 (1893); Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487 (1885)).
863 Id. at 342. "The States may not punish treason against the United States," Brandeis
added while citing two early state court decisions, "although indirectly acts of treason may
affect them vitally. No more may they arrogate to themselves authority to punish the teaching of pacifism which the legislature of Minnesota appears to have put into that category."
Id. at 342-43 (citations omitted).
Id. at 340.
s' Cover usefully labels Brandeis's argument in Gilbert as a "kind of structural preemption." Cover, supra note 706, at 379. Yet I think Cover exaggerates when he writes: "To
Brandeis, it is not potential disruption of the war that grounds preemption but disruption
of the national deliberative political process . . . ." Id. at 380. Brandeis was certainly concerned about the impact that suppression of speech would have on political life, but he
grounded his preemption argument on the exclusive power of Congress to declare war. See,
e.g., 254 U.S. at 336 ("[a]s an incident of its power to declare war," Congress-may "prohibit
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concluded his opinion with an impassioned plea for extending the
substantive due process right of the fourteenth amendment beyond
the "liberty to acquire and to enjoy property." Brandeis had difficulty believing that the constitutional guarantee of liberty, which
the Supreme Court had repeatedly invoked to protect businessmen
against restrictive legislation, "does not include liberty to teach,
either in the privacy of the home or publicly, the doctrine of pacifism; so long, at least, as Congress has not declared that the public
67
safety demands its suppression." ' In Gitlow,8
decided five years
later, the full Court agreed that free speech is one of the fundamental liberties protected by the due process clause, and Brandeis
later reinforced this holding in Whitney. "The power of the courts
to strike down an offending law," he concluded, "is no less when
the interests involved are not property rights, but the fundamental
personal rights of free speech and assembly."""8
IX.

CONCLUSION

In order to promote libertarian values without acknowledging
their own prior role in the restrictive first amendment tradition,
Holmes and Brandeis followed Chafee's misconstruction of "clear
and present danger," a phrase Holmes first used in Schenck to
elaborate the "bad tendency" theory. Chafee reciprocated by incorrectly attributing to all of their opinions a uniform libertarian interpretation of the first amendment. He eventually accounted for
the undeniably restrictive elements of the first Espionage Act deciinterference by persuasion"); cf. id. at 340 (The Espionage Act "did not prohibit the teaching of any doctrine; it prohibited only certain tangible obstructions to the conduct of the
existing war."). At times, Cover himself seems to qualify somewhat the exaggeration quoted
above. "Brandeis argued," Cover states elsewhere in his article, "that exclusive national jurisdiction over the national functions of conscription and war required constitutional immunity from state interference with the flow of public deliberation necessary to informed legislation." Cover, supra, at 379.
'"
Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
"' 268 U.S. at 666 (majority), 672 (dissent).
274 U.S. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring). I agree with Cover that Brandeis, who
opposed extensions of substantive due process, held back in Gilbert so that he could continue to resist its application in other contexts. As Cover points out, Gilbert is a "tour de
force" precisely because Brandeis's position did not depend on substantive due process.
Cover, supra note 706, at 380; see Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (because state statute invalidly "interferes with federal functions and with the right of a citizen
of the United States to discuss them, I see no occasion to consider whether it violates also
the Fourteenth Amendment."). Only in Whitney did Brandeis concede the relevance of substantive due process and invoke it explicitly to protect free speech. See Cover, supra note
706, at 379 & n.102. See generally Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 39 HARv. L. Rzv. 431, 455-58 (1926) (tracing emergence of "free speech" as
"liberty" protected by the fourteenth amendment).
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sions by claiming that "Justice Holmes was biding his time until
the Court should have before it a conviction so clearly wrong as to
let him speak out his deepest thoughts about the First Amendment."86 9 Pinning his hopes on "clear and present danger," Chafee
submerged the incitement standard Hand developed in Masses,
70
the approach that Chafee himself preferred.
While never matching the rhetoric of Holmes in Abrams or
Brandeis in Whitney, the Supreme Court majority, after a long
and uneven history, has apparently accepted, and in some ways
moved beyond, the libertarian views advanced by scholars before
World War I and by Hand, Chafee, Holmes, and Brandeis in the
decade following the Espionage Act of 1917. Despite the heroic attempts of Chafee, Holmes, and Brandeis to promote libertarian
doctrine through the "clear and present danger" standard, however, protective Supreme Court decisions have followed it only
fitfully.
Three important decisions by Chief Justice Hughes in the
1930's opened a new era in the history of Supreme Court adjudication of free speech claims. Though rarely referring directly to the
first amendment, Hughes, writing for a majority or for a unanimous court, protected speech in a variety of factual settings. 1
Given the often tortured efforts of Chafee, Holmes, and Brandeis
to promote "clear and present danger" as the legal formula for
their libertarian values, it is ironic that the first Supreme Court
decisions in which the majority actually protected speech never
mentioned this language. Indeed, Hughes's constant reiteration of
the distinction between legal speech and unlawful incitements 72 is
strikingly similar to Hand's analysis in Masses. It therefore appears that the forced assimilation by Chafee and Brandeis of the
very different approaches of Hand and Holmes was based on a
misplaced pragmatism. As it turned out, the "clear and present
danger" test was not needed when the Supreme Court first accepted free speech claims.
From the late 1930's through the early 1950's, many Supreme
Court opinions revived and expanded the scope of the "clear and

869

Z.

870

See supra text accompanying notes 580-605.

87'

CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 86

(1941).

DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (reversing conviction for criminal syndical-

ism); Near v. Minnesota ex reL. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697, 697 (1931) (overturning statute permitting injunctions against "malicious, scandalous, and defamatory" publications); Stromberg
v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (invalidating statute prohibiting display of red flag).
872 See, e.g., DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937); Near v. Minnesota ex reL.
Olsen, 283 U.S. 697, 713-15 (1931); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, -q69 (1931).
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present danger" test. Herndon v. Lowry,87 3 a 1937 decision reversing the conviction of a Communist Party organizer who had been
attempting to recruit Southern blacks, marked the reappearance of
"clear and present danger. 8' 7 4 Justice Roberts's opinion for a bare
75
majority, after unconvincingly attempting to distinguish Gitlow,
applied a rigorous definition of the "clear and present danger" test
to reject, for the first time in the history of Supreme Court adjudication, the "bad tendency" theory that had provided the rationale
for most restrictive free speech decisions both before and after
World War I. The opinion observed that the state statute defining
insurrection, "as construed and applied" during the trial, did not
"furnish a sufficiently ascertainable standard of guilt" to enable
the judge and jury to "appraise the circumstances and character of
the defendant's utterances or activities as begetting a clear and
present danger of forcible obstruction of a particular state function."87 6 As a result, a speaker, "however peaceful his own intent,"
may be punished because a jury concludes that speech attacking
social conditions or advocating a change in government "might, in
the distant future" lead to the use of force.8 77 The Court rejected
this "vague and indeterminate" standard of "dangerous tendency"
as an unconstitutional "dragnet" that violates freedom of
speech. 7 Without explicitly acknowledging its doctrinal innovation, the Supreme Court majority in Herndon accepted as a constitutional rule the libertarian interpretation of "clear and present
danger" initially set forth by Chafee in Freedom of Speech in War
Time and promoted only by Holmes and Brandeis from Abrams
87 9
through Whitney.
In the fifteen years following Herndon, the Supreme Court
majority often invoked the "clear and present danger" phrase to
sustain free speech claims, often in very different contexts from its
original use in cases involving subversive advocacy. The Court used
this phrase to protect speakers punished for breaching the
8802
peace,"' contempt
of court, 8 " peaceful picketing,8 2 solicitation of
-3

301 U.S. 242 (1937).

974

Id. at 255.
Id. at 256-58.

:76

8 6 Id. at 261.
77

Id. at 262.

88Id. at 263-64.
979 Ironically, Chafee himself was so concerned about the potential for racial warfare in
the South that he thought the Supreme Court should have denied this free speech claim.
See Prude, supra note 483, at 645.
880 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 309-11 (1940).
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union members, 883 and failure to salute the American flag.""4 Ignoring the majority's distinction in Gitlow," 5 the Court applied the
"clear and present danger" test to statutes punishing advocacy as
well as to statutes prohibiting acts. Most strikingly, the Court
twice used this language to reverse convictions of opponents of
World War II whose appeals could easily have been denied according to the standards employed by Justice Holmes in Schenck,
88
Frohwerk, and Debs.
Although Supreme Court opinions after Herndon frequently
relied on the "clear and present danger" test to protect free
speech, the test did not become the prevailing standard of libertarian interpretation that Chafee had intended. The test was never
consistently endorsed by a clear majority of the Supreme Court.8 7
Many majority decisions throughout this period upheld free speech
claims without even mentioning "clear and present danger."8 88 Indeed, Justice Frankfurter, a close friend and associate of Justice
Holmes, went out of his way to minimize its significance. Frankfurter stressed that Holmes never intended "clear and present danger" "to express a technical legal doctrine or to convey a formula
for adjudicating cases. It was a literary phrase not to be distorted
by being taken from its context." 889 On the other hand, none of the
Supreme Court cases that rejected free speech claims in the 1930s
and 1940s referred to "clear and present danger" except in an occasional dissent. 9 0 The phrase had become a useful, but never a
necessary, route to a libertarian result. Restrictive decisions used
other language.
At the height of the Cold War, the Supreme Court reverted to
the restrictive interpretation of "clear and present danger" that

"I Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 378 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 336,
347-50 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262-63, 273 (1941).
82 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1940).
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530, 536 (1945).
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633, 639 (1943); Taylor
v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583, 589-90 (1943).
"5 See supra notes 709-13 and accompanying text.
"I Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680, 687 (1944); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S.
583, 589-90 (1943).
"4

"7

See M.

SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SuPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

58

(1966); McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1182, 1208 (1959); Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 313, 320
(1952).
8 See M. SHAPIRO, supra note 887, at 59-60; McKay, supra note 887, at 1207-08; Mendelson, supra note 887, at 324-26.
"0 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 353 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
890 Mendelson, supra note 887, at 324.
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marked its original formulation by Holmes in Schenck. In its 1951
decision in Feiner v. New York,""' the Supreme Court employed
this phrase to deny a free speech claim. Dennis v. United States,892
decided later the same year, dramatically highlighted this reversion. Dennis is particularly significant because Learned Hand, who
in the years immediately following World War I viewed his own
decision in Masses as a compelling doctrinal alternative to
Holmes's "clear and present danger" test, wrote the Second Circuit
opinion in Dennis which the Supreme Court affirmed.
Upholding the conviction of eleven leaders of the Communist
Party, Hand, in language quoted verbatim by Chief Justice Vinson
in his plurality opinion for the Supreme Court, rephrased the
"clear and present danger" test. According to Hand, judges must
"ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid
' Unlike Brandeis in Whitney, who maintained
the danger."898
that
the gravity of the evil should be considered only after its imminence had been demonstrated,89 ' Hand "purposely substituted 'improbability' for 'remoteness' ",895 and used gravity, not as an independent test, but as a "mutually interdependent" factor to be
balanced against improbability.896 Justices Frankfurter and Jackson wrote separate concurrences in Dennis upholding the convictions while criticizing the "clear and present danger" test.9 7 Justices Black and Douglas each dissented, claiming that the plurality
misconstrued the meaning of "clear and present danger." 898
The Dennis case marked both the apex and the turning point
of the Supreme Court's reliance on the "clear and present danger"
Be1
340

U.S. 315, 320-21 (1951); cf. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382, 393-98 (1950) (rejecting application of "clear and present danger" test while upholding
requirement that union officers sign "non-Communist" affidavit).
892 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
93 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), quoted in 341 U.S. at 510.
"' See 274 U.S. at 377-78 (Brandeis, J., concurring); cf. supra text accompanying notes

811-12, 835-38. Hand himself conceded in Dennis that "it would be uncandid to say" that
Holmes's dissent in Gitlow "did not make the immediacy of the 'substantive evil' a condition of the unlawfulness of even direct incitement to rebellion." 183 F.2d at 208. Hand
noted, however, that this dissent "also dwelt upon the improbability that the paltry efforts
of the accused could effect their purposes within any period which need[s] to be reckoned

with." Id.
$ 183 F.2d at 212. "Given the same probability," Hand explained, "it would be wholly
irrational to condone future evils which we should prevent if they were immediate." Id. For
Hand, immediacy was an important, but not an exclusive, measure of probability.
:" Id. at 209.
" 341 U.S. at 570 (Jackson, J., concurring), 519, 542, 551 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

" Id. at 585-90 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 579-80 (Black, J., dissenting).
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test. The phrase could no longer bear the pressure of the inconsistent interpretations placed on it by different Justices. And the
opinions by Hand and Vinson made painfully clear to libertarians
that "clear and present danger" was no longer a "one-way ticket" 89 9 to a protective decision. Although subsequent Supreme
Court opinions occasionally cited this test, it never again recaptured the prominence it had achieved in the fifteen years between
Herndon and Dennis. The Warren Court often resolved free
speech issues through doctrines which allowed it to uphold free expression without focusing directly on the dividing line between
protected and unprotected speech.9 00 Indeed, the Warren Court's
decision not to apply the "clear and present danger" test in an
important first amendment case struck one astute commentator as
a "conceptual revolution." 90 1 At the very least, Dennis and its aftermath signalled the failure of the attempt by Chafee, Holmes,
and Brandeis to make "clear and present danger" the constitutional standard for libertarian values.
Yet this failure did not terminate the influence of the early
civil libertarians on the evolution of modern Supreme Court doctrine. Prosecutions under the Smith Act after Dennis brought a
renewed focus on the content of speech, the factor stressed by
Hand in Masses but largely submerged in Supreme Court analysis
during the intervening years. And the Warren Court's "clearest
and most protective standard under the first amendment, 9 0 2 its
1969 decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio,90 3 seemed to join the most
protective elements of the incitement and the "clear and present
danger" standards as independent tests that must both be met
before speech can be punished. 4 The incitement standard, while
protecting advocacy short of incitement, did not preclude punishing incitements to future actions. The "clear and present danger"
standard, as long as it retained its immediacy requirement, protected remote incitements but allowed the punishment even of ab89 Mendelson, supra note 887, at 324.
00 See Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FouND. RESEARCH J. 645, 721-22.
See generally Gunther, Reflections on Robel: It's Not What the Court Did But the Way
That It Did It, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1140 (1968).

:01 Kalven, supra note 521, at 214.
Gunther, supra note 14, at 754.
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
01 Gunther, supra note 14, at 754-55, was the first to stress this protective combination. See also Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REv.
422, 445-46 (1980); Comment, Brandenberg v. Ohio: A Speech Test for All Seasons?, 43 U.
CHI. L. REV. 151, 159-60 (1975).
002

:03
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stract advocacy if it produced a sufficient probability of harm. 0 5 In
Whitney, Brandeis combined these two standards to require either
90
the advocacy or the likelihood of "immediate serious violence.1
Brandenburgwent further by requiring both the advocacy and the
likelihood of "imminent lawless action. 90 7 According to the Court
in Brandenburg,
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use
of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.9 08
Subsequent decisions by the Burger Court have reaffirmed the
Brandenburg test.9 09
X. POSTSCRIPT

In many respects, the Brandenburg standard remains uncertain. No language in the per curiam opinion elaborated the single
sentence in which the Court announced its striking new standard.
Indeed, because this standard was neither accompanied by any serious analysis nor necessary to the resolution of the case, one
thoughtful commentator has speculated that the Supreme Court in
Brandenburg might not have intended the literal meaning of its
own language.9 10 Nor has the Court, even while relying on Bran-

'o'

See Comment, supra note 904, at 159-60; see also Gunther, supra note 14, at 755.
274 U.S. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring); see supra text accompanying notes 820-

21.

o 395 U.S. at 447. I am indebted to Jamie Kalven for helping me refine my thinking
on the relationship between Whitney and Brandenburg.
90

395 U.S. at 447.

09 See,

e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977) (advertisements
for contraceptives, "whatever might be the case if [they] directly incited illicit sexual activity among the young," do not violate Brandenburg standard); Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 448 (1974) (lengthy quotation from Brandenburgto invalidate statute
excluding from ballot any political party refusing to take oath that it does not advocate the
forceful overthrow of government); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam)
(statement during campus antiwar demonstration "at worst... amounted to nothing more
than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time"); Healy v. James, 408 U.S.
169, 188 (1972) (applying Brandenburg to overturn denial by college president of official
recognition of local chapter of SDS); cf. Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080, 1085 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (Court should decide whether campus
meetings of "Gay Lib" organization violate Brandenburg standard by leading directly to
violations of state sodomy statute). See generally Emerson, supra note 904, at 446; Greenawalt, supra note 900, at 726; Gunther, supra note 14, at 754 & n.192; Comment, supra note
904, at 160-63.
"0 Greenawalt, supra note 900, at 650.
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denburg, ever elaborated its meaning. Commentators question
whether it can be applied outside the context of advocacy of illegal
activity.911 And even within this context, the Supreme Court has
not addressed important distinctions between different kinds of
advocacy. For example, there are compelling reasons rooted in first
amendment theory for affording more constitutional protection to
"public ideological solicitation" than to "private nonideological solicitation." Advocating robbery or murder for private gain surely
stands on a different constitutional footing than advocating principled resistance to politically unpopular government policies. Yet
Brandenburg and its progeny have not found it necessary to consider either this basic distinction or a myriad of more subtle but
nevertheless significant ones.912
More generally, substantial doubts can be raised as to whether
any constitutional standard, however protective its language, can
protect free speech in times of crisis. During the two greatest
threats to free speech in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
failed to uphold first amendment values. Restrictive Supreme
Court decisions construing the Espionage Act of 1917 during the
"Red Scare" following World War I and the Smith Act during the
early 1950's, at the height of the virulent anti-Communism personified by Senator Joseph McCarthy, promote understandable skepticism about the ability of the judiciary to withstand periods of
national hysteria. Frohwerk, Debs, Dennis, and even Schenck are
generally and appropriately considered blemishes on the first
amendment tradition. This historical record makes it tempting to
attribute the apparently more protective language of the Brandenburg standard and its subsequent reiterations to a time of greater
popular acceptance of freedom of expresson, perhaps produced by
substantial support for or toleration of the civil rights and antiwar
movements of the 1960's. It is easy to doubt the efficacy of this
standard during possible future outbreaks of widespread hostility
to dissenters.
921 See, e.g., id. at 785. Se& generally Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free
Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. PEv. 107, 110, 150 (1982). One commentator has extended the
applications of the Brandenburgstandard to various institutional settings, Comment, supra
note 904, at 165-91, but even this limited extension has been criticized. See, e.g., Emerson,
supra note 904, at 438; Greenawalt, supra note 900, at 782-83.
912 The phrases in quotations are borrowed from Greenawalt, supra note 900, at 748-62.
Greenawalt's comprehensive article contains numerous useful refinements of the Brandenburg test based on a close analysis of first amendment principles. His analysis indicates how
many important issues remain unresolved. Pages 647-53 and 783-85 provide an overview of
Greenawalt's major themes and conclusions. Van Alstyne provocatively reviews an even
broader range of potential distinctions. See Van Alstyne, supra note 911, at 139-42.
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The Supreme Court's failure to protect free speech during
prior periods of crisis, however, can be attributed to the weaknesses of inherited legal standards as well as to judicial capitulation to national hysteria. Holmes's opinions in the first Espionage
Act cases, and the majority decisions in free speech cases throughout the 1920's, continued to rely on the restrictive "bad tendency"
theory that had characterized Supreme Court decisions in the generation before World War I. The "clear and present danger" test,
although it had been used to reach protective results, originated in
Holmes's antilibertarian Social Darwinism. Its restrictive implications were noticed almost immediately by Hand and Chafee, and
its weaknesses as a general analytic standard were emphasized
before Dennis by Justice Frankfurter9 13 and by eminent scholars
such as Paul Freund, 1 Alexander Meiklejohn, 9 5 and Herbert
Wechsler. 1 6 It is intriguing to consider whether the prior development of a more protective and less manipulable standard-the
Brandenburg test, for example-might have produced different results in 1919 or 1951. And-it is unclear whether the Brandenburg
test, generally considered the most protective standard for free
speech adjudication ever developed by the Supreme Court, 917 will
actually shield freedom of expression against future intolerance.
The Brandenburg test, by requiring that the content of language constitute incitement and that the likelihood of illegal action
be imminent, has enormous potential. Its application would arguably have overturned convictions in all of the cases in which the
Supreme Court, using different standards, upheld convictions for
subversive advocacy. The history of free speech adjudication, however, suggests further refinements that would strengthen and reinforce the Brandenburgtest. Defining incitement as urging specific
criminal action would clarify any lingering ambiguity regarding the
Supreme Court's overly subtle distinction between general advocacy of illegal action and advocacy of abstract doctrine.91 8 And imI's See, e.g., Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. at 353 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
914

P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SuPREME COURT 27 (1949).

915 A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 14, at 28-50.
"6 Wechsler, supra note 14, at 887, reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSrrUTIONAL

LAW, supra note 14, at 628, 634.

,17 See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 900, at 723-24; Gunther, supra note 14, at 754-55;
Kalven, supra note 14, at 236 n.6; Comment, supra note 904, at 159-60; see also Emerson,
supra note 904, at 437.
'is This distinction emerged from Justice Harlan's opinions in Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298, 318-27 (1957), Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 230-55 (1961), and Noto
v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 291-300 (1961). Harlan himself acknowledged that this distinction is "subtle and difficult to grasp." Yates, 354 U.S. at 326; see Wechsler, Jones &
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minence, as Brandeis suggested in Whitney, should be found only
when circumstances preclude rational thought, including further
speech. The seriousness of the crime advocated and threatened, a
factor identified by Holmes, Brandeis, and Hand, should also be
weighed in determining the appropriate penalty919 for speech that
meets the incitement and imminence standards.
A proper allocation of responsibilities between judge and jury,
moreover, would help insure the just administration of the Brandenburg standard. As Hand pointed out in his correspondence
with Holmes and as Brandeis stressed throughout his first amendment opinions,920 trial judges should withhold cases from juries
when the evidence cannot support a conviction under the appropriate standard, and appellate judges should overturn jury convictions that do not meet this standard. 21 On the other hand, when
the evidence can support a conviction, judges should not, as in
Dennis, remove the determination of guilt or innocence from juries.9 22 Free speech is best protected if jury convictions are a neces-

sary, but not a sufficient, condition for punishment. This division
of roles preserves the benefits of trial by jury as a check against
official abuse of power while restraining the excesses of hostile
majorities.
The specter of the Supreme Court's historical failure to safeguard dissenting speech in times of national hysteria haunts even
these libertarian refinements of Brandenburg. Their constraints
still leave substantial room for discretion and subjectivity. The fact
that the Brandenburgstandard has never been tested during a period of widespread intolerance exacerbates uncertainties about its
power, even if its logic is conceded. It may be that "public ideological speech" can be sheltered from the vagaries of interpretation
only by a standard protecting advocacy of illegal action unless a
criminal act, or at least a physical attempt, actually occurs.2 3 Such
Korn, supra note 401, at 626-27 (Model Penal Code requires criminal solicitation be "specific" to distinguish it from "legitimate agitation of an extreme or inflammatory nature"); cf.
Greenawalt, supra note 900, at 758 (supporting distinction between criminal "urging to specific crimes" and protecting "mere advocacy of illegal acts").
:,9 See supra text accompanying notes 836-38.
10 See supra text accompanying notes 463, 846.
:21 See Greenawalt, supra note 900, at 750, 757 n.413.
" See Boudin, "Seditious Doctrines" and the "Clear and Present Danger"Rule (pt.
2), 38 VA. L. REv. 315, 351, 355-56 (1952) (determination of "clear and present danger" in
Dennis should have been made by jury); cf. A. Hiss, IN THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION 286
(1957) ("The jury, a strong safeguard against unpopular officials, is little or no protection in
times of public stress.").
" Theodore Schroeder, the key figure in the Free Speech League in the generation
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a rule, however, is unlikely to be accepted by a Supreme Court
majority. Some variant of Brandenburgwill probably remain the
constitutional standard for the foreseeable future. Only judicial
construction during the next "Red Scare" or "McCarthy period"
will reveal the extent to which this relatively protective test can
induce judges to uphold free speech values in times of crisis.

before World War I and the author of an extensive libertarian analysis of the first amendment, proposed such a test. See Rabban, supra note 4, at 576-78 (discussing Schroeder's
proposed test); cf. id. at 560-61 (more general discussion of Schroeder). Justice Black apparently took a more libertarian position. He maintained that all discussion of public affairs
should be protected even if it does incite to action. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 340
(1957) (Black, J., dissenting). Greenawalt rejects the proposition that liability for speech
"should be permitted to attach only if the proposed crime is actually committed," although
he concedes the possibility that "encouragements of open crimes that do not threaten persons or property. . . should receive absolute protection." Greenawalt, supra note 900, at
759-62.

